

**POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE INTERACTIONS TOWARDS EFFECTIVE  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH AND  
EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURES IN MOROGORO DISTRICT COUNCIL,  
TANZANIA**

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**A THESIS SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE  
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## **EXTENDED ABSTRACT**

Political-administrative interactions in local governments have gained wide attention among most development practitioners and scholars of public administration. Political-administrative relations focus on the interaction and reciprocal relations between the elected and appointed officials in performing local governments' functions. Through decentralization by devolution "D by D", local governments have been mandated to provide social services within their jurisdictions such as education, health, and clean and safe water, among others. Implementation of construction of health and infrastructures projects is one of the strategy used by local governments to ensure effective provision of health and education services. Despite the efforts made by the government to construct health and education infrastructures quality and adequacy of physical infrastructures of health and education remain a challenge. The overall objective of this study was to assess the contribution of political-administrative interactions to implementation of construction of health and education infrastructure projects (classrooms, teachers' houses, latrines, laboratories, dispensaries and health centres) in Morogoro District Council, Morogoro Region in Tanzania. The study specifically: (i) assessed the levels of interaction between elected and appointed officials (ii) examined attitudes between elected and appointed officials in the projects; (iii) analysed adherence to the principles of governance between elected and appointed officials in projects implementation, and (iv) examined the contribution of the interaction between elected and appointed officials in construction of health and education projects in Morogoro District. The study adopted a case study research design, and involved a total of 64 respondents that included elected and appointed officials who were randomly selected. Qualitative data were collected through Focus Group Discussions (FGD), Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and observation

techniques while quantitative data were collected using a questionnaire survey. Qualitative data were analysed through content analysis and categorised based on the research objectives. Quantitative data were analysed using IBM Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) Software by computing descriptive statistics employing frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations. An interaction index was also computed. The results from the interaction index revealed that there was moderate interaction (65.6%) between the elected and appointed officials in implementation of public development projects in Morogoro District Council. About one-fifth (20.3%) of the respondents had low interactions while 14.1% had high interaction. On attitude, the results indicated that 56.2% of respondents had negative attitude while 12.6% had indifferent attitude and 31.2% had positive attitude towards their relationship in implementation of the projects. It was, further, found that there was poor transparency at 68.8% and accountability (65.2%) between the elected and appointed officials in implementation of projects, particularly on financial matters. The findings also showed that the elected officials were not adhering to the rule of law compared to the appointed officials; instead they were influenced by their political interests and partisan politics and ignorance on the laws, policies and regulations. The findings indicated that good relationship between elected and appointed officials facilitated mobilization of project resources, increased public participation, improved trust, minimised conflict of interest and ensured transparency and accountability in the projects. However, the study revealed various challenges that affected their relationship in the projects. The challenges included difference in the levels of education, distrust and conflicting interests, partisan and political interference, and poor transparency and accountability. With regard to the results of objectives one and two, it is concluded that inadequate monitoring of relationships between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects by

local government leads to moderate interaction and increases misunderstandings. From the results that meet objective three, it is concluded that lack of transparency, accountability and adherence to the rule of law among elected and appointed officials jeopardizes compliance with governance principles in implementation of the projects. In regard to the results on contribution to projects, it is concluded that positive relationships between elected and appointed officials contributes much to effective implementation of the said projects in the study area. Based on the conclusion drawn on the interaction between elected and appointed officials, it is recommended that local government should regularly conduct trainings on policies, regulations, and demarcation and monitoring of officials' interaction in implementation of development projects. In view of the conclusion drawn from objective three, it is recommended that Morogoro District Council should monitor adherence to governance practices among both elected and appointed officials and provide trainings on policies, rule of law, and conducts that govern their relations. It is also recommended that local governments should encourage collaborations and partnerships between elected and appointed officials as advocated by complementary model of political-administrative relations. Moreover, it is recommended that local governments, through their own sources, should establish monthly allowances to village/hamlet chairpersons and other elected officials. This will improve morale and accountability of the elected officials to effectively implement development projects.

**DECLARATION**

I, KELVIN MUTATINA NJUNWA, do hereby declare to the Senate of Sokoine University of Agriculture that the thesis is my original work, done within the period of registration, and that it has neither been submitted nor being concurrently submitted for a higher degree award in any other institution.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCM	<i>Chama Cha Mapinduzi</i>
CHADEMA	<i>Chama Cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo</i>
CUF	Civic United Front
DED	District Executive Director
DEO	District Education Officer
DHO	District Health Officer
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
KMC	Kinondoni Municipal Council
LGAs	Local Government Authorities
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme
MDC	Morogoro District Council
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NPM	New Public Management
REPOA	Research on Poverty Alleviation
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SEDEP	Secondary Education Development Plan
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SUA	Sokoine University of Agriculture
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNICEF	United Nations Children Education Fund
URT	United Republic of Tanzania

USA	United States of America
VC	Village Council
VEO	Village Executive Officer
WDC	Ward Development Committee
WEOs	Ward Executive Officers
WHOs	Ward Health Officers

## CHAPTER ONE

### 1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives an introduction to the study on which this thesis is based. It is divided into nine sections. Section 1.1 presents background to the study problem; section 1.2 presents statement of the problem for this study; section 1.3 provides the justification of the study; section 1.4 presents general and specific objectives of the study while section 1.5 presents research questions of this study. Section 1.6 elaborates on theoretical review; section 1.7 provides clear explanation of the conceptual framework of the study; section 1.8 presents methodology of the study while the last section 1.9 describes the organization of the whole thesis.

### 1.1 Background Information

Political-administrative relations in local governments have become increasingly important in improving local governments' performance and in strengthening democratic practices at local levels (Svara, 2006 Purwanto *et al.*, 2017; Esteve and Dasandi, 2017). The relationship between elected and appointed officials can easily reach other people and be connected through social ties in local governments. A study conducted by Mafuru *et al.* (2015) realized close interaction between elected and appointed officials in performing their duties at Kinondoni Municipal Council, Tanzania which resulted to good performance in social service delivery to the public.

The concept of political-administrative dichotomy was initially recognised by Woodrow Wilson in 1878 with his classic article "*The Study of Administration*" and claimed that the field of administration is the field of business and should be free from political interference. Carbon (2010) supported the idea of Woodrow by clearly explaining that

politicians are expected to define policies, assign goals and responsibilities and evaluate results while administrators are given autonomy to manage their own affairs and be responsible for implementation of policies.

Political-administrative relations originate from two concepts, “Politics and administration”, under which public administration refers to an executive branch of government that deals with responsibilities of implementing laws, regulations and decisions of the government and management related to provision of public services (UNDP, 2015; Sebola, 2018). Politics refers to the activities of the government in the administration of the state through numerous decisions taken to allocate public resources as well as to resolve conflicts (Makinde, 2015). Politics in other ways deals with policy formulation and oversight responsibilities and are done by elected officials. Elected officials provide political guidelines through formulating and clarifying public preferences and communicating to the appointed officials for implementation. Furthermore, elected officials oversee appointed staff to ensure that they perform their functions for public interests.

Local governments in Tanzania provide a useful setting for examining the relationship between the elected and the appointed officials (Purwanto *et al.*, 2017; Guo, 2019). Local government is governed and supervised by elected officials at district, ward and village levels and by appointed officials on the other side that are recruited by either the central government or by local governments by themselves. The New Public Management (NPM) insists on good relationships between administrators and elected officials. Their relationship should not be characterized by the master-servant relationship. In New Public Management, elected and appointed officials are an integral part of public administration in both central and local governments (Kalseth and Rattso, 1998;

Siggen *et al.*, 2009; Weible, 2011). According to Rahman (2017), politicians and administrators are two groups of actors who are always inseparable and indispensable from each other. Therefore, the performance of local governments is highly based on mutual and positive relationships between elected and appointed officials. Such relationships enhance government's legitimacy while the opposite undermines them (Montoy and Watson, 1995; Rahman, 2017).

In Norway, relationships between elected and appointed officials in local governments are largely different from the way it is in developing countries; there is more of co-operation with very low level of conflicts (Jacobsen, 1999; Vesser, 2010). Elected and appointed officials in local governments work together as a team in improving social services delivery. In Norway, the level of trust between elected and appointed officials is high compared to most developing countries, and this increases cooperation between Norway and developing countries. Jacobsen (1999), in his study on trust in political-administrative relations, revealed that distrust between elected and appointed officials negatively affects the level of transparency, especially sharing important information between appointed and elected officials. In the case of China, Guo (2019) argues that it is very difficult to apply separation between elected and appointed officials as the country is based on one-party political leadership of multiparty cooperation. It is not possible to separate between administration and politics in China.

In South Africa, the relationship between elected officials and appointed officials is characterized by regular conflicts and experiences serious challenges (Cameron, 2010; Dasand and Esteve, 2013; Sebola, 2018). The major challenges of the relations between elected and appointed official include lack of clear demarcation between the two in performing their duties. South Africa (SA) government established an ethics and code of



conduct for councillors, which prohibits councillors from interfering in the administration. Municipal Financial Management Act of 2003 has barred councillors from taking in tenders decisions (Cameron, 2010). According to Mafusina (2003), the public service in South Africa is highly politicised and is historical. Most of senior administrative staff in local governments in South Africa are submissive party members who are working for the interests of their political parties.

A study conducted in Ghana, West Africa, by Adarkwa *et al.* (2015) on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats' heads in public services management revealed that, there were numerous disagreements between the politicians (Ministers) and bureaucrat personnel (Chief Directors). The study revealed interference of elected officials in to the sphere of appointed officials and politicise public service. Their study concluded that poor relationship between elected and appointed officials largely affects appointed officials which resulted into frequent administrative staff turn-overs in civil services in Ghanaian civil services.

In Tanzania, relationship between elected and appointed officials is historical. The current local government system adopted the British Local Government System in which elected officials focused on supervising appointed officials in performing their duties. Local governments (rural and urban authorities) in Tanzania consist of elected and appointed officials with different responsibilities. The urban authorities include City and Municipal Councils while rural authorities include districts and town councils, and their structure is a little different as stipulated by Local Government (Urban Authority) Act, 1982 and Local Government (District Authorities) Act, 1982. For the purpose of this thesis, the focus was on district councils. The appointed officials are supposed to be insulated from politics for them to implement government functions using their expertise, value

judgement and professionalism rather than subjective opinions emanating from political pressure (Weible, 2011; Lane, 2013).

Therefore, appointed officials are supposed to possess special knowledge and skills, based on their expertise to implement sound and feasible policies. In other words, administrators have to work within the limits of the legal and policy frameworks and ensure policies are executed and implemented as designed by politicians (Demir and Nyhan, 2008; Ndadula, 2013). In the context of this study, the appointed officials in local governments are those officials who are recruited and hired by the government to work in the local governments at the district, ward, and village levels. They include the District Executive Director (DED), Heads of Department (HoDs), Ward Executive Officers (WEOs), Ward Health Officers (WHOs), Ward Education Officers (WEOs,) and Community Development Officers (CDOs) at ward levels. Others are Village Executive Officers (VEOs), Village Health Officers (VHOs), Village Education Officers (VEOs), and Village Development Officers (VDOs) at the village level.

Elected officials in the local governments are democratically elected by the people through local government elections (Warioba, 2008; Njunwa, 2017; Ogbelte *et al.*, 2018). Elected officials include Members of Parliament (MPs) who are residents in given councils, Chairpersons of Councils, Ward Counsellors, Village Chairpersons, Hamlet Chairpersons, WDCs members, and village council members. Ward Development Committee (WDC) consists of both elected and appointed officials whereby ward councillors become Chairpersons and WEOs become Secretaries. The village assembly is one of the major decision-making organs at village level and is responsible for electing village council members in the village government.

Elected officials are more likely to advocate the interests of the community in social as well as economic development of an area (Zeemering, 2008; Siraju *et al.*, 2015; Landa, 2017). In Tanzania, local governments hold their elections after every five years as stipulated in the amendment of the Local Government Authority (Elections) Act, Cap 2010 (URT, 2010). The candidates for these elections must be nominated by their political parties. In most cases, the elected officials ought to be responsive to their electorates and constituents and always make decisions for their own political interests or ambitions.

Political-administrative relations are classified into three major theoretical debates which are classical model, political model and complementary model. The Classical/Orthodox model was developed by Woodrow Wilson who insisted that politics and administration are two separate fields and must be separated from each other (Siggen *et al.*, 2009; Azunu 2013). The model's stand relies on the fact that the field of administration just as the field of business must be removed from the hurry and strife of politics (Wilson, 1887). Jacobsen (2006) termed the orthodox model as a contingency perspective which views relationships between politicians and administrators as a *division of labour* (Weber and Taylors principles). He regarded politicians as "rulers" and administrators as "implementers of the policy processes". Mafuru *et al.* (2016) termed this model as a classical model characterized by separate but complementing roles of elected and appointed officials. Thus, under the classical theory, separation between politicians the two is critical in ensuring effective operation of their day to day functions and minimizing interpersonal conflicts.

The political model tries to express doubt over total separation of administrators from politics or policy formulation process (Ugyel, 2017; Bakhsh, 2018). By the model it is believed that it is not possible for administrative officials to have absolutely no hand in

the process of policy formulation. This model relies on the fact that administrators are professionals possessing technical skills that can be useful in policy formulation. Montjoy and Watson (1995) criticize the orthodox dichotomy model by arguing that it is not possible to prohibit appointed officials from venturing into the policy making process because administrators are actively involved in policy formulation as well as project implementation. Thus, the model shows that, appointed officials, based on their skills and knowledge's, may contribute a lot in policy making process. It should be noted that elected officials are periodically appointed and sometimes lack necessary skills and experiences in the policy making process.

The complementary model is sometimes called an “overlapping role model’ characterised by the overlapping or exchangeability of the roles between politicians and administrators and focuses on the interconnectedness between politics and administrations (Svara, 2006; Mafuru *et al.*, 2015). The model holds that administrators can have great impact on policy making and that elected officials can have great impact on administration and separating the two will result in poor performance. Shafrizt *et al.* (2004) suggest that politicians and administrators need to work in harmony. Therefore, this requires sacrificing the independence of both politicians and administrators. Svara (1999) supports the partnership approach by emphasizing on complementarities of politics and administration by stressing on interdependency, reciprocal influence, and extensive interaction between elected and appointed officials. Mafuru *et al.* (2016) argue that, under this model, which is termed as village model, administrators are engaged in discussions about political issues and strategies and at the same time politicians provide their opinions on the implementation of the political decision.

The Government of Tanzania recognises the central role of health and education sectors in achieving the overall development goal of improving the quality of life for her citizens. Therefore, through local governments, central government establishes various public development projects for the purpose of improving social service delivery (Kambunga, 2013). Public development projects can be defined as those development projects that aimed at improving the standards of living of the people in a given locality and which involve communities in their implementation (Crook, 2003; Agba *et al.*, 2013; Kisimbe and Kasubi, 2014). Therefore, public development projects such as construction of a dispensary or a health centre building, primary or secondary education building, water points and agricultural based projects are implemented in response to the needs of the communities. Through decentralization policy, particularly decentralization by devolution (D by D), most of development projects which were formerly implemented by the central government were transferred to the local governments (Kipiriri *et al.*, 2003; Frumence *et al.*, 2014; Sigalla, 2015). Banerjee *et al.* (2009) argue that decentralization of authority over the provision, allocation and delivery of public goods to local governments has been a wide spread practice in many developing countries.

The United Republic of Tanzania established the Primary Health Service Development Program (2007 – 2017) as major health sector strategy to improve the access and expand health services in underserve areas with aim of establishing one dispensary per village and one health centre per ward (URT, 2017). Through PHSDP (2007 – 2017), the district councils have been given authority to build dispensary in each village and one health centre in every ward. PHSDP aimed not only at constructing new infrastructures, but also at improving the existing ones.

In 2004 the Government of Tanzania (GoT) launched its Secondary Education Development Plan (PEDEP) with major objective of increasing access to secondary education to majority. The PEDEP emphasised on the construction on new secondary schools and rehabilitation of the existing ones. The construction of those health and education infrastructures at village and ward level is done by the collaboration between district officials, elected officials and communities. The government provide support for final finishing of the building and equipping the newly constructed facilities with human resources, equipment's such as furniture's and other facilities required (Kigume and Maluka, 2018). Therefore, the district councils have been granted power to mobilize local resources and initiate the construction of health and education facilities up to certain levels within their localities.

The roles and responsibilities of Local Government Authorities are clarified in the Local Government (District Authorities and Urban Authorities) Acts of 1982 (as amended). The law assigns local decentralized local health services in Tanzania; therefore, local governments become responsible to “promote the social welfare and economic wellbeing of all persons within their areas of jurisdiction”, and this requires LGAs to take all measures “for the furtherance of and enhancement of health, education, social, cultural and recreational life of the people” (Section 111). Decentralization of social services focuses on democratization and enhancement of participation of communities in issues that directly affect their lives (Yilmaz and Crook, 2003; Ngware, 2005; Varsha, 2010).

Public participation in development activities, either directly or through representatives, is regarded as the means of enhancing relevant, quality, and sustainable development. Ahwoi (2001) and the World Bank (2010) regard public participation as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over different initiatives, decisions and

resources which affect them. Therefore, the involvement of the communities and their elected representatives in public development projects is imperative for the success of these projects.

As stipulated by Local Government Act Numbers 7 and 8 of 1982, local governments have both administrative and developmental roles. As a developmental role, Local Government Authorities (LGAs) increasingly deliver fundamental public services (Njunwa, 2006; Warioba, 2008; Mafuru and Hulst, 2015). Public service delivery includes infrastructures development, health and education provision, access to water and sanitation as well as creating enabling environment for agricultural development. In this respect, the views of Natalini (2010) and Kesale (2017) are pertinent that local governments have been given a “developmental role” as institutions that are close to the communities and are likely to respond to the local needs and priorities. Local governments in Tanzania are based on political devolution and decentralization of functional responsibilities, power and resources from central government to local governments and empower communities to control their development process.

Through Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP I) in 1998, the Central Government devolved authorities and responsibilities of social service delivery to the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) with a view of improving social services delivery to the public (LGRP II, 2011). Local government reform programme (LGRP), apart from other things, aimed at improving quality, access and equitable delivery of health and education services (Ngware, 2005; Sarwatt *et al.*, 2014). Local governments, through their elected officials, have the responsibility of providing social services in their areas of jurisdiction (Goel, 2008; Muro and Namusonge, 2015). Agriculture, water, health, and education projects are now either directly managed or overseen by Local Governments.

The government realized the shortage of health and education infrastructures in rural areas as large numbers of villages and wards do not have adequate buildings to establish dispensaries or health centres (Kida and Phares, 2014). There are not adequate classrooms and laboratories for pupils as well as houses for teachers in their localities. After realizing this problem of inadequate infrastructures, the government initiated construction projects in collaboration with elected and appointed officials in local governments. The Government of Tanzania invests much in health and educational sectors; it spends considerable amounts of money on the health sector close to 10% of its total budgetary resources (Abel-smith and Rawal, 2012; Malik *et al.*, 2015). It was reported that Local Government Authorities (LGAs) receive around TZS. 10 700 per person in recurrent health grants each year. At local level, the village and ward initiates and implements construction of dispensaries and health centres in their localities. The communities participate through self-help, free labour and financial contribution to the health projects implementation. The National Health Policy (2003) emphasizes on community participation from planning to implementation stage of health related activities in local governments.

Apart from health projects at local levels, local governments through statutory meetings elected and appointed officials initiate and implement various construction projects for education infrastructures in their localities. Education projects include construction of classrooms, laboratories, latrines and teachers' houses. Through three phases of Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) 2002 – 2006, 2007 – 2011 and 2012 – 2016 (Pesha, 2016; URT, 2001), the Government of Tanzania aimed at improving the provision of quality primary education especially in rural areas. It also aimed at increasing the number of children who are enrolled and those who complete primary school education. Morogoro District Council as one of the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) realized a



shortage of classrooms, latrines and teachers' houses (MDC, 2013). Therefore, the council, through elected officials (Councillors and Village and Hamlet Chairpersons), mobilized local communities to participate in construction of classrooms, latrines and teachers' houses in order to increase access to primary education.

## **1.2 Problem Statement**

Most schools and health centres in rural Tanzania, lack essential infrastructures to enable them function safely, efficiently and effectively (Pesha, 2012; URT, 2015). The health care sector in rural areas face critical underfunding that affect the quality and provision of health care services (REPOA, 2006; Tibandebage *et al.*, 2007; Mackintosh *et al.*, 2013). The physical conditions of most classrooms, latrines, teachers' and doctors' houses and dispensaries are very poor with floors full of holes, without doors, and with damaged roofs and unfinished buildings (Mpamila, 2007; Lwaitama, 2008). Morogoro District characterized with inadequate and shortage of dispensaries, health centre and primary and education facilities. MDC report (2016) state that the district has no district hospital, it has only eight health centre out of 25 wards and has only 32 dispensaries. The council is supposed to have 381 classrooms for secondary schools, but by 2018 it had only 260 classrooms during the time of the research on which the thesis is based, which amounted to the shortage of 121 classrooms (36.6%) (MDC, 2018). A current Morogoro District report (2020) indicates a shortage of 1665 latrines (63%) for primary and secondary schools which amount to 50%, 1302 of teachers' houses which amount to 79%.

In realizing this problem, the Government of Tanzania (GoT), through local governments, established various public development projects in Morogoro Rural District in order to improve social service delivery particularly in health and education sectors (MDC, 2018). According to Banger and Mamdani (2004), Tanzania faces serious challenges with regard

to improvement of health and well-being of its people, especially the rural communities. Health and education projects, especially construction of infrastructures are established at the wards and village levels with the involvement of elected officials, appointed officials, local communities and other development stakeholders.

Despite government efforts to ensure that the majority of rural communities in Morogoro District have access to better health and education infrastructures through construction of health and educational projects the situation is still challenging and characterized by poor implementation (Banger and Mamdan, 2004; Poncian and Mpambije, 2015; Landa, 2017). Despite communities' effort to construct educational infrastructures the district failed to fulfil the guidelines set by the Ministry of Education, Science, Technology and Vocational Training which stipulate the optimum ratio of 20 boys and 25 girls for one toilet hole and 45 pupils for one classroom (URT, 2014). Most primary health care infrastructures such as buildings are still characterized by poor buildings and shortage of laboratories. In regard to construction of dispensaries and health centres infrastructures, the district is characterised by inadequate numbers as required by government (MDC, 2018).

Effective implementation of construction of classrooms, teachers' houses, dispensaries and health centres has been a challenge in Morogoro District. Different factors account for the failure including financial constraints, poor participation, financial mismanagement and corruption, lack of political will, and poor accountability (Bratton, 2011; Makorere, 2012; Frumence *et al.*, 2014). In some cases, however, despite having adequate funds, some projects could still not be implemented as per the allocated funds (Poncian and Mpambije, 2015). REPOA (2007) attributes poor performance of local

governments in health and education infrastructure projects to lack of political accountability among local officials.

Few studies on political-administrative relations have been conducted in Tanzania, especially in local governments, but most of them have not focused on its contribution to effective implementation of construction of health and education infrastructures projects. There is insufficient information on how political-administrative relations contribute to implementation of construction of health and education infrastructures projects in the study area. Most literature (Lyatonga, 2012; Mafuru and Hulst, 2015; Dasand and Esteve, 2017; Alsarraf, 2017) analysed the influence of political-administrative relations on employees' performance in local governments. However, although meticulous literature review was done during the time of designing the research on which this thesis is based, no literature was found on linkages between political-administrative relations and public development projects implementation in Tanzania. Therefore, the research was done to generate empirical information to fill in this information gap in order for the central government local governments, policy makers and other stakeholders to have good understanding of the importance of enhancing political-administrative relations and collaboration for effective implementation of development projects.

### **1.3 Justification of the Study**

Little is known in the scholarly literature about the contribution of political-administrative relations in the implementation of construction of health and education infrastructure projects in the local governments in Tanzania. Therefore, the findings from this study will contribute new knowledge on political-administrative relations and its contribution to successful implementation of construction of health and education infrastructure projects.

This information is crucial in informing actors involved in promoting better services in the health and education sectors in local governments.

The results from this study are an input for attainment of Tanzania Development Vision 2025, especially in attaining a well-educated and learning society through high level of quality education at all levels in order to respond to development challenges and effectively compete regionally and internationally. The above objective precipitated the need for this study to analyse the importance of political-administrative relations in improving access to quality physical infrastructures in health and education services. The results from this study will assist to reveal the nature of relations between elected and appointed officials in Morogoro District Council (MDC) and its implication for increased construction of health and education infrastructures, something which could not have been documented if the study had not been done.

The study is also aligned with Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Numbers 3 and 4. SDG Number 3 focuses on attaining good health and is aimed at preventing child deaths and maternal mortality. SDG Number 4 focuses on improving wellbeing and quality education to all. It is aimed at reducing children around the world out of school, especially from the poorest households.

The study is aligned with Tanzania Primary Health Service Development Program (2007 – 2017) and Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP), 2004 in which aimed at increasing access to health and education infrastructures through constructing new facilities such as classroom, laboratories, latrines, dispensaries and health centres.

## **1.4 Objectives**

### **1.4.1 Overall objective**

The overall objective of the study was to assess the contribution of political-administrative relations in construction of health and health infrastructures in Morogoro District Council.

### **1.4.2 Specific objectives**

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- i. Examine interaction level between elected and appointed officials in implementation of health and education infrastructure projects,
- ii. Examine attitudes of elected and appointed officials towards each other in implementation of health and education infrastructure projects,
- iii. Assess elected and appointed officials' adherence to governance practices in construction of health and education infrastructure projects, and
- iv. Investigate the contribution of political-administrative relations in construction of health and education infrastructure projects.

## **1.5 Research Questions**

The research was guided by the following research questions:

- i. To what extent do elected and appointed officials interact in construction of health and education infrastructures?
- ii. How do elected and appointed officials view each other in their interaction about implementation of infrastructure projects?
- iii. Do the elected and appointed officials comply with governance principles in their interaction?

- iv. What is the contribution of political-administrative relations in implementing infrastructure projects in Morogoro District Council?

### **1.6 Theoretical Framework**

The study was guided by the complementary model of political-administrative relations (Svara, 2006; Henry, 2013; Mafuru *et al.*, 2015). The model implies that politicians and administrators exist in separate and distinctive parts. However, it recognises the roles each can play in the entire organization. The complementary model of political-administrative relations advocates self-conscious administrative involvement in sensitive political issues while observing political neutrality (Overeem, 2005; Baletito and Ibrahim, 2012). Based on this model, it is unfeasible and undesirable to separate politics and administration as opposed to Wilson's (1887) classical model which advocates total separation of politics from administration. The complementary model suggests that, in performing their duties, the elected and the appointed officials should observe political neutrality and consider public interests over personal interests (Overeem, 2005; Svara, 1999). The approach advocates mutual trust, respect, transparency, accountability and loyalty between elected and appointed officials (Hood and Lodge, 2006).

The key assumption of the model is on the interconnectedness between politics and administration. The approach holds that administrators can have a great impact on policy making whereas the elected officials can have a great impact on administration, and thus separating the two will result in poor performance (Khair and Shahan, 2012; Ndudula, 2013). Therefore, the theory stresses on interdependency, reciprocal influence, and extensive interaction between the appointed and the elected officials.

For this thesis, the model was used to guide assessment of how elected and appointed officials interact in ensuring effective implementation of public development projects in the local governments. As advocated by current scholars, the relationship between elected and appointed officials must be guided by partnerships, cooperation and harmony as a team (Lyatonga *et al.*, 2012; Azunu, 2013; Mafuru and Hulst, 2015) in implementation of development projects as advocated by the complementary model. The roles and responsibilities of the elected and the appointed officials in development projects are interdependent and require the support of each other in order to accomplish their functions. These officials need to have unified public interests at heart to have successful implementation of public development projects.

### **1.7 Conceptual Framework**


The conceptual framework of this thesis is presented in Fig. 1.1, developed by the researcher. The conceptual framework involves independent and dependent variables. Dependent variables are variables that are expected to change as a result of changes of manipulation of independent variables (Creswell, 2014; Bryman, 2008). The framework established linkage between political-administrative relations in terms of their interdependency, reciprocal influence, extensive interactions and team work as independent variables and effective implementation of the construction of health and education infrastructures as the dependent variable. A conceptual framework has been argued to be a researcher's "road map" in pursuing their investigations (McGaghie *et al.*, 2001; Bryman, 2008).

The conceptual framework helps the researcher to understand how particular variables in the study connect with one another. That means that interaction between elected and appointed officials has great impact on the success or failure in implementation of the

projects (dependent variable). Thus, in this study, the independent variables are broadly political-administrative relations. However, before these independent variables create impact on the dependent variable, they are likely to be influenced by level of interdependency, reciprocal influence, interactions within the governance elements of participation, accountability, trust, transparency and rule of law.

The performance of construction of health and education infrastructure in Morogoro District Council is the dependent variable in this case. If political-administrative relations contribute positively to the construction projects implementation then the consequence is successful implementation of the projects (project goals realized) by achieving project completion within the prescribed time and at required level of completion. However, if political-administrative relations contribute negatively to the construction of health and education projects, then the result is project failure (project goals not realized). That is, the construction projects are likely to be doomed with the characteristics of either non-completion of projects or poor quality of projects.






**Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework**

## 1.8 General Methodology

### 1.8.1 The study area

The study was conducted in Morogoro District Council, Morogoro Region. Morogoro District Council is located in the North-East of Morogoro Region and lies between latitudes 6° and 8° South of the Equator and between longitudes 36° and 38° East of the Greenwich Meridian. To the East, the district council borders with Bagamoyo and Kisarawe Districts (Coast Region) while it borders with Kilombero District to the South, and with Mvomero District to the North and West. In the 2012 Population and Housing Census, Morogoro Rural District had a population of 286 248 people (140 824 male and 145 424 female) with an average household size of 4.2 (URT, 2013).

The study area was selected because it has been reported by the government as one of the leading local governments which perform poorly in implementation of public development projects (URT, 2015). The history of district which was documented by Ngware (2005) and Warioba (2008) shows that from time to time, the district experienced high level of misunderstanding between elected and appointed officials. Current the report from PO-RALG of 2020 has noted that the district lags behind in its space of implementation of health and education projects. Two education projects and two health infrastructure projects were selected as study cases. The study specifically focused on construction of Mandela Secondary School Project (Mkambarani Ward), Kiziwa Village Dispensary Project (Kiroka Ward), Mkuyuni Health Centre Project (Mkuyuni Ward), and Kinole Secondary School Project (Kinole Ward). The sites of the projects are indicated in Fig. 1.2.



**Figure 1.2: Map of the study area: Morogoro District Council**

### **1.8.2 Research design**

The study adopted a case study research design, which allows empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real life context (Yin, 1994; Bryman, 2008; Starman, 2013). The study had four cases of health and education infrastructure projects implemented in Morogoro District Council. This research design was appropriate in this study because it enabled the researcher to obtain in-depth information on the relationship between the elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects. The case study was also appropriate because it provides opportunity of having few participants with knowledge based on the objective of the study. A case study design allows for both quantitative and qualitative analyses of data and also allows seeking evidence from both numerical and categorised responses of individual subjects (Nachmias and Nachmias, 2004; Starman, 2013).

### **1.8.3 Sampling procedure and sample size**

The wards were purposively selected based on the presence of construction of health and education infrastructure projects implemented in their areas. The four selected wards were Mkambarani, Mkuyuni, Kiroka, and Kinole. Two villages were selected purposively from each ward based on the types of public development projects (health and education projects) making a total of eight villages. The purposefully selected villages were Kibwaya, Kizinga, Pangawe, Mkuyuni A, Bamba, Kirundwa, Tandai and Kiziwa (Morogoro District Council, 2003).

The study collected data from elected and appointed officials in the study area, whereby a formula by Yamane (1973) was adopted to obtain the desired sample size, assuming 95% confidence level and 0.05 as sampling error. The formula used is follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)} \dots\dots\dots$$

(1)

Where:  $n$  = sample size,

$N$  = population size and

$e$  = level of precision (sampling error).

The number of elected and appointed officials in the study area were 76. Therefore, using the above formula, a total of 64 elected and appointed officials were sampled. The sample size is relevant because it was large enough to provide the required information. Statistically, 30 cases can provide empirical evidence in social science research (Kothari, 2005).

Twenty two (22) key informant interviews were conducted using an interview guide. Key informants were selected purposively basing on their being regarded as having in-depth knowledge and experience in the implementation of public development projects in the local governments. They included one Member of Parliament, Chairperson of the Council, Chairpersons of Health and Education Committee, 2 Chairpersons of Projects Committees, 4 Ward Councillors, District Executive Director, 2 Heads of Department, 2 Village Chairpersons, 2 Ward Executive Officers, 2 Head Teachers and 2 Ward Medical Officers.

#### **1.8.4 Data collection**

Quantitative data were collected through a structured questionnaire, copies of which were filled by both elected and appointed officials. Qualitative data were collected using Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), field observation methods,

and documentary review. A total of four FGDs with a total of 42 participants were conducted in all the four wards. Participants in FGDs ranged from eight to eleven, and they were purposefully selected based on their sex, knowledge and experience on the research topic. FGDs helped the researcher to collect in-depth information and understand feelings and emotions of the respondents. Both face to face and telephone interviews were conducted to gather information from the respondents.

Observation technique was used to collect data from the field by attending and observing full council meetings, village assemblies, village council and WDCs meetings. The researcher visited school and health centres construction sites. Through observation technique, the researcher directly observed the relationships between the elected and appointed officials in their day to day functions and their behaviour as it was being manifested. The researcher attended two full council meetings, two Ward Development Committees (WDCs) and three village council meetings. The researcher also observed interactions between elected and appointed officials in construction of classrooms, latrine, dispensaries and health centres. Secondary data were also collected from Villages, Wards and District offices and government reports.

#### **1.8.5 Data analysis**

Qualitative data were analysed using content analysis whereby data from key informants, focus group discussants, and field observations were interpreted into different themes based on conceptual description of ideas and concepts (Patton, 1990; Kothari, 2005; Creswell, 2014). Quantitative data were analysed using IBM Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) whereby descriptive statistics were computed including frequencies, percentages, averages and standard deviations of various variables. Tables were used to present results in each manuscript based on objectives.

With respect to the specific objectives, the data were analysed as follows. Objectives One and Two were to examine elected and appointed officials' interaction level and attitudes towards each other in implementation of health and education infrastructure construction projects. The interaction level between elected and appointed officials was determined using an index summated scale, which comprised eight statements. Interaction levels were obtained as follows:

$$ITIndex = \frac{Tscore}{Maxscore} \times 100$$

Where:

*ITIndex* = Interaction index

*Tscore* = Total score obtained

*Maxscore* = Maximum possible score.

Level of interaction was established by using quantitative method of data analysis. The statements representing interaction were graded on a five-point index-summated which comprised eight (8) statements. To each of the statement, the respondents were requested to respond 'strongly agree', 'agree', 'undecided', 'disagree', or 'strongly disagree' with 5, 4 3, 2, and 1 scores respectively representing the responses. Thereafter, interaction levels were categorized from the index using mean and standard deviation (SD) into:

Low = below (mean - SD),

Moderate = between (Mean  $\pm$  SD) and

High = above (Mean + SD).



Elected and appointed officials' attitudes to each other were determined using a Likert Scale which also comprised 8 statements. The respondents were requested to respond strongly agree (5 points), agree (4 points), undecided (3 points), disagree (2 points) or strongly disagree (1 point) to each of the statements. In order to present the collected information in a more user-friendly way, the responses from the scale were transformed into three categories whereby strongly agree and agree were grouped into agree (3), undecided (2) was left as it was, and disagree and strongly disagree were grouped into disagree (1). The overall attitude was categorised as positive attitude, negative attitude, or indifferent attitude, and the cut-off points were created as follows. The highest possible score was 40 points (i.e. 8 x 5) representing the highest positive attitude; the mid score was 24 (i.e. 8 x 3) representing neutral attitude; and the lowest possible score was 8 (i.e. 8 x 1) representing negative attitude. Therefore, the range of scores for negative attitude was from 8 to 23 points; the score indicating indifferent attitude was 24, and the range of scores for positive attitude was 25 to 40 points.

Objective Three was to assess adherence to governance practices of elected and appointed officials in construction of health and education infrastructure projects. The data were analysed using content analysis whereby data from focus group discussions and key informant interviews were interpreted and organized into different themes based on the conceptual description of ideas and concepts. The analysis of quantitative data was done using IBM Statistical Package of Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 20 whereby descriptive statistics were computed.

Objective Four was to investigate the contribution of political-administrative relations in construction of health and education infrastructure projects. The main technique applied in data analysis was content analysis whereby data from key informants (KIIs), focus

group discussions (FGDs) and field observation were grouped into different themes based on the conceptual description of ideas and concepts. Quantitative data such as frequencies and percentage were analysed using IBM Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software. The contribution of political-administrative relations in construction of health and education infrastructure projects was determined by analysing views of the respondents on how and where low and high interactions between elected and appointed officials were associated with inadequate and adequate completion of construction projects respectively.

### **1.9 Organization of the Thesis**

This thesis is organised in the publishable manuscripts format with five chapters. These are an introductory part of the study as chapter one and three publishable manuscripts presented in three chapters. Manuscript one is presented in chapter two that focuses on assessing the levels of interaction between the elected and appointed officials on construction of health and education infrastructure projects as well as their attitude towards each other in implementation of health and education infrastructure construction projects. This is followed by the second manuscript which is presented in Chapter Three focusing on governance practices and adherence to principles of governance in implementation of the infrastructure projects by elected and appointed officials. The third manuscript is presented in Chapter Four which focuses on the contribution of political-administrative relations in the implementation in construction of health and education infrastructure in Morogoro District Council. The fifth chapter presents a summary of the results which were presented in the three manuscripts, and presents conclusions and recommendations drawn from the findings of this study.

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## CHAPTER TWO

### 2.0 ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS' ATTITUDES AND THEIR INTERACTION IN CONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURES IN MOROGORO DISTRICT COUNCIL

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#### 2.1 Abstract

Political-administrative interactions have been an important concept in the New Public Management (NPM) in developing countries. The concept focuses on the relationships between elected and appointed officials in performing government functions. This paper examines the level of interaction between elected and appointed officials and their attitude towards the interaction between them in implementation of development projects. The paper adopted a case study research design. The study was carried out in four wards in Morogoro District Council. A total of 32 elected officials and 32 appointed officials were randomly selected for the study. The data were collected using a questionnaire, a

FGD guide and a key informant interview (KII) guide. The findings showed that the level of political-administrative interaction between elected and appointed officials in the project was moderate (65.6%). The finding implied that moderate level of interaction is likely to be the cause of low transparency and accountability of the elected and appointed officials. The finding showed that 62.5% of the elected officials had negative attitude towards appointed officials while 50% of appointed officials had negative attitude towards elected officials. The study also revealed several factors that negatively affected level of interaction between elected and appointed officials in Morogoro District Council. These factors include distrust, conflict of interests, partisan politics, financial mismanagement, roles ambiguities and low level of education on the side of elected officials. It is concluded that there is negligence in monitoring the relationships between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects which results to moderate interaction. It is also concluded that unfavourable relations between elected and appointed officials are affected by negative attitudes toward each other, and the relations increased misunderstandings between the two parties. Based on the conclusions, it is recommended that, in increasing interaction between elected and appointed officials, the Local Government Authorities in Morogoro District should facilitate regular training and awareness campaigns on the importance of their relations and positive attitudes towards each other. It is also recommended that appointed officials should practice the principle of neutrality in their implementation of development projects. Political neutrality will minimize politicization of public services and reduce conflicts between the two parties.

**Key words:** Political-Administrative Interactions, Public Development Projects, Local Governments, Appointed Officials, Elected Officials



## 2.2 Introduction

The concept of political-administrative interactions has attracted attention of most scholars in public administration and management sciences. Siggen *et al.* (2009) use political-administrative relations to refer to the area of study that has interested and continued to interest many researchers and development practitioners. The scholars are interested to understand the ways elected and appointed officials interact in performing their duties. There are debates on whether the elected officials should be excluded from policy implementation or appointed officials should be excluded from policy formulation.

The concept of political-administrative relations involves two major concepts namely “Politics” and “Administration”. Politics refers to the functions of the government in the administration of the state through numerous decisions made in the allocation of public resources and resolving conflicts (Mafunisa, 2003; Makinde, 2015). Therefore, politics focuses on public decision making on who receives what, when, and how and determine the allocation of public resources. Public administration deals with public officials who possess technical skills and are hired by government to execute policy and functions of the government (Stillman, 2000). Thornhill (2012) defines administration as the enabling functions, which are required to be assigned in determining policy goals and in effecting political decisions or policies. Therefore, public servants are responsible for administration or execution of policies formulated by political office barriers.

There are some arguments that a political-administrative interaction is important in improving government functions. For instance, Khair *et al.* (2012) provide that bureaucratic responsibility in democracy largely depends on the existing political-administrative relations. Despite politics and administration being two separate and analytical components, still, to a great extent, they are integrated into the same political

process. In showing the need for positive relations between the elected and appointed officials, Njunwa (2006) noted that there are relations between local elected officials and local administrators in performance of Local Government Authorities (LGAs). In showing the importance of political-administrative synergy, Mafuru *et al.* (2015) cite Kinondoni Municipal Council (KMC) where the elected officials and the administrators cooperate in implementing local government functions. Kasper *et al.* (2002) argue that the relationship between politicians and administrators fuels a continuous normative and descriptive debate. It is not possible to talk about the political process without talking about the administration or vice versa.

Through decentralization of public services to the Local Government in Tanzania, local governments were given the mandate to establish and maintain social services such as health and education (Njunwa, 2006; Mollel and Ringo, 2014; Boex *et al.*, 2015). World Bank (2013) provides justification for decentralize public services to local governments because it includes elected officials who have more information about the needs of the people and it is possible to choose policies or projects based on people's 'interests'. The main issues under social services projects include infrastructures development, health and education services, water and sanitation as well as agricultural development. It is argued that LGAs have been given a "developmental role" as institutions that are close to communities and which respond to the local needs (Shivji *et al.*, 2000; REPOA, 2008; Njovu, 2015). Therefore, Local Government Authorities (LGAs) have become potential instruments in improving social services delivery by initiating and implementing various development projects in their localities.

In performing the above functions, local governments in Tanzania comprise two kinds of officials namely the elected and appointed officials. According to Mushi and Melyok

(1999), local governments in Tanzania are governed by elected members, such as Councillors from each of the ward, and appointed officials who are recruited by the central government or by the council themselves. The local government system in Tanzania was adopted from the British Model of local government, which comprises two officials namely Councillors (the elected) and Council Officers (the appointed) (Kisimbe *et al.*, 2014). In performing their functions, the democratic powers are vested with the elected councillors while running of the day to day functions of local governments is the responsibility of the paid employees (Chaligha, 2004; Warioba, 2008). Currently, the relationship between the appointed and the elected officials in implementing public development projects in local governments is imperative (Sola, 2008). This is due to the fact that public development projects which are initiated by communities, donors or the government require participatory approaches (REPOA, 2007).

The relationship between elected and appointed officials in local governments is largely depend on how the parties viewed to each other (Ndudula, 2013; Mafuru *et al.*, 2015). The attitude of elected officials over the appointed officials can be used to determine the level of interaction between two parties. Negative attitude creates distrust and poor communication between elected and appointed officials in their interactions. Robbin (2008) define attitude refer attitude as feelings, belief and behaviour predisposition or tendency to respond positively or negatively towards certain object, people, group or situation. Individual attitude over another person's influence their behaviour in either favourable or unfavourable. The attitude is likely to increase elected or appointed officials performance and productivity as well as relationship with other people.

Public development projects are development projects that are initiated and implemented by the communities and the government through Local Government Authorities (LGAs)

(Muro *et al.*, 2015). For the purpose of this paper, the focus is on the construction of health and education infrastructures in Morogoro District Council. Both the elected and appointed officials play important roles in ensuring that the projects are effectively implemented. In most cases, the relationship between the appointed officials and the elected officials is characterized by either conflict or synergies. Public development projects established in Morogoro District Council include education projects such Kiroka Secondary School project, Bamba Primary School project, Kizinga Secondary School project as well as Kibwaya Primary School project. On the side of health projects, the Council implemented Kiroka Ward Health Centre project, Kizinga Dispensary project, Mkuyuni Ward Health Centre project and Kizinga village dispensary project (MDC, 2013). All of those projects were initiated and implemented with collaboration between the elected and appointed officials through the district council.

Despite different efforts made by the government of Tanzania to ensure that the majority of the population have access to quality social services, access to such services in many rural districts has remained poor (Devas *et al.*, 2003; Kesale, 2016). It is reported that health and education services in rural communities are characterized by poor quality infrastructures and have failed to provide quality services to the people (URT, 2004). The local governments in Tanzania in collaboration with local communities have established various development projects on construction of infrastructures through a self-help system to improve service delivery. Studies have revealed that public development projects in most cases failed to achieve their targets (Warioba, 2008; Kesale, 2016, Mkuku, 2016). A number of factors were established to account for the failure of the development projects including financial constraints, poor participation of communities, poor accountability and lack of transparency. A study conducted by Mwamaso (2015)

indicated that poor financial accountability is a major source of ineffective development projects in Tanzania.

Various studies on political-administrative relations have been conducted in different places in Tanzania (Masue, 2010; Mafuru *et al.*, 2015; Njunwa, 2017). The studies focused on impacts of political-administrative relations on employees' performance in local governments. Little is known on the relationship between the elected and the appointed officials in the processes of implementing public development projects in local governments in Tanzania. The main idea conceived in this paper is that most public development projects fail due to lack of clear understanding of the nature of relationship between the elected and appointed officials in implementation of the projects. Therefore, the paper aimed at (i) examining the level of interaction between the elected and the appointed officials in project design and implementations and (ii) examine elected and appointed officials' attitude towards their relationships in the implementation of development projects in Morogoro District Councils, Tanzania.

### **2.3 Theoretical Framework**

The paper is guided by complementary model which was proposed by Svara and Jacobsen (Azunu, 2015). The model came as a critique to the orthodox/classical model which was developed by Woodrow Wilson who propounded that politics and administration are two separate fields and must be separated from each other, and that political questions are different from administrative questions (Montjoy *et al.*, 1995; Siggen *et al.*, 2009; Azunu, 2013). The complementary model strongly affirms that it would be folly to suggest that administrative officers should have absolutely no hand in the formulation of policy, which, according to the orthodox dichotomy is the preserve of politicians. According to the complementary model, the elected and the appointed officials have to work together in

harmony and be interconnected in performing their duties (Jacobsen, 1999; Goel, 2008). Svara (1999) supports the partnership model by emphasizing on complementarities of politics and administration through interdependency, reciprocal influence, and extensive interaction between the elected and the appointed officials.

The model insists on the participation, trust and transparency in working relationship between the elected officials and the appointed officials. In relation to engagement, Mafuru *et al.* (2015) recommends that administrators should be engaged in discussions about political issues and strategies and at the same time the elected officials should provide their opinions on implementation of political decisions. Other authors suggest that politicians rely very much on expert advice from technocrats in the policy formulation process; likewise, the appointed officials rely on the elected officials for allocation of requisite resources to enable them perform their roles effectively (Montjoy *et al.*, 1995; Landa, 2015; Njunwa, 2017). With respect to this study, effective implementation of public development projects requires the complementary model of relationship between the elected and appointed officials. Therefore, a total separation of administrators from politics is not practical as they possess technical knowledge and skills in policy formulation processes. At the same time, it is not possible for administrators to successfully implement development projects without support from the elected officials who act as representatives of the people.

## **2.4 Methodology**

The study was conducted in Morogoro District Council, Morogoro Region. The Council was purposefully selected. The history of district which was documented by Ngware (2005) and Warioba (2008) shows that from time to time, the district experienced high level of misunderstanding between elected and appointed officials. Currently the report

from PO-RALG (2018) has noted that the district lag behind in its space of implementation of health and education projects. Eight villages that were actively engaged in implementation of development projects were purposefully selected from four wards. The selected wards were Mkambarani, Mkuyuni, Kiroka, and Kinole (Morogoro District Council Report, 2003). The villages were Pangawe, Kizinga, Bamba, Kibwaya, Mkuyuni, Tandai, Kirundwa, and Kiziwa.

The study adopted a case study research design. A case study research design is a research method that is commonly used in qualitative research. The case study design is based on an in depth investigation of a single individual, group or event to explore the cause of underlying principles (Creswell, 2014; Bryman, 2008; Zainal, 2007).

The study collected data from elected and appointed officials in the study area, whereby a formula by Yamane (1973) was adopted to obtain the desired sample size, assuming 95% confidence level and 0.05 as sampling error. The formula used is follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)} \dots\dots\dots$$

(1)

Where:  $n$  = sample size,

$N$  = population size and

$e$  = level of precision (sampling error).

The number of elected and appointed officials in the study area were 76. Therefore, using the above formula, a total of 64 elected and appointed officials were sampled. The sample size is relevant because it was large enough to provide the required information.

Statistically, 30 cases can provide empirical evidence in social science research (Kothari, 2005).

Qualitative data were collected using focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews (KIIs) and observation. A total of four FGDs with a total of 42 participants were conducted in all the four wards. Participants in FGDs ranged from eight to eleven, and they were purposefully selected based on their being regarded to have knowledge and experience in public development project implementations. During FGDs, the participants discussed issues such as political-administrative relations, governance and implementation of developments projects. The information collected through observations technique “participant as observer” included participating in full council meetings, Ward Development Committees (WDCs) and Village Assembly meetings while construction of ward health centres and secondary schools was going on.

Sixteen key informants were purposefully selected based on their understanding and knowledge on the study. Elected officials included Member of Parliament (MP), Ward Councillors, Villages Chairpersons, Chairperson of the Council, and Chairpersons of project Committees. The appointed officials included District Executive Director, Heads of Department, Chairperson of Economic and Social Welfare Committee, Ward Executives (WEs), Village Executive (VEs), Ward Community Development Officers (CDM) and Head Teachers.

Qualitative data were analysed by using content analysis whereby data were interpreted and organized in different themes to generate meaningful information. Analysis of quantitative data was done using IBM Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 20. Descriptive statistics were analysed to determine frequently, percentages, means, median and standard deviation. Level of interaction between elected and



appointed officials was established by using quantitative methods of data analysis. For Objective One, eight statements representing interaction were used, and the respondents were requested to indicate ‘strongly agree’, ‘agree’, ‘undecided’, ‘disagree’, or ‘strongly disagree’ against each of them with 5, 4, 3, 2, or 1 scores respectively representing the answers. The eight statements are as seen in Appendix 1, Question 17. Then an interaction

index was developed using the following formula:

$$ITIndex = \frac{Tscore}{Maxscore} \times 100$$

Where:

*ITIndex* = Interaction index

*Tscore* = Total score obtained

*Maxscore* = Maximum possible score.

The same approach was also used by Rao *et al.* (1992) and Fita *et al.* (2012). Thereafter, interaction levels were organised into an index using mean and standard deviation (SD).

Low = below (mean - SD),

Moderate = between (Mean  $\pm$  SD) and

High = above (Mean + SD).

For the second objective on elected and appointed officials’ attitude towards each other, a Likert Scale which also comprised eight statements was used. The respondents were asked to indicate if they strongly disagreed (1), disagreed (2), were undecided (3), agreed (4) or strongly agreed (5) with each of the statements. The eight statements are as seen in Appendix 1, Question 19. The responses were then grouped into three categories as follows: strongly agree and agree were grouped into agree; strongly disagree and disagree were grouped into disagree and undecided was left to stand alone.

The overall attitude was categorised as positive attitude, negative attitude or indifferent attitude. The highest possible score was 40 points (i.e.  $8 \times 5$ ) representing the highest positive attitude; 24 was the mid score ( $8 \times 3 = 24$ ) representing neutral attitude; and the lowest possible score was 8 (i.e.  $8 \times 1$ ) representing the lowest negative attitude. Therefore, the ranges of scores for negative attitude were from 8 to 23; the score of 24 indicated indifferent attitude, and the range of scores for positive attitude was from 25 to 40.

## **2.5 Results and Discussion**

The sub-topic in this section present and discuss the findings of the manuscript number one. Specifically, the discussion of this section focuses on objective one and objective two which focuses on examine level of interaction between elected and appointed officials and their attitude towards each other in implementation of construction of health and education infrastructures projects in Morogoro District Council.

### **2.5.1 Level of interaction between elected and appointed officials in construction of health and health infrastructures**

The paper aimed at examining the level of interaction between the elected and appointed officials in construction of infrastructure projects. On the level of interaction between the appointed and the elected officials, the findings in Table 2.1 show that 20.3 % of the respondents indicated that such interaction was at low level; 65.6% indicated that it was moderate, and only 14.1% of the respondents said that there was high level of interaction between the elected and the appointed officials in implementation of development projects. These findings indicate that the general level of interaction between the elected and appointed officials in the implementation of development projects was moderate.

The finding was supported by revelation drawn from the FGDs conducted at Kinole Ward where the participants were in consensus that there was moderate level of interaction between appointed and elected officials. The findings from FGDs were supported by District Executive Officer (DED) who pointed out that;

*“In our villages, interaction between elected officials such as Village Chairpersons and Village Executive Officers is low and we are not happy the way they interact in implementation of the projects, always complain to each other”*  
(Key Informant 8, Kinole Ward on 14<sup>th</sup> April 2017).

The finding from both survey, KIIs and focus group discussions (FGDs) seems to imply that moderate level of interaction is likely to be the cause of low transparency and accountability of the parties involved in the implementation of the said projects. This has been revealed where sharing of the information between them was main challenge of transparency and accountability aspects of governance in the selected villages in the district. The finding is in line with findings of a study conducted by Thornhill (2012) in South Africa in his study on effective political-administrative relations for policy making and implementation. In his findings, he found moderate interaction between elected and appointed officials as politicians (Ministers) interfered with administrators’ work in daily running of the government functions, and this resulted in negative interaction between the two parties. Moderate interaction between elected and appointed officials negatively affects performance of the government in South Africa.

**Table 2.1: Level of interaction between appointed and elected officials**

<b>Level</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Per cent</b>
Low	<18.8	13	20.3
Moderate	18.9 – 33.7	42	65.6
High	>33.7	9	14.1

However, the findings from key informant interviewed revealed that in most cases there was a misunderstanding between the elected and the appointed officials in project implementation. The chairperson of one of the school committees said the following words:

*“Not always, but in some cases, we realize that appointed officials are not transparent and cooperative with the elected officials, especially when councillors/village chairpersons are coming from opposition political parties”*  
(Key Informant 12, Kiroka Ward, 09<sup>th</sup> March, 2017).

The findings from KIIs are also in line with findings of studies which were conducted by Sola (2006) and Chaligha (2008); their studies revealed that effective performance of local governments in providing social services to public depends much on interactions between the elected and appointed officials in their day to day functions. Through observation during meetings include District Full Councils, Ward Development Committees (WDCs) Village Councils and Village Assembly, misunderstandings between elected and appointed officials were observed; in most cases they complained to each other on poor accountability and transparency in implementation of the projects. Therefore, lack of transparency, cooperation and understanding among elected and appointed officials jeopardized effective implementation of development projects in the study areas.

### **2.5.2 Elected and appointed officials attitude towards each other in construction of health and education infrastructures**

Attitudinal statements were used to examine attitude of elected and appointed officials towards each other in construction of health and education infrastructures. The results are

presented in Table 2.2 and show that 62.5% of elected officials had negative attitude towards appointed officials while 50% of appointed officials had negative attitude towards elected officials.

**Table 2.2: Overall attitudes of respondents on the relationships between elected and appointed officials in Morogoro District Council (n=64)**

Overall Attitude	Elected		Appointed	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Negative	20	62.5	16	50.0
Indifferent	3	9.4	5	15.6
Positive	9	28.1	11	34.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>100. 0</b>

#### **2.5.2.1 Elected officials' attitude towards appointed officials in their relations in implementation of development projects**

As seen in Table 2.3, a greater proportion (62.5%) of elected officials had negative attitude towards appointed officials while a smaller proportion (50.0%) of appointed officials had negative attitude towards elected officials. This implies that elected officials do not interact high with appointed officials due to their negative attitude and distrust. Negative attitude to each other implies that sharing information and working as a team would be a challenge in implementation of development projects. The findings also revealed that elected officials were not happy to work with appointed officials as they accused them of not being accountable to the projects. The finding was also supported by a key informant interviewee at Mkambarani Ward; one of the Village chairpersons stated that:

*“ ..... The appointed officials are not committed to local development projects implementation as they are not residents of our village. Their children and other family members get their education and health services in town, therefore, they lack patriotism and mismanage our projects funds”* (Key informant 4, Kiziwa Village 12<sup>th</sup> July 2017).

This study's findings are in line with findings of a study conducted by Mkuku (2016) in Ulanga District Council, which revealed that there was negative perception of elected

officials on their relationship with appointed officials in performing their day to day functions. In that study by Mkuku (2016) it was found that 70% of the elected officials agreed that there was unfavourable attitude toward appointed officials in Ulanga District Council.

The findings were also supported by information from FGDs at Kinole Ward on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2017 in which participants were in consensus that there was negative attitude of elected officials towards appointed officials in projects implementation. Participants agreed that regular conflicts and misunderstandings between elected and appointed officials was influenced by their negative attitudes to each other. Such negative perceptions tend to increase conflicts between appointed and elected officials during their implementation of development projects (Warioba, 2008; Weible, 2011).

#### **2.5.2.2 Appointed officials' attitude towards elected officials in their relations in implementation of development projects**

The results in Table 2.3 show that 50% of the appointed officials in Morogoro District Council had negative attitude towards elected officials in implementation of health and education infrastructure projects while 15.4% of the respondents indicated indifferent attitude and 34.4% had positive attitude towards their relations with elected officials in the projects. This implies that it was very difficult to experience high level interaction between the parties as characterized by mistrust and negative attitude towards each other. The study revealed that as a result of negative attitude of appointed officers towards elected officials, it was difficult for them to share information with elected officials. This finding was supported by a key informant interview with the Head Teacher at Kinole Secondary School who stated that:

*“It is very difficult to trust elected officials especially village chairpersons. They always consider political interests first and dislike compliance with policies, rules and regulations; they rather focus on their personal interests”* (Key informant 11, Kinole Ward, 18<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

The findings were also supported by information from FGDs at Mkuyuni Ward on 14<sup>th</sup> June, 2020 whereby it was revealed that councillors and village chairpersons used force and threatened the appointed officials to accept their decisions to use the development project funds for their personal and political interests. The participants argued that appointed officials in most cases avoided conflicts with elected officials who possessed legitimate power to impose punishment or reject to work with appointed officials. This implies that appointed officials failed to implement public development projects in favour of public interests and cohesively implemented projects in favour of the elected officials. The appointed officials had to comply with elected officials in order to protect their security of employment to the council.

During a full council meeting which was conducted on 15<sup>th</sup> December, 2019 at Pangani village and which the author of this paper attended, it was observed that elected officials (Councillors) had negative attitude towards appointed officials as they accused them of not being accountable for the interests of the council and misuse revenue of the council for their personal benefits. The meeting was intended to discuss why Morogoro District Council had got a poor performance certificate *“Hati Chafu”* in CAG report for the fiscal year 2018/2019. One of the Councillors stated that:

*“We, elected officials, are always complaining that appointed officials who are working in our council are not committed, are corrupt and lack patriotism in their*



*work performance. This has led to getting the poor performance certificate. They need to change their behaviour”* (Full Council meeting at Pangani Village, 15<sup>th</sup> December 2019).

These findings are also in line with those of a study conducted by Mafuru *et al.* (2015) on political-administrative relations in local governments in Tanzania. Their study indicated that appointed officials such as Ward Executive Officer (WEOs) and Village Executive Officer (VEOs) in Mvomero District Council had negative attitude towards elected officials as they viewed them as corrupt and that they were mismanaging public funds for their personal gains and political interests. The appointed officials also perceived negatively the elected officials accusing them of merely being influenced by political reasons. Their study indicated some cases of appointed officials being cohesively influenced to accept project proposals for their political interests. Once the appointed officials refused their proposals, the elected officials created poor working environments for administrators to perform their duties.

**Table 2.3: Attitudes of elected and appointed officials towards each other in their interactions in Morogoro District Council (n=64)**

Attitudinal Statements	Total (%)			Elected (%)			Appointed (%)		
	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree
1. They are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	48.4	15.6	35.9	21.9	15.6	62.5	50	15.0	34.4
2. They are transparent and always share information about the projects	55.7	10.9	33.4	43.8	18.8	37.5	53.1	3.1	43.8
3. They are working in trust with appointed/ elected officials	52.2	17.2	30.6	50.0	12.5	37.5	46.9	21.9	31.2
4. They are accountable to the projects	56.2	9.4	34.4	62.5	3.1	34.4	50.0	15.6	34.4
5. They work for their self-interests rather than for public interests	35.9	14.1	50.0	40.6	9.4	50.0	31.2	18.8	50.0
6. They are not accountable to the project success	42.2	6.2	51.6	40.6	3.1	56.2	43.8	9.4	46.9
7. They are corrupt and mismanage project funds	31.2	15.6	53.1	31.2	15.6	53.1	31.2	15.6	53.0
8. They are influenced by partisan politics	25.0	12.5	62.5	28.1	6.2	65.6	21.9	18.8	59.4

In Table 2.3, the statements with serial numbers 1 to 4 had positive connotations while the ones with serial numbers 5 to 8 had negative connotations. Of the four statements with negative connotations, the greatest proportions of the respondents (62.5%) agreed with the statement that roles played by elected and appointed officials during project implementation were highly characterized and influenced by partisan politics rather than public interests. Of the four statements with positive connotations, the greatest proportion of the respondents (55.7%) disagreed with the statement that there was transparency between elected and appointed officials and that they always shared information about the projects.

### 2.5.3 Perceived sources of negative attitude between the Elected and the Appointed

#### Officials in the projects

As shown in Table 2.4, it was found that distrust between elected and appointed officials was the major source of negative attitude and misunderstandings between the parties in implementation of development projects. This was mentioned by 84.4% of the respondents. The findings imply that there was trust deficit between elected and appointed officials, and this negatively affected information sharing about the projects. The second factor for negative attitude towards each other was conflict of interests between elected and appointed officials which was reported by 73.4% of the respondents. For example, elected officials were always for political interests including getting voters' support and being re-elected. The elected officials accused administrators of being after personal economic gains from development projects funds and not for the communities' interests while the administrators accused the elected officials of politicizing development for their own political pursuits.

**Table 2.4: Perceived sources of negative attitude between elected and appointed officials in the projects (n-64)**

<b>Challenges</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Per cent</b>
Distrust	54	84.4
Personal interest/conflicts	47	73.4
Partisan politics	42	65.6
Financial mismanagement	34	53.0
Roles ambiguities	33	51.6
Low level of education	32	50.0
Poor Accountability	21	32.8

This implies that, through conflict of interests between elected and appointed officials, it becomes difficult for them to cooperate and have mutual interests in the projects implementation. Therefore, their differences in interests affect their level of interaction in implementation of development projects. These findings are in line with findings reported

in a study conducted by Matunga *et al.* (2015) which revealed that both the elected and the appointed officials were more characterized by prevailing personal interests than public interests. The interest of politicians is to get trust and popularity from their voters and maximizing their votes for winning elections while administrators are interested in promotion, increase in their salaries and recognition from their bosses. In protecting their interests, their relations were characterized by lack of transparency in decision making and resource allocation.

The finding was also supported by a KII: one of the Heads of Department made the following statement:

*“It is very difficult for an elected official to support any development project that he/she feels that it will not benefit him/her politically or financially. They prefer even not to comply with rules and regulations for their personal gains”* (Key Informant 3, at Morogoro District Council, 23<sup>rd</sup> June 2017).

Fighting for projects funds for personal gains between the elected and appointed officials in the implementation of development project was cited as the third biggest source of negative attitude between the two. About two-thirds (65.6%) of the respondents agreed that fighting for financial resources negatively affected the relationship between the two groups of people in the projects. The elected officials always regarded the appointed officials as corrupt and that they were misusing project funds for their economic benefits while the appointed officials regarded the elected officials as ignorant and were always motivated by political interests. About this, one of Village chairpersons at Bamba village said:

*“In our village we have no Village Executive Officer since 2015. Our VEO misused more than TZS. 700,000/= which had been contributed by local people for our school project. Most of these appointed officials are corrupt hence it is not possible to trust them”* (Key Informant 13, at Kiroka Ward, 12<sup>th</sup> March 2017).

The study finding is in line with findings of a study by Jacobsen (1999) who studied the level of trust between the appointed and the elected officials in local governments in Norway and Tanzania. The results of the cited study indicated that, in Tanzania, there was significantly lower degree of trust between the elected and appointed officials and administrators than the case was in Norway. Slightly more than a half (51.6 %) of the respondents mentioned that jurisdictional ambiguities created misunderstandings between elected and appointed officials on their roles in projects. The elected officials interfered with the work of the appointed officials in the implementation of the projects.

This finding was supported by focus group discussants at Kiroka Ward on 15<sup>th</sup> April 2017; the discussants were in consensus that the elected officials were interfering appointed officials' roles in financial matters including collecting financial contributions and the use of such funds in the implementation of the projects. This study's finding is also in line with findings reported in a study conducted by Yilmaz *et al.* (2010) who revealed that the elected officials considered themselves as being in charge of the appointed officials, and in most cases they interfered with professional works and coercively wanted to influence appointed officials' work performance. Similarly, Ndudula (2013) also revealed that the major cause of conflicts between elected and appointed officials at Mquma Local Municipality (MLM), in South Africa, is the intrusion of politicians and administrators in each other's roles and responsibilities. The study findings are also in line with the findings of a study by Lyatonga *et al.* (2012), who suggested that training of the elected

officials (councillors) in legal, policy matters and their respective roles as representatives of the people would reduce frequent conflicts between the elected and the appointed officials.

Also, the finding revealed further that partisan politics was the least leading source of negative attitude between the elected and the appointed officials in development projects. About one-third (32.8%) of the respondents cited partisan politics as the source of unfavourable attitude between the parties. In most cases, the elected officials, regardless of their political differences, tended to support development projects as a way of fulfilling their election campaign promises. However, the majority of the elected officials such as Councillors, Village chairperson and Hamlet chairpersons were from *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (MDC, 2015). The findings are contrary to those of a study conducted by Njunwa (2017) in Tanga City Council which revealed that partisan politics as a major source of conflicts between the elected and the appointed officials. The results imply that sources of conflicts differ from one council to another one based on different political environments.

## **2.6 Conclusions and Recommendations**

Based on the findings, it is concluded that inadequacy in monitoring of relationships between elected and appointed officials in the implementation of projects by Morogoro District Council leads to moderate interactions and increases misunderstandings between the two. It is also concluded that political interests and partisan politics influence the relationship between elected and appointed officials in implementation of construction of health and education projects in the study areas and negatively affected their interactions in the projects. Furthermore, it is concluded that negative attitude between elected and appointed officials is influenced by conflicts of interest, lack of distrust and discourage

higher interactions between elected and appointed officials during implementation of development projects. From the theoretical point of view, it is generally concluded that elected and appointed officials' relations seem to deviate from the dictates of the complimentary model. However, the dictates of the complimentary model corresponding with administrative and legal framework governing two actors' relation for better governance of the matters of the communities including development projects implementation.

In view of the above conclusions, it is recommended that Morogoro District Council should facilitate regular training and awareness campaigns on the importance of good relationships between elected and appointed officials in order to promote effective implementation of development projects as suggested by the complementary model. Training of both appointed and elected officials will improve their interaction in implementation of development projects. Trainings should provide clear understanding of the contribution of political-administrative relations in implementation of development projects. It is also recommended that local governments should ensure regularly monitoring of compliance with rules, regulations, policies and code of conducts that guide relationships between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects. It is also recommended that appointed officials should adhere to the principle of neutrality in their work performance in order to minimise politicization of public services and unnecessary conflicts with elected officials. The study further recommends that elected officials and appointed officials should create positive attitude towards each other and increase their levels of trust and transparency on financial matters that relate to development projects.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### 3.0 GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS IN CONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURES IN MOROGORO DISTRICT COUNCIL, TANZANIA

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#### 3.1 Abstract

Good governance is a global issue. It is a crucial aspect in new public management as it ensures, among others, participation, transparency, accountability and adherence to the rule of law among the parties involved in development. This paper sought to assess elected and appointed officials' adherence to governance practices in construction of health and education infrastructure projects in Morogoro Rural District. The study involved four wards which were selected purposively in the study areas. This paper adopted a case study research design and used qualitative data whereby focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) were employed to collect data.

The study used content analysis to analyse and interpret the data. The study found that the relationship between the elected and the appointed officials was moderate due to lack of good governance practices. This trend affected negatively the relationship between the two parties in implementation of development projects. The study found that the two parties cooperated much in designing but less in implementation of development projects. The study revealed further that, there was poor transparency in financial matters among both the elected and the appointed officials, which resulted in financial mismanagement. The relationship was highly influenced by dual accountability of the appointed officials and lack of adherence to rule law, policies and regulations in project implementation. It is concluded that harmonious relations between the elected and the appointed officials is less likely to be achieved if the two parties fail to adhere to good governance practices. It is also concluded that lack of serious monitoring of adherence of legal and administrative framework as a challenge in managing relations between elected and appointed officials in improve governance practices in the construction of health and education infrastructures projects. Local governments have to build capacity and awareness among both the elected and the appointed officials on policies, laws, rules and regulations that guide relations and performance of both parties. The council should ensure that meetings such as village assembly, village councils and WDCs are conducted regularly as required by law in order to improve participation, accountability, and transparency in the implementation of the projects.

**Key words:** Governance, participation, transparency, accountability, rule of law, Local Government Authorities



### 3.2 Introduction

Governance in Local Government Authorities (LGAs) is a critical condition for improving social services delivery to the public (Sigala, 2015; Makorere, 2014). The Central Government and international communities insist on adherence to the principles of good governance in achieving sustainable development. The World Bank and International Management Finance (IMF) insist on good governance in fostering development in the third world countries, which is better appreciated at the grassroots level in the third world countries (Yilmaz and Vasha, 2010). The African Union (AU) Agenda 2063 focuses on inclusive growth and sustainable development, good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice, rule of law and people driven development (Sigalla, 2014; Ogbette *et al.*, 2018).

As observed by Kabote *et al.* (2017), it is difficult to have good governance in totality. However, more efforts are needed to exercise principles of good governance in order to attain sustainable development. In order to achieve sustainable development, the Government of Tanzania adopted Tanzania Vision 2025, whose main objective is to achieve equality and good life for all, good governance and the rule of law, and building a strong and resilient economy that can effectively withstand global competition. The World Bank (2000) defines governance as the manner in which power is exercised in the government of a country's economic and social resources for development. UNDP (2016) set up Tanzania's governance programme 2016 – 2021 that focuses on effectiveness, transparency, accountability and inclusive governance. It is difficult for Tanzania to achieve the Vision 2025 without adherence to the principles of good governance because resilient economy transparency, rule of law and accountability of all stakeholders (URT, 2000).

Galadima (1998) defines governance as a process of organizing and managing legitimate power structures, entrusted by the people, to provide law and order, protect fundamental human rights, ensuring rule of law and due process of law, and provide for the basic needs and welfare of the people and the pursuit of their happiness. In other words, governance is essential to both the elected and appointed officials in guiding their relationship as it ensures transparency, accountability and the rule of law. Tanzania Framework of Good Governance (TFGG) defines governance as a network and interaction of public (governmental) and private (non-governmental) bodies that have a role to play in the formulation and implementation of public policy and the delivery of public services (URT, 1999). UNDP (1997) identifies nine principles of good governance as participation, rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, effectiveness and efficiency, accountability and strategic vision.

The purpose of good governance is to stimulate development and reduce poverty, reduce misuse of public funds for self-interests, improve accountability, ensure transparency, and establish equality before the law (Mgonja and Dossa, 2015). Tanzania Development Vision 2025 focuses on the establishment of a higher quality of life, peace, tranquillity and national unity, good governance, an educated society imbued with the ambitions to develop, and an economy which is competitive with sustainable growth for the benefits of all Tanzanians. Governance practices in local governments is performed on the basis of adherence of administrative policies, law, rules and regulation that managing relation between appointed and elected officials (Sigala, 2015; Nkyabonaki, 2019). It includes, The Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Local Government (District Council) Act of 1982, Standing Order for Public Service, 2009, Public Service Act, 2002 and Public namely Code of Conduct for Councillors of 2000, Code of Ethics and Conduct of Public Service Leader Code of Ethics Act, 1995.

In most cases, public development projects in local governments are implemented with collaboration with local communities. Community participation in the implementation of development activities in the Local Government is essential in bringing sustainable development and increasing commitment and accountability, increasing resource availability of the programme, promoting self-help and improving cooperation and trust between communities and their leaders (Njunwa, 2010; Chirenje *et al.*, 2013; Muro *et al.*, 2015). Through decentralization by devolution (D by D) during the 1990s, the Government initiated a bottom-up development approach and transfer of power to the Local Governments in service delivery (Kisumbe *et al.*, 2014). Through Local Government Miscellaneous Amendments Act No. 6 of 1999, Local Governments, through councils, were mandated to make decisions to improve delivery of local services. The Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 7 of 1982 clearly stipulates that Local Government Authorities (LGAs) must involve the communities and their representatives in developing plans and activities.

In the implementation of development projects, the issues of accountability and transparency are vital in the performance of local governments. The Local Government Authorities Act No.7 of 1982 insists on participation, transparency and accountability in social service provision in the Local Governments. Accountability and transparency ensure better service delivery and mitigate abuse of power and corruption by public officials in public offices (Njunwa, 2007; Sigalla, 2014; Mbogela and Mollel, 2014). Through transparency, citizens are empowered to monitor activities and decisions of the government and to hold government accountable. It is not possible for the citizens and the elected officials to hold government officials accountable if they (the elected officials) lack adequate information. According to Okeke *et al.* (2016), accountability is one of the prerequisites of democratic and good governance. Through accountability, it is possible to

hold the elected and appointed officials responsible and answerable for their actions, activities and decisions. It should be noted that accountability might only exist when there is a relationship where an individual or a body and the performance of tasks of that individual or body is subjected to supervision, direction or request that provides information or their actions.

The elected and appointed officials play significant roles in ensuring successful implementation of development projects in local governments. Therefore, the relations between political and administrative officials are critical and mandatory in increasing the local government's performance. In performing its mandatory and permissive functions, local governments depend on cooperation between the elected and appointed officials. Political-administrative relations in the Local Government Authorities are essential in increasing better service delivery to the public. The elected and appointed officials have to work together and in harmony in order to discharge their responsibilities in local government (Land, 2017). Despite that, politics and administration are two separate and analytical components; largely they are still integrated in the same political process. In showing the need for positive relations between the elected and appointed officials, Njunwa (2006) notes that there are existing relations between the elected and local administrators in performance of Local Government Authorities (LGAs) duties.

Public development projects in local governments become instrumental in improving public service delivery in local communities. Through public development projects, the local communities implement various development projects, which include educational, health, water and sanitation, and agriculture projects (Boex *et al.*, 2015). Through decentralization by devolution (D by D), Local Government Authorities (LGAs) have the mandate of providing social services to the public through establishing and implementing

development projects in their areas of jurisdiction (Njunwa, 2006; Baletito *et al.*, 2012). This paper focuses on the construction of health and education infrastructures such as classrooms, teachers' houses, laboratories, health centres and dispensaries, projects which are implemented in the local government through a communities' self-help system. It should be noted that 70% of the total local governments' budgets in Tanzania is allocated for primary education; 18% is allocated for basic health care; and the remaining 12% is for road maintenance and agriculture (Boex, 2003). In the financial year 2017/2018, with community self-helps, Local Governments were committed to the construction of 2000 classrooms and rehabilitation and upgrading of the existing facilities (UNICEF, 2018). In the health sector, in the fiscal year 2017/2018, the government allocated TZS. 2222 billion equal to 7.0% of the then national budget (Tarimo and Lee, 2018).

### **3.3 Problem Statement**

Despite the efforts made by the Government of Tanzania to ensure that the majority of Tanzanians, if not all, have access to quality health and education services, more than 50% of the population in rural communities still lack access to these services in terms of infrastructures such as classrooms, laboratories, latrines and teachers houses (Kisimbe *et al.*, 2014; Landa, 2017; Njunwa, 2017). Most of the public development projects in health and education sectors are characterized by governance in terms of poor accountability, lack of transparency and poor participation of local leaders and communities at larger (Bratton, 2011; Makorere, 2012; Muro *et al.*, 2015). As for supervision of local councils in Tanzania, REPOA (2008) revealed that local governments' performance suffers from poor access to information and lack of culture of transparency, poor accountability and poor representation of citizens by their councillors. This is probably a result of lack of

adequate information on government regarding the implementation of the projects with reference to roles of pillars of governance.

This paper examines governance aspects in managing relations between elected and appointed officials in construction of health and education infrastructures in Morogoro District Council. The paper focuses on four principles of good governance: participation, transparency, accountability and the rule of law. The four aspects were selected because interaction between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects depends much on those aspects of governance.

### **3.4 Theoretical Framework**

The paper was guided by the complementary model, which was proposed by Svara (Svara, 1999). The approach came as a critique to the orthodox/classical model, which was developed by Woodrow Wilson who propounded that politics and administration are two separated fields and must be separated from each other, and that political questions are different from administrative questions (Montjoy *et al.*, 1995; Siggen *et al.*, 2010; Azunu, 2013). The approach encourages involvement, transparency and accountability of both elected and appointed officials in their day to day functions. According to the complementary approach, the elected and appointed officials have to work together, in harmony and be interconnected in performing their duties (Jacobsen, 1999; Goel, 2008). Svara (1999) supports the complementary model by emphasizing on the complementarity of politics and administration through interdependency, reciprocal influence and extensive interaction between elected and appointed officials.

In order to adhere to the principles of governance such as participation, transparency, accountability and the rule of law, elected and appointed officials are supposed to work

together in harmony and with mutual understanding. The appointed staff must be engaged in discussions about political issues and strategies. Similarly, the elected officials should provide their opinions on the implementation of political decisions. As Jacobsen (1999) observes, the level of trust between the elected and the appointed officials is crucial in ensuring transparency and accountability. Distrust between the elected and the appointed officials is likely to affect negatively their relationship and hence lead to poor work performance.

In line to that, Tanzania has the legal and policy framework to govern the conduct of these officials include the Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania, 1977, Local Government (District Council) Act of 1982, Standing Order for Public Service, 2009, Public Service Act, 2002, Code of Conduct for Councillors of 2000, Code of Ethics and Conduct of Public Service, Leader Code of Ethics Act, 1995. However, compliance to these laws and policies seems to be a question of the political orientation at the localities. For example, the revelation of such literature as study conducted by Nkyabonaki (2019) which revealed that there is no satisfied compliance of administrative policies, laws, rule and regulations by public servants and public leaders due to ecology of public sector that include under pay, weak monitoring and evaluation of employee performance and culture of nepotism in public sector.

### **3.5 Research Methodology**

This manuscript is based on a research which was conducted in Morogoro District Council, Morogoro Region. Four wards and eight (8) villages that were implementing construction of health and education infrastructure project were purposively selected. The districts were selected based on the fact that many public development projects had failed to achieve the targets or the implementation was below standards (URT, 2015). The

selected wards were Mkambarani, Mkuyuni, Kiroka and Kinole (Morogoro District Council 2003). The villages included Kirundwa, Kiziwa, Pangawe, Kizinga, Bamba, Kibwaya, Mkuyuni A, and Tandai. The study employed a case study research design, which was employed within the context of its use, which is within the situation in which the activities take place (Zainal, 2007; Creswell, 2014; Bryan, 2008).

Data were collected using a combination of methods of data collection, which were a questionnaire based survey, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and documentary reviews. The study collected data from elected and appointed officials in the study area, whereby a formula by Yamane (1973) was adopted to obtain the desired sample size, assuming 95% confidence level and 0.05 as sampling error. The formula used is follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)} \dots\dots\dots$$

(1)

Where:  $n$  = sample size,

$N$  = population size and

$e$  = level of precision (sampling error).

The number of elected and appointed officials in the study area were 76. Therefore, using the above formula, a total of 64 elected and appointed officials were sampled. The sample size is relevant because it was large enough to provide the required information. Statistically, 30 cases can provide empirical evidence in social science research (Kothari, 2005).



An interview guide was used to collect information from key informants, and an FGD guide was used to collect information from focus group discussants. Interview technique is useful in collecting in-depth qualitative information (Bryman, 2008; Baxter *et al.*, 2008). Key informants were purposively selected based on being regarded to have understanding and knowledge of the study issues (Kothari, 2005). These included the Member of Permanent (MP), the District Executive Director (DED), Ward Councillors, Ward Executive Officers (WEOs), Village Executive Officers (VEOs), Ward Community Development Officers (CDMs), Village Chairpersons and Chairperson of the Development Committees. Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to collect qualitative data. Four FGDs with 42 participants ranging from eight to eleven were purposively selected based on being regarded to have knowledge and experience in the construction of the projects.

The data were analysed using content analysis whereby data from focus group discussion and key informants were interpreted and organized into different themes based on the conceptual description of ideas and concepts. According to Shuttleworth (2008), the analysis for qualitative data tends to be more opinion based than being statistics based unlike in analysis of quantitative data. Quantitative data such as frequencies and percentages were analysed using IBM Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) software.

### **3.6 Results and Discussion**

This section and its subsections present and discuss the results of manuscript number two which is based on the third objective of the study. The discussion concentrates on the way elected and appointed officials adhere to principles of governance in implementation of development projects. This paper focuses on four principles of governance, namely

participation, transparency, accountability and rule of law as they are directly related to interaction between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects.

### **3.6.1 Participation aspect in projects implementation**

Many participants in FGDs were positive on the involvement of both the elected and the appointed officials in designing and implementing public development projects. The participants were in consensus that elected officials and appointed official were working together in designing development projects and organizing meetings for the communities to be aware of the projects. They also worked together in organizing and conducting village assemblies to discuss the types of development projects to be implemented in their localities. One of the Village Executive Officers at Mkuyuni Ward said:

*“It is not possible to implement any public development project without involving our elected officials who play a great role in mobilizing human and financial resources needed for the projects implementation.”* (Key Informant 7 at Mkuyuni Ward, 16<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

An elected official (Village Chairperson) normally chairs village meetings while Village Executive Officers (VEOs) serve as secretaries to the meetings. A village assembly is a legal organ which was established under Section 24 of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No 7 of 1982 and meets four times in a year, after every three months. Further, it was found that, after deliberations are made in a village assembly, the appointed officials discuss and approve budgets and relevant projects in details in village councils and later Ward Development Committees (WDCs) approve the same. It should be noted that both village councils and WDCs constitute both elected and appointed officials as members. Village councils are composed of elected and appointed officials

who are responsible for designing development projects and preparing budgets for the projects through Village Finance and Planning Committees (URT, 2012). However, it was found that in villages which were represented by opposition party leaders such as Kinole and Kiroka villages, elected officials were not highly involved in the design phases of projects. One of the village chairpersons from an opposition part at Kinole Ward said:

*“ In most cases, village executive officers organise meetings with officials from the district and discuss about development issues related to my village, but they never mind to invite me to attend such meetings”* (Key informant 9 at Kinole Ward 29/06/1071).

During the implementation phases of the projects, the elected and the appointed officials work together in influencing and mobilizing communities into participating in the implementation of the projects. The findings of this paper revealed that village chairpersons and hamlet chairpersons were the ones responsible for collecting financial contributions from the households. In case there were any challenges in the projects implementation, the elected and the appointed officials worked together to work out solutions. These findings imply that the designing and implementation phases of construction of infrastructure for health and education services were highly dependent on involvement of the communities, elected and the appointed officials. Each side contributed to the success of the projects implementation through working together.

In this case, involvement of both elected and appointed officials in decision making and implementation agrees with the complementary model which insists on involvement of both elected and appointed officials. The study findings are also in line with findings of a study conducted by Sigala (2015) in Mbeya District Council who revealed that there was high level of participation of communities and their representatives in decision making and implementation of development activities in their localities. The above mentioned

study by Sigala (2015) showed that the elected officials participated in village assemblies, Village Councils, different Village/Ward Committees and Ward Development Committees (WDCs). The findings revealed further that the elected officials mobilized people in self-help activities including collection of financial contributions as well as mobilizing people to provide physical labour to facilitate the implementation of the projects.

### 3.6.2 Transparency aspect in projects implementation

Transparency plays an important role in establishing a strong relationship between stakeholders in any development project. Code of Ethics and Conduct for Public Service and Code of Conduct for Councillors in Tanzania require both elected and appointed officials to promote transparency and accountability in their performance. The mentioned code of ethics and conducts require elected and appointed officials in discharging their duties to promote transparency and openness. High level of transparency increases trust and confidence between the elected and the appointed officials. In order to ensure transparency, WEOs/VEOs were required to provide reports of revenue and expenditure about relevant projects after every three months. The results in Table 3.1 show that 68.8% of the respondents said that there was low transparency between elected and appointed officials in implementation of the projects. This implies that there was miscommunication, distrust and poor information sharing between elected and appointed officials in implementation of projects.

**Table 3.1: Views on transparency with respect to relations between elected and appointed officials in implementation of projects**

<b>Ways</b>	<b>Yes (%)</b>	<b>No (%)</b>
Conduct regular meetings as required by laws and other meetings	27.6	73.4
High level of transparency between elected and appointed officials	30.2	68.8
Maintain role of demarcation between elected and appointed officials	41.5	59.5
Maintain personal interest/conflicts	40.0	60.0
Avoid partisan politics	36.0	56.4

Accountability to the projects implementation	34.8	65.2
Perform based on regulations, rules and procedures	40.0	60.0

A bad example was at Kinole and Kiroka; it was found that appointed officials were not transparent on financial matters. Appointed officials did not expose the exact amount of revenues and expenditure of the same. Because of financial misuse, Ward Executive Officers (WEOs) and Village Executive Officers (VEOs) at Bamba and Kinole villages hesitated to call village assemblies or WDCs because they were afraid of being held accountable. They had a tendency of colluding with project development committees when it came to project funds. This was proved by observation of the complaint form elected officials on how appointed officials misuse projects funds for their personal interests. During key informant interviews at Bamba Village, one of the elected officials emphasized that:

*“ We always come into conflict with Ward Executive Officers/ Village Executive Officers because they are not transparent when it comes to expenditure of project funds, and they are not providing reports in time” (Key Informant 14 at Bamba, 12 July, 2017).*

Similar findings were also reported by participants in one of the focus group discussions at Kinole and Mkambarani wards who insisted that the appointed officials (WEOs and VEOs) were always for self-interest and did hide financial information. During key informant interviews, members of Kinole Secondary school construction project committee had this to say:

*“We are supposed to conduct village assembly meetings three times in a year, and one of the objectives of the village assembly meetings is to receive financial reports. We are very disappointed with our VEO who is not conducting the*

*assembly and who is not providing reports to us as it is required”* (Key Informant 2 at Kinole Ward, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

The findings are in line with a study which was conducted by Krah and Mertens (2020) on democracy and good governance in Africa which found that there was low level of financial transparency between politicians and administrators in local governments in Ghana. Their study indicated that openness in local government performance minimizes mismanagement of public funds because it discourages financial malpractice and corruption. To support low transparency, Table 3.1 indicates that 73.4% of the respondents reported that legal meetings that involve elected and appointed officials were not being conducted as required. Meetings in local governments are essential tools in providing feedback. The findings were supported by focus group discussions at Mkuyuni A and Bamba Villages which showed that only one village assembly was conducted in the year 2016. During the interview, no reason was provided as to why they had conducted only one village assembly; they complained that people were not interested in meetings. In this case, the findings are contrary to the complementary model which recommends that elected and appointed officials have to work in harmony, trust and transparency in order to have better work performance.

These findings imply that there is a need for having regular meetings of the communities with the elected and the appointed officials to provide and discuss information about projects' funds. This is because lack of transparency and communication creates poor relations between elected and appointed officials with regard to project implementation. In most cases, conflicts between elected and the appointed officials arise when there is lack of transparency on expenditure of project funds. Legal meetings are not conducted in time to provide information to the elected officials.

Similar observations are reported by Muro *et al.* (2010); Mbogela and Mollel (2014) and Ogbette *et al.* (2018) who reveal that appointed officials in the Local Governments are not transparent enough to the people and to their elected officials, and they refuse to provide information on the exact amount of revenues received from the Government and about community participation in public development projects. The findings in the study by Muro *et al.* (2010) revealed further that misuse of financial resources and corruption are major sources of lack of transparency in implementation of development projects. The appointed officials have a tendency of not disclosing information that may prove potentially harmful to them and are worried that politicians will use it against them. This implies that most elected officials fail to influence decisions because they don't have adequate access to information from appointed officials; sometimes such information is not provided to them on time. Similar findings are reported by Sarwatt *et al.* (2014) and Sigalla (2015). The studies showed that insufficient information about income and expenditures on public development activities was provided to communities and their elected representatives.

However, the study on which this paper is based found that transparency between the elected and the appointed officials in projects implementation varied from one ward to another, depending on a number of factors. It was observed, for example, that at Mkambarani and Mkuyuni both the elected and the appointed officials adhered to the principle of transparency as stipulated by the Local Government (District Authorities), Act No. 2 of 1982. Ward Executive Officers (WEOs) provided information about the funds directed to development projects to the elected members through WDCs and Village Councils. They, together with the elected officials and Development Committee's members, discussed how to spend the financial resources for development purposes. This was reported by the Village chairperson at Kizinga who had the following to say:

*“Our Village Executive Officer gives us all information about money that has been collected for development projects implementation through village council and village assembly meetings, and we are happy with his commitment and faithfulness” (Key Informant 10 at Mkambarani Ward, 17<sup>th</sup> July 2017).*

### **3.6.3 Accountability in the project implementation**

The findings revealed that there was dual-accountability on part of the appointed officials in projects implementation that influenced the relationship between the two. In reality, the appointed officials have to be accountable to the District Executive Director (DED) and report on their performance about the projects. However, in the field, the appointed officials are also accountable to the elected officials and receive orders and directive from the elected officials. In WDCs, the Ward Councillor is the Chairperson, and the Ward Executive Officer is the secretary. In a village council, the Village Executive Officer is the Secretary. The appointed officials such as WEOs and VEOs are accountable to elected officials through providing development reports to the elected officials before submitting them to the village councils or village assembly meetings. During key informant interviews, one of the Village Executive Officers at Mkambarani made the following observation:

*“When it comes to accountability, the appointed officials are highly confused on whom they are exactly supposed to be accountable to, because the elected officials want appointed officials to be accountable to them as their bosses” (Key Informant 15 at Mkambarani Ward, 6<sup>th</sup> May 2017)’.*

The study found that the elected officials influence the accountability of the appointed officials as they provide challenges to elected officials, the use of watchdogs and



scrutinizing their performance in project implementation. If the appointed officials underperform, the elected officials would report this underperformance to higher authorities such as Heads of Department or District Executive Director. These findings are in line with the findings of some other studies such as Landa (2017) and Kesale (2017) who found that councillors in the structure of local government system act as watchdogs of the performance of the local government personnel in improving socio-economic development through social service delivery. The findings of the studies by Landa (2017) and Kesale (2017) revealed that the appointed officials have to provide regular reports on the implementation of development projects to the elected officials who act as leaders and representatives of the communities.

The success or failure of development projects is largely dependent on accountability on the part of the elected officials (Kironde *et al.*, 1997). As it was stated earlier, most of the public development projects are initiated by communities through support of their elected officials. The findings of this paper revealed that the elected officials played a major role in determining and supervising the implementation of development activities and public development projects. In the local government structure, at ward level, the elected officials (Councillors) act as Chairpersons, and WEOs act as Secretaries in the Ward Executive Committees (WDCs); while at the Village Council, the village chairpersons act as chairpersons and VEOs act as secretaries to the Council.

The study findings are in line with findings of a study conducted by Mafuru *et al.* (2015) which revealed that in Mvomero District Council elected officials complained that the appointed officials were not accountable in the implementation of development projects because they were not residents of the localities; they believed that the communities were not responsible for the employment of these officials. They therefore considered the

appointed officials as individuals who lacked patriotism, were selfish and embezzled project funds to pay themselves undue overtimes and allowances. During a key informant interview at Kiziwa Village, one of the elected officials said:

*“The appointed officials are neither committed nor accountable to the success of our projects because they are not living in our villages and even their children are not studying in our poor village schools and getting services in our poor health centres”* (Key Informant 5 at Kiroka Ward, 14<sup>th</sup> March 2017).

This implies that accountability among appointed officials in the projects implementation is still a problem in the local governments. The elected officials fail to hold appointed officials accountable due to weak internal and external control systems, corruption and low level of education and awareness on issues of policies and laws (World Bank, 2016; Kironde *et al.*, 1997). Various studies show that the appointed officials have been misusing development projects’ funds for personal interests (Lyatonga *et al.*, 2015; Mafuru *et al.*, 2015; Kesale, 2016).

On another side, the findings revealed that appointed officials also complained on poor accountability of the elected officials in implementation of development projects. It was revealed that elected officials accuse appointed officials as they get salary and allowances to implement projects, therefore they have to be accountable to the projects and not to them. During a key informant interview at Kinole Ward, one of the WEOs said:

*“We are not getting support from politicians during implementation of the project simply because they complain that we are getting salaries and allowances while they get nothing from the project”* (Key Informant 3 at Kinole Ward, 25<sup>th</sup> April 2017).

These findings are in line with findings of a the study which was conducted by REPOA (2008), which showed that in their working with elected officials, appointed officials criticised elected officials that they always made unrealistic promises during elections and had cynical concerns for re-election and that these made them have irresponsible accountability to appointed officials.

#### **3.6.4 Adherence to the rule of law, administrative policies, rules and regulations in the projects implementation**

Rule of Law in the implementation of development activities in local governments is highly crucial in ensuring that justice and fairness prevail. The government through Ministry of PO-RGLG and PO-PSM establish various administrative policies, rules and regulations that guide the performance of both appointed and elected officials in their performance. The policies, rules and regulations aimed at improving the relation and maintaining the relations between elected and appointed officials for the interest of the public. The policies, laws, rules and regulations include; Local Government (District Council) Act of 1982, The Constitution of United Republic of Tanzania, Standing Order for Public Service, 2009, Public Service Act, 2002 and Public namely Code of Conduct for Councillors of 2000, Code of Ethics and Conduct of Public Service Leader Code of Ethics Act, 1995.

Elected and appointed officials in central and local governments require to adhere with accountability and transparency, political neutrality, confidentiality, avoidance of favouritism and conflict of interests (URT, 2005). Code of Ethics and Conducts for Public Service and Code of Conduct for Councillors in Tanzania require both parties to maintain political neutrality and to perform their responsibilities in accordance to law, regulations and procedures, when discharging their responsibilities. Most administrative policies,

laws, rules and regulations established intends to promote acceptable behaviour at the work place and maintain positive relations at work place.

**Table 3.2: Whether respondents know policies, laws and regulations guiding relations between elected and appointed officials (n = 64)**

Responses	Total		Elected		Appointed	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Yes	29	45.3	12	37.5	17	53.10
No	35	54.7	20	62.5	15	46.90

Despite the fact that local governments have various policies and regulations guiding the relations between elected and appointed officials, still the majority of the officials are not aware of those policies, rules and regulations. Table 3.2 indicates that 62.5% of the elected officials in MDC were not aware of the policies and regulations while 53.1% of the appointed officials were not aware of the same policies and regulations. This findings is supported in Table 3.1 that shows 60% of the respondents reported that elected and appointed officials in performing their duties do not comply with rules, policies and regulations. During focus group discussion conducted at Kiroka ward on 14<sup>th</sup> April 2017 in which the researcher was invited, the participants revealed that majority of elected officials were standard seven leavers, therefore it was very difficult for them to read and understand administrative policies, laws, rules and regulations. This implies that there is a need to facilitate training on awareness of those policies and regulations to elected officials in order to control their interference and failing to comply with those policies, rule and regulations.

The study findings show that the elected officials did not adhere to policies, rules and regulations in their performance with appointed officials because they were more influenced by personal and political interests than adherence to laws and policies.

Example, Code of Conducts for Councillors and Code of Ethics and Conduct for Public services require both elected and demand elected officials to influence community to participate in development projects without considering their political affiliation, They should adhere to rules and regulations and not providing service with bias due to his/her political affiliation. The study revealed that chairperson at Kiroka Village discouraged and influenced people on not contributing for building a dispensary for political reasons that the timing of the project was wrong as it was near to general elections. The chairperson was afraid of losing popularity from the voters. This finding was confirmed during an interview with Village Executive Officer Kiroka who said:

*“Elected officials always do not adhere to the rule of law guided by government policies; they are always for political interests and not otherwise. They support law or policy only if it helps them remain in power (Key Informant 5 at Kiroka Ward, 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2017).*

The appointed officials accused the elected officials of not adhering to the decisions, policies, and by-laws that were approved by the village assembly meetings. For example, at Mkuyuni Ward, they agreed that any person who refused to contribute for the projects should be taken to court, but in most cases the elected officials obstructed the implementation of that rule for political reasons. It was found that only the Councillor of Kiroka Ward was very strict in ensuring that people contributed resources as agreed by village assembly or WDCs. During a key informant interview, one of the head teachers at Mkambarani had the following to say:

*“It is impossible for the elected officials to implement a policy or a by-law which negatively affects their voters; the only desire of politicians is to remain in power,*

*build trust to the electorate and be re-elected* (Key Informant 15 at Mkambarani Ward, 22<sup>nd</sup> May 2018).

These findings imply that personal and political interests influence the elected officials' decision to adhere to the policies and to the rule of law in the implementation of the projects.

Therefore, it is important to consider various factors before establishing by-laws or policies and check out on their implication on the performance of the elected officials. These findings are in line with findings of a study which was conducted by Mafuru *et al.* (2015) in Mvomero District Council which revealed that despite the existence of code of conduct that provides a clear demarcation of the roles between the elected and the appointed officials, the former do not respect the realm of the latter, something which negatively influences the implementation of development projects. The authors revealed further that the elected officials sometimes perform the roles of administrators in implementation of development projects, and these include collecting money for construction of roads or supervising project works without the consent of the appointed staff. These findings were supported by one of appointed officials at Kiroka who had this to say.

*“In most cases, politicians who are supposed to work as policy makers and representatives of local people, also intervene in our responsibilities such as collecting revenues, selling land and supervising projects and sometimes prohibit us from performing our professional duties* (Key Informant 1 at Kiroka Ward, 16<sup>th</sup> March 2017).

Code of Ethics and Conduct for Public Services, Code of Conduct for Councillors, and Standing Order, 2009 requires both elected and appointed officials to perform their work

with integrity and adhere with the principle of political neutrality. As section F. 21 (e) of the Standing Order stated that:

*“A public servant shall be neutral and impartial while delivering services to the public without any bias due to his political affiliation”*

The findings revealed that appointed officials at ward and village levels in their performance to the projects officials were influenced by their affiliation to Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM). The appointed officials are likely to cooperate smoothly with elected officials rather than supporting elected from opposition political parties. During key informant interview with one of Village chairpersons from opposition party at Kinole Ward stated that:

*“ Ward Executive Officer and Village Executive Officer always perceive negative on elected officials from opposition political parties, they are reluctant to support us in implementation of projects based on their political affiliation with CCM”*  
(Key Informant 9, Kinole Ward on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

The above findings were supported by focus group discussion (FGD) conducted at Kinole Ward whereas majority of participants agreed that implementation of health and education projects failed because of the existed conflicts between elected and appointed officials as a result of their different political affiliations. This finding implies that appointed officials fail to comply with the principles of political neutrality in their performance, therefore, interactions between the two become a great challenge to project success.

### **3.7 Conclusions and Recommendations**

The implementation of construction of health and education infrastructures in Morogoro District depends much on good relationships between elected and appointed officials and

their adherence to the principles of good governance. The extent to which the elected and appointed officials improve participation, adhere to the rule of law, increase transparency and accountability increase the chances of success in the implementation of development projects. It is concluded that there was high participation of elected and appointed officials at early stages including designing and mobilization of resources, but that the participation decreased at the stage of implementation of projects. Thus, it is concluded that low levels of transparency, accountability and adherence to the rule of law among elected and appointed officials jeopardize implementation of development projects and negatively affect relations between the elected and appointed officials. The statutory meetings such as village councils, village assemblies and WDCs are not conducted regularly; therefore, the elected officials and the communities do not receive any information about the implementation of their development projects. In view of the results, it is also concluded that the complementary model is an effective tool that does assist the two parties to adhere to good governance principles, which are advocated for information sharing, involvement, and compliance with rules of law by the two parties to maintain their relations.

In connection with the above conclusions, it is recommended that Morogoro District Council should set strategies to conduct regular monitoring of adherence to governance principles by both parties. The complementary model of political- administrative relations was found to have important contribution to improving interaction between elected and appointed officials and adherence to governance; therefore, it is recommended to the council to use the model in projects implementation. Local governments, through PO-RALG, should conduct training to both elected and appointed officials on policies, rules and regulations, and code of conducts that guide their relations in development projects. The study recommends, further, that the elected officials and appointed officials who are



responsible for organizing meetings should ensure that meetings such as village assemblies, village councils, and WDCs are conducted regularly. This could guarantee transparency and accountability of the appointed and elected officials in the implementation of public development projects.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### 4.0 CONTRIBUTIONS OF POLITICAL-ADMINISTRATIVE RELATIONS IN CONSTRUCTION OF HEALTH AND EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURES IN MOROGORO DISTRICT COUNCIL, TANZANIA

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#### **4.1 Abstract**

Social services provision is a central focus of any local government. Under decentralization by devolution (D by D), Local Government Authorities (LGAs) have become responsible for delivering social services within their areas of jurisdiction. This paper sought to investigate the contribution of political-administrative relations in construction of health and education infrastructure projects in Morogoro District Council. The study adopted a case study research design, and a total of 64 respondents (elected and appointed officials) were randomly selected. Qualitative data were collected through key informant interviews, focus group discussions and observation techniques. A questionnaire based survey was used to collect quantitative data. The study used content analysis techniques to analyse qualitative data, but descriptive statistics including



frequencies and percentages were used to analyse quantitative data. The study found that political-administrative relations played an important role for effective implementation of projects. The study revealed that good relationship between elected and appointed officials facilitated mobilization of project resources, increased public participation, improved trust, minimized conflicts of interest and ensured transparency and accountability. However, some challenges were found which, to some extent, limited attainment of good implementation of construction projects. The challenges included the following: partisan politics and politicization of public services, low levels of education and role ambiguities, distrust and poor accountability and lack of financial incentive to elected officials at local levels. It is concluded that maintained good relations between elected and appointed officials contribute to effective implementation of development projects. It is also concluded that lack of proper monitoring of the relationships between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects negatively affects their interactions. Therefore, it is recommended that local governments should monitor interactions between the elected and the appointed officials in projects including transparency, interference and accountability. The appointed officials have to maintain political neutrality in their performance and interaction with elected officials in the projects. The government is urged to pay certain monthly allowances to village/hamlet chairpersons as an incentive to the elected officials at local level to motivate them to be actively involved in development projects and avoid temptations to misappropriate or embezzle project funds.

**Key words:** Political-administrative relations, Public development projects, Local Government Authorities

## 4.2 Introduction

The government of Tanzania is undertaking various development initiatives towards poverty reduction and sustainable political, social, and economic development (REPOA, 2008). In improving standards of living, as stipulated in the Tanzania Development Vision 2025, the Government has made some efforts to improve social services delivery to the public. The government has improved access to education, safe water, roads and health services in rural and urban areas. In these initiatives, local governments have the responsibilities of ensuring social development and public service provision within their areas of jurisdiction, facilitating the maintenance of law and promoting local development through participatory processes (Njunwa, 2017; Shivji *et al.*, 2000). Accordingly, local governments are required to perform both mandatory and permissive functions in their localities as stipulated in the Local Government (District Authorities) Act No. 8 of 1982 (URT, 1982). As observed further by Siraju *et al.* (2015), local governments are vital organs of the state through which development programmes are formulated and implemented for well-being of the communities.

In achieving poverty reduction and sustainable development, the Government of Tanzania has undertaken various public development projects in both rural and urban Local Government Authorities (LGAs). The government tries to improve access to quality of social services such as education, health, clean and safe water, and infrastructures such as roads (Ogbette *et al.*, 2018; Muro *et al.*, 2015; Sigalla, 2015). A study by Lufunyo (2013) indicates that, through Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP), the Government was working to improve access to social services in the rural areas, especially in health and education services. For the purpose of this paper, the focus is on health and education development projects which were being implemented in Morogoro District Council.

The elected and appointed officials are an integral part of public administration in both central and local governments (Weible, 2011; Siggen *et al.*, 2009; Kalseth *et al.*, 1998). Therefore, the performance of local governments is highly based on mutual and positive relations between the elected and the appointed officials. Good relations between the two parties enhance government's legitimacy while bad or conflicting relations undermine legitimacy of the government (Rahman, 2017; Montoy, 1995). Local governments in Tanzania consist of the elected and appointed officials with different responsibilities to perform, as elected officials focus on policy formulation and oversight while appointed officials remain with policy implementation and technical issues (Lane, 2013; Weible, 2011). In other words, administrators have to work on the basis of their expertise and professionalism, not on political pressures and have to work within the limits of the legal and policy frameworks. In the context of this paper, the appointed officials in local governments are those officials who are recruited and hired by the government to work in the local government at the district, ward, and village levels. The appointed officials include the District Executive Director (DED), Heads of Department (HoDs), Ward Executive Officers (WEOs), Ward Education Coordinators (WEC) and Community Development Officers (CDOs) at ward levels. The village level appointed officers include Village Executives (VEOs), Village Health Officers (VHOs), and Village Community Officers (VCOs).

The elected officials are democratically elected by the people and represent the communities. The elected officials in the local governments include Members of Parliament who are residents in given councils, Chairperson of the Council, ward counsellors, village chairpersons, Hamlet chairpersons, WDCs members and village council members. The elected officials are more likely to advocate the interests of the communities in social and economic development in their localities (Siraju *et al.*, 2015;

Landa, 2017; Zeemering, 2008). In Tanzania, local governments hold their elections after every five years as stipulated in the amendment of the Local Government Authority (Elections) Act, Cap. 2010 (URT, 2010), and the candidates must be nominated by their political parties. In most cases, the elected officials ought to be responsive to their electorates and constituents and always make decisions for their own political interests or favour. According to Anosisye (2017), the elected officials, especially councillors, are supposed to collect, present and defend the interests of their electorates and ensuring effective services delivery within their areas of jurisdiction.

Public development projects can be defined as those development projects that aim at improving the standards of living of the people in a given locality and involving communities in their implementation (Kisimbe *et al.*, 2014; Agba *et al.*, 2013; Crook, 2003). Therefore, public development projects such as dispensary and health centre construction, primary and secondary education projects, water projects and agricultural projects are implemented in response to the needs of the communities. Through decentralization policy, particularly decentralization by devolution (D by D), most of the development projects which were formerly implemented by the central government have been transferred to the local governments (Sigalla, 2015; Frumence *et al.*, 2014).

Decentralization of social services focuses on democratization and enhancement of participation of the communities in issues that directly affect their lives (Yilmaz *et al.*, 2010; Crook, 2003). Public participation in development activities is done either directly or through representatives regarded as the means of enhancing the relevance, quality, and sustainability of development. The World Bank (1995) regards public participation as a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over different initiatives, decisions, and resources which affect them. Therefore, involvement of communities and

their elected representatives in the public development projects is imperative for projects success.

The government realized shortage of health and education infrastructures in rural districts as a large number of villages and wards did not have adequate buildings for provision of health and education services (Kida and Phares, 2014). After realizing this problem of inadequate infrastructures, the government initiated construction projects in collaboration with communities through a self-help system. The government of Tanzania invests much in health and education sectors; it spends considerable amounts of money on the health sector—close to 10% of its total budgetary resources (Malik *et al.*, 2015; Abel-smith and Rawal, 1992). It was reported that Local Government Authorities (LGAs) receive around TZS. 10 700 per person in recurrent health grants each year. At local level, the communities, in partnership with local governments, initiate and implement construction of dispensaries and health centres in their localities. The communities participate through self-help, free labour and financial contribution to health projects implementation. The National Health Policy (2003) emphasizes on community participation from planning to implementation stage of health related activities in local governments.

#### **4.3 Problem Statement**

In ensuring quality health and education services to the public, the government of Tanzania, through partnership with local community, establishes construction of infrastructures for those projects. The challenges to better access to such services have been contributed by a number of factors including financial constraints, poor participation, financial mismanagement and corruption, lack of political will and poor accountability (Frumence *et al.*, 2014; Makorere, 2012; Bratton, 2011). However, a study by Poncian *et al.* (2015) revealed that despite adequacy of funds, other development

projects could still not be implemented as per the allocated funds. REPOA (2007) attributed this to poor performance of local governments in public development projects to lack of political accountability among local officials. Several studies (Njunwa, 2017; Mafuru *et al.*, 2015; Lyatonga, 2012) have analysed the relationship between elected and appointed officials in local governments.

The previous studies, however, focused on the relationship between elected and appointed officials in facilitating employees' performance in local governments. The studies tried to examine the extent to which their relationships affect local government staff in performing their duties. Little is known in the scholarly literature about the importance and challenges of political-administrative relations for effective implementation of public development projects in the local governments. Therefore, this paper aimed at achieving the general objective to explore the roles played by elected and appointed officials in construction of health and education infrastructures in Morogoro District Council. Specifically, the paper examines the contribution of political-administrative relations in construction of health and education infrastructure projects in Morogoro District Council, and describe major challenges which negatively affect the relationship between the elected and the appointed officials in the given development projects in Morogoro District Council.

#### **4.4 Theoretical Framework**

The paper is guided by the complementary model as propagated by modern scholars of new public administration such as Svava (2001) and Jacobsen (1999). The complementary model of political-administrative relations advocates for the New Public Management (NPM) which calls for self-conscious administrative involvement in political sensitive issues while observing political neutrality (Baletito *et al.*, 2012; Overeem, 2005). Under

this model, it is unfeasible and undesirable to keep politics and administration separate as opposed to Wilson's (1987) classical model which advocates total separation between politics and administration. The complementary model suggests that, in doing their functions, the elected and the appointed officials should observe political neutrality and consider public interests over personal interests (Frederickson *et al.*, 2003; Svara, 1999). The key assumptions of the complementary model include interconnectedness between politics and administrations. The model holds that administrators can have a great impact on policy making and the elected officials can have a great impact on administration, and separating the two will result in poor performance (Khair *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, the complementary model stresses on interdependency, reciprocal influence, and extensive interaction between appointed and elected officials.

In order to ensure effective implementation of public development projects in the local governments, the relationship between elected and appointed officials must be guided by complementary relationships and work in cooperation as a team (Mafuru *et al.*, 2015; Lyatonga *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, elected and appointed officials have to work in cooperation and harmony in implementation of development projects as advocated by the complementary model. Their roles and responsibilities in development projects are interdependent and require support of each other in order to accomplish their functions. They need to have common public interests to achieve better implementation of public development projects.

## **4.5 Methodology**

### **4.5.1 The study area**

The study was conducted in Morogoro District Council, Morogoro Region. Morogoro District Council is characterized by poor implementation of public development projects

(URT, 2017). Four wards were purposively selected based on the presence both completed and continuing construction projects for health and education infrastructures implemented in their wards. The selected wards were Mkambarani, Mkuyuni, Kiroka, and Kinole. Two villages from each ward were selected purposively based on the nature of public development projects (educational and health projects) making a total of eight villages. The selected villages were Kibwaya, Kizinga, Pangawe, Mkuyuni A, Bamba, Kirundwa, Tandai and Kiziwa (Morogoro District Council, 2003).

#### **4.5.2 Research design**

The study adopted a case study research design. A case study research design allows exploration and understanding of complex issues and is considered to be a robust research method particularly when holistic, in-depth investigation is required. The design is useful for descriptive and explorative studies design (Starman, 2013; Bryman, 2008; Yin, 1994).

#### **4.5.3 Sampling procedures and sample size**

Four (4) wards namely Mkambarani, Mkuyuni, Kiroka and Kinole were purposefully selected. In those four wards there were health and education development projects which were being implemented and others which had just been completed. The study collected data from elected and appointed officials in the study area, whereby a formula by Yamane (1973) was adopted to obtain the desired sample size, assuming 95% confidence level and 0.05 as sampling error. The formula used is follows:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)} \dots\dots\dots$$

(1)

Where:  $n$  = sample size,

$N$  = population size and



$e$  = level of precision (sampling error).

The number of elected and appointed officials in the study area were 76. Therefore, using the above formula, a total of 64 elected and appointed officials were sampled. The sample size is relevant because it was large enough to provide the required information. Statistically, 30 cases can provide empirical evidence in social science research (Kothari, 2005).

#### **4.5.4 Data collection**

Data were collected through a questionnaire based survey, focus group discussions, key informant interviews, direct observation methods, and documentary review. Key informant interviews were conducted using an interview guide. Key informant interviews were used to get in-depth information about importance of political-administrative relations in development projects implementation in local governments. Key informants were selected purposively basing on being considered to have in-depth knowledge and experience on public development projects implementation in the local governments. The key informants included appointed officials particularly the District Executive Officer (DED), the District Education Officer (DEO), the District Medical Officer (DEO), Ward Executive Officers (WEOs), Village Executive Officers (VEOs), Ward Education Officers (WEOs), and Head Teachers. The elected officials included the Member of Parliament (MP), the District Chairperson, Ward Councillors, Village Chairpersons, Hamlet Chairpersons, School Committee members and members of projects committees.

A total of four FGDs with a total of 42 participants were conducted. The participants in FGDs were purposively selected based on their being considered to have in-depth information about development projects implementation. The focus group discussions (FDGs) involved both men and women who were directly involved in implementation

and had in-depth information about the projects. The number of participants in an FGD session ranged from eight to eleven. In those focus group discussions, issues of political-administrative relations and their importance and challenges in health and education projects implementation were discussed.

#### **4.5.5 Data analysis**

The main technique applied in data analysis was content analysis whereby data from key informants, focus group discussions and field observation were grouped into different themes based on the conceptual description of ideas and concepts (Kothari, 2015; Creswell, 2014; Patton, 1990). However, the data collected through the questionnaire based survey were analysed using IBM Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS), Version 20 whereby descriptive statistics were computed. The contribution of political-administrative relations in construction of health and education infrastructure projects was determined by analysing views of the respondents on how and where low and high interactions between elected and appointed officials were associated with inadequate and adequate completion of construction projects respectively.

### **4.6 Results and Discussion**

#### **4.6.1 Contribution of political-administrative relations in construction of health and education infrastructures**

Based on the four (4) case studies in four wards namely Mkambarani, Kiroka, Kinole and Mkuyuni which implemented construction of health and education infrastructure projects in Morogoro District Council, the results explain the contribution of political-administrative relations on implementation health and education infrastructures projects. The projects included construction of Mandela Secondary School classrooms and teachers' offices (Mkambarani Ward), Kiziwa Dispensary (Kiroka Ward), Mkuyuni

Health Centre (Mkuyuni Ward) and Kinole Secondary School classrooms and teachers' offices (Kinole Ward). The levels of interaction between elected and appointed officials in those areas are indicated in Table 4.1. Then the success and failure of projects in those areas are explained in relation to the interaction levels.

**Table 4.1: Level of Interaction by ward (n = 64)**

Ward	Low (<18.8)		Moderate (18.8-33.7)		High (>33.7)	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Kinole	5	<b>56.2</b>	9	31.5	2	12.5
Mkuyuni	4	25	9	<b>56.2</b>	3	18.8
Kiroka	4	<b>68.8</b>	11	25	1	6.2
Mkambarani	0	0	13	<b>81.2</b>	3	18.8

The finding in Table 4.1 shows that wards (Kiroka and Kinole) which had low interactions between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects, their performance towards aimed projects was low compared to those wards (Mkambarani and Mkuyuni) with moderate interactions. For example, as indicate in Plate 4.1 construction of classrooms and teachers' offices at Kinole Secondary School was not successfully implemented as planned because of low interactions (56.2%) between elected and appointed officials. It was observed that very few legal meetings such as WDCs and village councils were conducted due to misunderstandings between elected and appointed officials at Kinole Ward. The area is highly characterized by partisan politics whereby the majority of elected officials at village level were from opposition political party—CUF. Elected officials persuaded community members not to contribute their labour and cash for implementation of projects.



**Plate 4.1: Incomplete classrooms and teachers' offices at Kinole Secondary School**

Another case of incomplete construction was of Kiziwa Dispensary at Kiroka ward where the interaction levels between elected and appointed officials was low as said by 68.8% of the respondents. That project remained incomplete at the foundation stage for almost more than 5 years. Formerly, the construction of Kiziwa Dispensary was estimated to be completed within two years 2013 – 2015, but the Village chairperson at Kiziwa village and village council members and Ward Executive Officer and Village Executive Officer were in misunderstandings; as a result the misunderstandings contributed to poor participation of communities in the project. During a village council meeting at Kiziwa village, the researcher observed misunderstandings between Ward Executive Officer and Village chairperson on involvement of communities to contribute for the project. Elected official (Village chairperson) objected communities to contribute cash for the projects due to poor timing, particularly just before a harvesting season. One of the Village Executive Officers at Kinole Ward said:

*“Because of poor cooperation and communication between village chairpersons, Ward Executive Officers and Village Executive Officer; our construction of classrooms and teachers’ houses projects failed, which was compounded by poor participation of communities in the projects”* (Key informant, 5 at Kinole Ward, 18<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

The above findings imply that low interaction between elected and appointed officials in development project contributed to the failure of implementation of the projects at Kiroka and Kinole Wards. These findings were supported by focus group discussions at Kinole Ward where participants were in consensus that poor relations between their elected officials and appointed officials discouraged communities from participating in the implementation of the projects. It was argued that partisan politics between Chama cha Mapinduzi and Civic United Front affected the interaction between elected and appointed officials. One of the Village Executive Officers at Kinole ward stated:

*“Appointed officials, especially Ward Executive Officers and Village Executive Officers, have a tendency of not cooperating with opposition elected leaders, and in most cases they discourage community members from participation in development activities for political reasons”* (Key informant 7 at Kinole Ward, 19<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

The study findings are in line with findings of a study which was conducted by Landa (2017) on political endeavors desirable in Local Government Authorities (LGAs) which found that party politics in local governments negatively affect the relationship between elected and appointed officials in performing their functions.

Mkambarani and Mkuyuni Wards which experienced moderate interaction between elected and appointed officials observed successful implementation of construction projects. At Mkambarani, as indicated by Table 4.2, it shows that 81.2% of the respondent indicated moderate interaction between elected and appointed officials while at Mkuyuni as indicated in Plate 4.3 shows that 56.2% of the respondents indicated moderate interactions. This implies that complete implementation of the projects in Mkuyuni and Mkambarani within specified period was influenced by positive relations between elected officials and appointed officials in the study area. Both elected and appointed officials cooperated in mobilising resources for the projects from communities as well as conducting enough meetings to mobilise communities to participate in projects.



**Plate 4.2: Completed construction of classrooms for Advanced Level-Nelson Mandela Secondary School at Mkambarani Ward**

About the successful completion of classrooms at Nelson Mandela Secondary School, a key informant—WEO—at Mkambarani Ward said:

*“I successfully implemented construction of classrooms and teachers’ offices at Mandela Secondary School because I got high support from Village and Hamlet*



*Chairpersons in mobilising people to contribute their labour and funds for the projects” (Key Informant 15 at Mkambarani Ward, 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2017).*

The findings from the WEO were supported by focus group discussants at Mkuyuni Ward in which participants agreed that successful implementation of construction of Mkuyuni Health Centre was due to good cooperation between elected and appointed officials in influencing and mobilising communities to participate in the projects. These findings imply that communities are likely to participate and support development projects if they believe that their representatives—elected officials—are involved and work in harmony with appointed officials.

These findings are in line with findings of a study by Mafuru *et al.* (2015) which reported that elected officials—Councillors—play a great role of conveying information from council offices to residents on matters relating to feedback on development projects.



**Plate 4.3: Completed construction of Mkuyuni Health Centre, Mkuyuni Ward**

## 4.6.2 Ways in which political-administrative relations contribute to effective implementation of development projects

### 4.6.2.1 Promoting community participation and mobilization of resources

The implementation of development projects requires both human and financial resources to succeed. Local communities have to contribute either their labour or finance for implementation of given development projects (Muro *et al.*, 2015). It requires cost sharing between the Government and local communities who are the beneficiaries of the development projects. Political-administrative relations were said by the respondents to contribute to improving communities' participation in development projects in various ways as summarised in Table 4.2. The vast majority (93.7%) of the respondents were of the view that good relations between elected and appointed officials improve communities participation while 89.0% of them said that the relations promoted trust and working relations. Table 4.3 indicates that 75% of the respondents supported the opinion that bad relations between elected and appointed officials contributed to poor participation of communities in implementation of development projects.

**Table 4.2: Whether good relations between elected and appointed officials contribute to successful implementation of projects**

Statement	None		Little		Much	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Improve communities participation	0	0.0	4	6.3	60	93.7
Promote trust and working relations	1	1.6	6	9.4	57	89.0
Reduce partisan politics	2	3.1	10	15.6	52	81.2
Enhance mobilization of resources	1	1.6	10	15.7	53	82.9
Increase transparency and accountability	2	3.1	15	23.4	47	73.5
Increase poor financial resource management	19	29.7	16	25.0	29	45.3
Minimize interpersonal conflicts	6	9.4	14	21.9	44	68.8
Increase respect to rule of laws	17	26.6	15	23.4	32	50.0



The study findings also revealed that it is important for the elected and the appointed officials to have good relations in order to encourage citizens' participation in development projects. The study found that health and education projects such as Mkuyuni Health Centre and Mkambarani Secondary School implemented at Mkuyuni and Mkambarani Wards respectively were successful because of good relations among Councillors, Village Chairpersons, Hamlet Chairpersons, Ward Executive Officers (WEOs) and Village Executive Officers (VEOs) who worked together as teams to mobilize communities to contribute their resources to the projects.

The situation in Mkuyuni and Mkambarani Wards is contrary to the situation in Kinole Ward whereby there was low interaction between elected officials from opposition political party (CUF) who had conflicts and misunderstandings with appointed officials. The conflicts and misunderstandings led to poor mobilization of communities to participate in the projects. The same case happened at Kiziwa village where, due to conflicts between elected and appointed officials in construction of a village dispensary, results to delay of completion of the project since 2013.



**Plate 4.4: Community members participating in construction of a health centre at Mkuyuni Ward**

During a key informant interview at Kinole, Village Chairperson stated that:

*“Our Village Chairperson is a very committed leader and wants to initiate development activities but he always gets no support from our Village Executive Officer. Their conflict makes it difficult for us to participate in development projects”* (Key Informant 9 at Kinole, 18<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

The appointed officials such as WEOs and VEOs depend much on the elected officials in organizing public meetings, campaigns and mobilization of resources from the communities. The study found that elected officials are the ones who are closer to the communities; therefore, communities tend to trust what their political leaders tell them to participate in implementation of the projects. Apart from increasing communities’ participation, the study revealed that good relations between elected and appointed officials facilitated effective mobilization of funds from communities to implement public

development projects. About 83% of the respondents agreed that political-administrative relations contribute to mobilisation of communities to contribute their labour and cash for development projects. At Kinole Ward, communities rejected to contribute their funds and labour to a project to construct classrooms at Kinole Secondary School because their elected officials Village Chairperson asked them not to contribute. During a KII, one of the Ward Education Officers (WEOs) at Kinole had this observation:

*“It is very difficult for us (appointed officials) to implement public development projects successfully without support from politicians, because they are closer to the people, and once they accept the projects, it is easy for them to mobilize their voters”*(Key Informant 16 at Mkambarani Ward, 14<sup>th</sup> May 2017).

Similar findings were also reported in focus group discussions that it was difficult for communities to support construction projects in which their elected leaders were not involved or did not support. People believed that the elected officials represent their interests and problems, unlike the appointed officials. To support the commitment of elected officials to their interests, a key informant interviewee at Mkambarani ward said that elected officials contributed even their funds to development projects. The village chairperson at Kizinga said that their Member of Parliament (MP) donated TZS 14 000 000/= (Fourteen Million shillings) for implementation of dispensary projects in Mkambarani Ward. The Village Chairperson at Kiziwa Village had this to say:

*“The appointed officials have no pains with our local problems and interests, unlike the elected officials; the appointed officials are not accountable to our local problems and are always supposed to be supervised by elected officials.”*  
(Key Informant 10 at Mkambarani Ward, 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2017).

This quote implies that the process of involving elected officials including councillors, village chairpersons and hamlet chairpersons have a direct relationship with public participation in the public development projects. The findings are in line with the findings of Weible (2011) and Demir and Nyhan (2008) on local governments in the United States and whose findings indicate that the local elected officials in most cases respond to the problems of their local constituencies. They concluded that politics do play an important role in public administration and social services delivery.

These findings imply that the involvement of communities in designing and implementing development projects is highly dependent on the nature of the relationship between their representatives and the local government staff. These findings are in line with studies by Landa (2015) and Kafiriri *et al.* (2003) who found that councillors and village chairpersons, apart from their role of being mediators between councils and residents, they also have another important role of ensuring that the public participates in development activities of the council. Therefore, the findings are consistent with the complementary model which advocates interdependency and reciprocal relationships between the appointed and the elected officials in performing their functions.

**Table 4.3: The extent to which bad relations between elected and appointed officials affect implementation of development projects in the research area**

Statement	None		Little		Much	
	Freque ncy	Perc ent	Freque ncy	Perc ent	Freque ncy	Perc ent
Increase successful implementation of the projects	20	31.3	15	23.4	29	45.3
Delay in implementation of the project	13	20.4	6	9.4	45	70.3
Cause poor community support on the project	7	10.9	9	14.1	48	75.0
Increase partisans' politics	10	15.6	12	18.8	42	65.7
Decrease transparency and accountability	7	10.9	11	17.2	46	71.8
Lead to misuse of financial resources	13	20.3	15	23.4	36	56.3
Increase interpersonal conflicts	6	9.4	9	14.1	49	76.6

However, with regard to development projects which are directly financed by the Central Government and donors, the study findings revealed that when elected and appointed officials are in good terms “give and take” negatively affect the performance of the projects. The elected officials tend to collude with the appointed officials to misallocate the funds which are budgeted for development projects, and sometimes they pay themselves unlawful allowances. Both the appointed and the elected officials view themselves as unaccountable to the project funds which are not contributed by communities. Therefore, they misuse the funds for personal interests. One of the Ward councillors during a KII stated clearly that:

*“We always notice corruption and mismanagement of project funds when WEs and councillors or VEs and village chairpersons are in good relations as friends, particularly when the project funds come from the Government”* (Key Informant 1 at Mkuyuni Ward, 24<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

#### 4.6.2.2 Building trust and mitigating conflicts

The study found that good relationship between the elected and the appointed officials had a significant role in improving trust and mitigating conflicts in implementation of development projects. Table 4.2 indicates that 89.0% of the respondents agreed that good relationship between the elected and appointed officials in the projects increased trust and improved working relationship between elected and appointed officials as well as to local communities. The study found that lack of trust between elected and appointed officials contributed to interpersonal relations (76.6%) in implementation of the projects as indicated in Table 4.3. Due to lack of trust and interpersonal conflicts, it was difficult for the appointed officials to disclose information about project progress and financial reports to the elected officials if the appointed officials believe that they would be negatively affected. For example, at Kiziwa, the Village Chairperson was in conflict with the Ward Executive Officer (WEO); the major cause of the conflict was distrust whereby the Chairperson accused the Ward Executive Officer of financial mismanagement while the Ward Executive Officer accused the Village chairperson of boycotting project implementation for political reasons. The situation was supported by one of the key informant interviewees at Kiroka who reported remarks of the VEOs as follows:

*“We are afraid of giving certain information about the projects to the elected officials simply because they are not faithful and trustful, and sometimes they use the same information to destroy us for their political gains”* (Key Informant 2 at Kinole Ward, 13<sup>rd</sup> April 2017).

These findings imply that implementation of the public development projects was heavily politicized and subjected to underperformance resulting from lack of trust between the elected and the appointed officials. These study findings are in line with findings of a study by Jacobsen (1999) on “Trust on political-administrative relations: The case of local

authorities in Norway and Tanzania”. The findings of the cited study showed that, in Tanzania, there was a higher degree of distrust between the elected and the appointed officials in the local authorities than as opposed to Norway. The findings by Jacobsen revealed further that distrust makes the appointed officials fail to disclose information to the elected officials as it may be potentially harmful to them. This implies that the more the appointed officials trust the elected officials, the more willing they are to disclose information about projects implementation. In this case, high degree of trust and transparency in the design and implementation of development project conforms to the complementary model of political-administrative relations which suggests that the elected and the appointed officials should work in harmony, trust, and cooperation to avoid unnecessary conflicts.

#### **4.6.2.3 Increased transparency in projects implementation**

Transparency plays an important role in establishing a strong relationship between elected and appointed officials during designing and implementation of any public development project (Ngware, 2005; Ndudula, 2013). Lack of transparency between the elected and appointed officials discourages public meetings such as village assembly or village council meetings which are important in providing feedback about progress of various projects to community members. The study found that in Kinole and Kiroka Wards where there was low interaction between elected and appointed officials level of transparency was low especially on financial matters. The study revealed that at Kinole Ward, the village chairperson who was elected from Civic United Front (Opposition political party) had been less informed about financial matters and development project progress reports. Table 4.2 reported that 73.5% of the respondents supported that good relationship between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects increased transparency. Table 4.3 also indicates that 71.8% of the respondents related bad

relationship between elected and appointed officials with poor transparency in projects implementation. These findings imply that poor transparency in implementation of development projects affected negatively their relations and increased misunderstandings between elected and appointed officials. One of the key informants from Kinole complained that that:

*“I was elected to represent my people as their village chairperson; hence I am supposed to protect their interests. Sad enough, the Village Executive Officer (VEO) and Ward Executive Officer (WEO) do not inform me about the meetings, and do not accept my suggestions on development project implementation simply because I am an opposition leader”* (Key Informant 9 at Kinole Ward, 23<sup>rd</sup> April 2017).

The above findings were supported by focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted in Mkambarani and Mkuyuni wards whereby participants were in consensus that good relations between elected and appointed officials in implementation of dispensary and secondary school building projects improved transparency especially on financial matters. The participants revealed that good relationship between Ward Executive Officers (WEOs) and Ward Councillors facilitated conduction of meetings as required by the law. Through these meetings, communities managed to have access to information about expenditures of project funds as well as project development progress reports.

The study findings are in line with studies conducted by Audete-Chapdelaine (2016) and Brathan *et al.* (2005) whose results indicated that good relationship between elected and appointed officials requires transparency and reciprocal sharing of information about their day to day functions in Local Government Authorities. This implies that, if there has been



lack of transparency between the elected and appointed officials, it would affect their relations in implementation of public development projects.

#### **4.6.2.4 Improvement of accountability and responsiveness in the projects**

Effective implementation of any public development project requires effective monitoring and supervision from both elected and appointed officials (Khair and Shahan, 2012; Kisimbe and Kasubi, 2014). The study found that it is important to maintain good political-administrative relations to ensure accountability of stakeholders in the implementation of development projects. The study revealed further that the elected officials play an important role of supervising and holding the appointed officials accountable for implementation of development projects. As indicated in Table 4.2, it was reported that 73.5% of the respondents agreed that the relationship between the elected and appointed officials ensured proper use of financial resources and accountability for effective implementation of development projects. During a key informant interview at Kiroka Ward, one of the Councillors proudly stated that:

*“I am the Chairperson of the Ward Development Committee (WDC) as well as of various Development Committees. I have to monitor and supervise the implementation of the projects and scrutinize projects progress reports”* (Key Informant 11 at Kiroka Ward, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2018).

That quotation implies that if there were poor relations between elected and appointed officials, such relations would automatically affect performance of both parties in implementation of development projects. During a focus group discussion which was conducted in Bamba village, the discussants agreed that in construction of classrooms and offices for teachers there was poor accountability on the side of appointed official whereby Village Executive Officer (VEO) used more than 1 500 000/= without

permission from project committee for personal interests. The participants reported that District Executive Director (DED) instead of punishing him, he was transferred to another village.

This was the general view of the majority of FGD participants in Kiroka and Kinole Wards on the construction of health and education infrastructures. Therefore, good relations improve oversight functions of the elected officials over the appointed officials (Njunwa, 2006). The findings are supported by findings of a study by Kesale (2017) who revealed that councillors in the structure of local government act as watchdogs to the appointed officials and ensure that project funds are used for the intended objectives. Therefore, good relationship with mutual interests between the elected and the appointed officials ensures collective accountability of making sure that development projects are implemented successfully.

The findings are in line with those by studies conducted by Njunwa (2017), Mafuru *et al.* (2015) and Frumence *et al.* (2014) which indicated positive association between good political-administrative relations and accountability of both elected and appointed officials in local governments. Their findings revealed that cooperation between the two minimizes conflicts and facilitates team work and supports each other in performing their functions.

#### **4.6.3 Challenges of political-administrative relations interactions in project implementations**

##### **4.6.3.1 Distrust and conflicting interests**

Any relationship between individuals, stakeholders and organizations require mutual trust between parties. Thus any successful implementation of the development projects

requires that kind of mutual relations. The study found that in the projects where the elected and the appointed officials had no mutual trust, which is, the case for construction projects in Kiroka and Kinole Wards. There was poor interaction between the two, and the implementation of their projects was poor. The results in Table 4.4 indicate that distrust between elected and appointed officials was the major source of their poor interaction whereby 84.4% of the respondents agreed that it was the major source. During a Ward Development Committee (WDC) meeting at Kinole Ward on 12<sup>th</sup> June 2017 to which the researcher was invited, it was observed that it had been difficult for the appointed officials to disclose information about project progress and financial reports to the elected officials if they believed that they would be negatively affected by doing so. This implies that appointed officials distrusted elected officials; as a result this created tensions and misunderstandings between elected and appointed officials during implementation of projects.

The findings also showed that village council and village assembly meetings were not held simply because the appointed officials did not want to disclose the financial reports to the elected officials out of fearing that they would use those reports to accuse them to the public. This indicates that the appointed officials distrust the elected officials and accuse them of focusing on political interests instead of considering their interests as professionals. The findings were supported by a key informant interviewee, one of the Ward Executive Officers, who had said the following:

*“... It is difficult to trust politicians when you make decisions about implementation of development projects. During meetings they agree and support the agreements. However, in the implementation they change, if it is not in their political favour”* (Key informant 15 at Mkambarani, 06<sup>th</sup> May 2017).

The above quote was also supported by a Ward Development Committee (WDCs) meeting which was held on 12<sup>th</sup> April 2017 to which the researcher attended at Mkuyuni Ward; it was observed that elected and appointed officials complained to each other on their trust. Elected officials in most cases complained over misuse of collected funds for the projects and poor accountability on the side of appointed officials. The findings show poor interpersonal relations between the two parties. Table 4.2 indicates that 68.8% of the respondents agreed that good relations between appointed and elected official minimize interpersonal conflicts and increase their interactions. The results in Table 4.3 show that bad relations between elected and appointed officials increased interpersonal conflicts and misunderstandings between the two parties in construction projects.

Members had a common understanding that the elected officials had a tendency of accusing the appointed officials of poor implementation of projects, asserting that the appointed officials perform badly for their own political interests. For example, during a village council meeting held on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 2017 at Bamba Village to which the author was invited and which he thus attended both elected and appointed officials agreed to take actions against people who rejected to contribute cash to a dispensary project. However, during the implementation of the decision to collect contributions from communities, the elected officials protected their voters against being taken to court for not paying.

This implies that elected and appointed officials have different interests when it comes to making decisions and implementing them during implementation of development projects. They did this because they feared that they might not be re-elected during a subsequent general election. In Tanzania, there were local elections in 2019, and general elections were due in October 2020. Therefore, the elections negatively affected relations between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects when

decisions were not in favour of voters. From theoretical point of view, these are antagonistic relations between elected and appointed officials. This sort of antagonism is described in the complementary model as applied in this paper.

#### **4.6.3.2 Level of education and role ambiguities**

Education level is one of the factors that affect elected and appointed officials' interaction in the construction projects. Therefore, relationships between elected and appointed officials in the implementation of development projects are influenced by the levels of education of the two. The results in Table 4.4 show that 70.3% of the respondents considered low level of education especially among elected officials as a factor which affected the relationship between appointed and elected officials. The study revealed that the majority of the elected officials were standard seven leavers and did not have further formal education. Out of 31 councillors in Morogoro District Council, only six had attended and completed secondary education. At Kiroka and Kinole wards, 80% of village chairpersons were standard seven leavers with only knowledge of reading and writing. Local government election laws require a nominated candidate to have basic literacy of how to read and write (Warioba, 2008). The appointed officials in all the eight villages where the research was conducted raised concerns that low level of education of the elected officials was a constraint to implementation of development projects. During key informant interviews, one of Ward Executive Officers made the following remark:

*“... Because of their low level of education and ignorance, it is very difficult to work with politicians when it comes to implementation of development projects; they always think that they know everything...”* (Key Informant 5 at Kiroka Ward, 24<sup>th</sup> September 2017).

The above quote implies that differences in the levels of education between the appointed and the elected officials are a major source of interpersonal conflicts between the two parties. The study revealed further that the elected officials failed to make sense out of the financial reports that are given to them by the appointed officials and ignore their technical advice. The low level of education of the elected officials makes them feel inferior before the elected officials and on the other hand high education level of the appointed officials makes them feel superior before the elected officials. The findings are in line with findings of a study by Mafuru *et al.* (2015) who reported that low level of education of the councillors in Mvomero District Council led to poor relations with the appointed officials. This is unlike in Kinondoni Municipal Council where the majority of the councillors who held diplomas, first and second degrees had good relations with the elected officials as they had similar education levels and some similar professional qualifications. The study findings are also in line with findings of a study by REPOA (2008) that revealed that many elected officials in the ward and village levels have only basic education and sometimes no formal education at all, and this negatively affects their effectiveness in handling technical issues.

**Table 4.4: Major challenges in relations between appointed and elected officials in implementation of projects**

<b>Challenges</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percent</b>
Distrust	54	84.4
Personal interest/conflicts	47	73.4
Partisan politics	42	65.6
Financial mismanagement	34	53.0
Roles ambiguities	33	51.6
Low level of education	45	70.3
Poor Accountability	21	32.8

The study further found that roles ambiguities between elected and appointed officials in the projects promote poor relationship between appointed and elected officials in

Morogoro District Council. In most cases, the elected officials fail to demarcate their roles from those of the appointed officials in the implementation of the projects (51.6%). The appointed officials accused the elected officials of interfering with their professional roles and responsibilities in the projects. The findings are in line with findings of a study by Frumence *et al.* (2013) who showed that poor awareness of project's committee members (elected) restricted their participation and made them to fail to understand their demarcation on their duties with the appointed officials. The elected officials in most cases perform duties that are supposed to be performed by appointed officials.

The elected officials are required to mobilize and supervise the implementation of the projects while the appointed officials are supposed to implement the projects. The elected officials want to perform technical parts of the implementation of development projects such as collection of funds contributed by people, purchasing of materials for the projects and awarding tenders. The findings were supported by one of the VEOs during the KIIs who said that:

*“The problem with the elected officials in the implementation of projects is that they want to engage themselves in technical aspects while the code of conduct requires them to perform mobilization and supervision functions.”* (Key Informant 9 at Kinole, 12<sup>th</sup> April 2017).

#### **4.6.3.3 Partisan and political interference**

Local government elections in Tanzania are largely influenced by a multi-party system whereby all the contestants must be nominated by political parties. Therefore, the relationship between the elected and the appointed officials is also influenced by the nature of the elected officials in a given area. Table 4.3 indicates that 65.7% of the respondents reported that party politics and political interference were among the

challenges that negatively affected their relationship. The elected officials accused the appointed officials that the latter lacked political neutrality in performing their functions in their areas of jurisdiction. The opposition elected officials raised concerns that WEOs and VEOs segregated them and declined to disclose information about projects' progress for political reasons. During focus group discussions at Bamba Village, participants had common understanding that Ward Councillors, WEOs, and VEOs failed to support their projects simply because they claimed that they were not in a position to work with elected leaders who were against CCM manifesto. One of the Village chairpersons said:

*“It is very difficult for opposition elected leaders to get support or cooperation with appointed officials simply because the latter are afraid of being punished by the District Executive Director (DED) who is appointed based on his political affiliation to CCM”* (Key Informant 7 at Kirundwa village, 12<sup>th</sup> August 2017).

This implies that the appointed officials view the opposition elected officials negatively as opponents of development and are stubborn to peace and security in their places. The findings are in contrary to the complementary approach of political-administrative relations which affirms that the relationship between the two has to be interdependent and reciprocal without conflicting interests. In view of this, the study observed that in villages/wards the appointed and the elected officials participated in the project implementation. This finding is in line with findings of a study by Mafuru *et al.* (2015) that was done in Mvomero District Council where the majority of councillors came from *Chama Cha Mapinduzi*. It was easy for councillors to pass a proposal from the appointed officials while in Kinondoni Municipal Council where nearly half of the councillors were coming from opposition parties, the council was not simply a rubber stamp of proposals submitted to them by appointed officials.



The findings revealed that in Kiziwa the dispensary projects failed to be implemented because of regular conflicts among WEOs, VEOs and village chairpersons who came from an opposition political party (CUF). The Village Council comprised 25 members among whom 18 were coming from opposition political parties, and only seven (7) came from *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM). The opposition elected officials would approach community members and ask them not to contribute anything to the projects by saying it is the responsibility of the government. During key informant interviews, one of the VEOs had this to say:

*“It is very difficult to work with the elected officials from the opposition parties because they always distrust and view us as puppets of the ruling party (CCM). They always discourage communities from contributing funds for projects on political interests”* (Key Informant 7, at Mkuyuni A, 12<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

This implies that politicization of public services also led to challenges in the relationship between the elected and the appointed officials in the implementation of development projects. Appointment of political parties’ cadres in the local governments negatively influences their relations with the elected officials as it makes the appointed officials fail to observe political neutrality. The findings are in line with those of a study conducted by Audete-Chapdelaine (2016) and Camron (2010) who stated that any interference of elected officials to the appointed officials creates problems and make lives of the appointed officials even more problematic and contributed to poor service delivery. In Pakistan, Bakhsh (2018) said that local governments’ administrators experience interference from politicians which negatively affect their performance.

#### **4.6.3.4 Lack of accountability and transparency**

In relation to accountability, the findings revealed that both parties accused each other of poor accountability to the projects. The study found that appointed officials accused the

elected officials that they were not accountable to the implementation of projects, especially when the projects were not in favour of their political career. As indicated in Table 4.3, 64.8% of the respondents agreed that poor accountability and transparency between elected and appointed officials negatively affected their interaction. The results showed that elected officials especially at village and hamlets levels were not accountable to the projects implementation because they were not benefitting financially from the projects in contrast with appointed officials. A good example was at Bamba village, Kiroka ward; elected officials complained that VEO were using project money to make follow up about the projects to the District while village chairpersons had to use their own money for the same work for travelling to and from the district headquarters. During key informant's interviews, one of the village chairpersons complained that:

*“ It is difficult for us to engage or cooperate with appointed officials in projects implementations because we are not paid anything for that work like appointed officials and other elected officials such as MPs and Ward Councillors” ( Key informant 10 at Mkambarani Ward, 24<sup>th</sup> July 2017).*

The appointed officials went further to accuse elected officials of engaging in corruption and bribery for directing the funds away from the implementation of the projects. They used their influence to award tenders to incompetent bidders, and this resulted in poor quality implementation of the projects. In other cases, they forced their private building companies to be awarded tenders to supply and construct projects. During KIIs, one of the WEOs stated that:

*“The elected officials, in most cases, approach us to give them money from projects for their personal uses. Once you reject they will start to accuse you of poor performance and stealing their funds” (Key Informant 1 at Kiroka Ward, 12<sup>th</sup> July 2017).*

The findings were supported by focus group discussions (FGDs) whereby it was argued that the elected officials in most cases were not accountable to the projects and left the implementation to be under the appointed officials. At Bamba Village, the village assembly decided to remove the village chairperson from his position for misuse of TZS 800 000/= that was contributed by the people for a dispensary project. The elected officials reported not to have gotten any money from supervision of the development projects; this is in contrast with the appointed officials. Therefore, they cannot fully participate in the projects because they have to do other businesses to earn income. During KIIs, one of the village chairpersons had this to say:

*“All the elected officials including the President, Members of Parliament and Ward Councillors are getting allowances and salaries while we, Village and Vitongoji Chairpersons, are not given any payment or allowance”* (Key Informant 4 at Pangawe village, 6<sup>th</sup> July 2017).

The findings are in line with findings of a study conducted by Njunwa (2003) who suggested that village government, through local governments, should find ways to compensate their elected officials and other officials at village level. It implies that compensation to village and hamlet chairpersons will increase their commitment to project implementation and will reduce misappropriation or embezzlement of project funds.

The elected officials accused the appointed officials of not being accountable and transparent in implementation of construction projects. The findings revealed that the elected officials viewed the appointed officials as lacking patriotism and misusing project funds for their own economic gains. During a key informant interview, one of the village chairpersons had this to say:

*“The appointed officials are not accountable in the implementations of development projects, and once they misuse projects funds the only punishment given to them is transferring them to work in another village”* (Key Informant 10 at Kizinga village, 07<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

The observation in the extract was supported by findings from focus group discussions at Mkuyuni Ward, whereby the participants agreed that the appointed officials were not accountable to the implementation of development projects. They accused the appointed officials of being incompetent and corrupt and boasting themselves that no one could do anything to them. This implies that the appointed officials in their view believed that they were not accountable to the village governments. During a village assembly at Kizinga Village, people accused their Village Executive Officer (VEO) of misusing their contributions for development projects and asked the Ward Executive Officer (WEO) to remove him from their village. The village governments have no power of hiring or firing the appointed officials for poor performance or financial mismanagement.

In relation to transparency, the study revealed that the appointed officials were accused of hiding information about the projects' progress. They were reluctant to disclose financial reports to the elected officials especially expenditures, and this was a challenge in their relations with the elected officials. The appointed officials rejected the assumption that they were accountable to the elected officials, and insisted that they had to submit their reports to the WEOs or to the DED. They claimed that once the elected officials have information about project funds they begin disturbing them to use the money for unintended objectives. During key informant interviews, one of the VEOs had this to say about disclosing information:

*“Once they know the financial status, the elected officials are very stubborn and will come to your office and request for money for their personal uses, and once you reject their requests you are in trouble.”* (Key Informant 4 at Kiziwa village, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

#### **4.6.3.5 Lack financial incentives to elected officials**

It was found that elected officials especially at hamlets and village levels complained that they were not financially compensated in comparison to their counterparts. The government provides allowances to other elected officials such as Ward Councillors and Member of Parliament (MPs’) and provides salaries to appointed officials. The study revealed that in most cases elected officials lamented that they could be accountable for projects implementation compared to appointed officials who were being paid for the purpose of implementing those projects. During key informant interviews, one of the VEOs at Kinole had this to say about disclosing information:

*“It is not possible for me to spend all my time working with appointed officials in supervising or mobilizing resources for the projects while my family have no food to eat; they have to pay us allowances as they are doing to appointed officials”* (Key Informant 5 at Kinole Ward, 14<sup>th</sup> June 2017).

The findings were supported by focus group discussions (FGDs) at Mkuyuni Ward whereby it was argued that the elected officials in most cases were not accountable to the projects and left the implementation to be under the appointed officials because they complained that they did not benefit financially from the projects. Participants in this FGDs suggested that the government should establish a certain amount of cash as allowances to Hamlet/Village Chairpersons as motivation for them to spend more time on implementation of the projects.

#### **4.7 Conclusions and Recommendations**

Based on the findings reported in this article, it is concluded that good interactions between elected and appointed officials contribute much to successful implementation of construction projects as in the case of Mkambarani and Mkuyuni Wards. The relations between elected and appointed in development projects may either promote or discourage communities' participation in implementation of the said projects. The study further concludes that inadequate regular monitoring of the relationship between elected and appointed officials in implementation of construction projects by council is considered as a challenge for effective cooperation between the two parties. It is concluded that when other factors for project success have been considered, the question of taking care of relationships between elected and appointed officials is very crucial for timely and appropriate level of project completion as suggested in the complimentary model of relationships. Moreover, it is concluded that elected officials especially at village and hamlet levels are not motivated to fully commit themselves to projects implemented because they don't have any allowance as their counterparts.

On the basis of the conclusions, it is recommended that Morogoro District Council should monitor and encourage collaboration and partnerships between elected and appointed officials as advocated by the complementary model which affirms team work and mutual relations between parties. It is also recommended that local governments through PO-RALG should ensure that appointed officials adhere to the principle of maintaining political neutrality in implementation of construction projects. This will remove biasness and favouritism based of partisan politics and will improve their relations and interaction with elected officials especially those from opposition political parties. It is also recommended that elected officials should avoid political interference of the appointed

officials in their implementation of development projects. Therefore, this will minimize cohesive influence on appointed officials to practise neutrality in their performance

The government, through the President; Office-Regional Administration and Local Governments (PO-RALG), should establish payment of certain monthly allowances to Village/Hamlet Chairpersons as given to Ward Councillors. This would improve morale and accountability of the elected officials towards implementation of development projects and will avoid their attempts to misappropriate or embezzle project funds. .

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## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **5.0 SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This section presents a summary of the results, and conclusions and implications of the findings in each of the three manuscripts presented in this thesis as described under the following subtopics. The recommendations derived from the conclusions are also presented specifying appropriate strategies and measures to be undertaken to improve the relationship between elected and appointed officials in implementation of public development projects in Morogoro District Council.

#### **5.1 Summary of the Major Findings and Conclusions**

##### **5.1.1 Interaction level and attitudes on political administrative relations**

The interaction level and attitude between elected and appointed officials in construction of health and education infrastructures in Morogoro District are presented in Chapter Two where the results that meet the first and second objectives of this study are presented and discussed. The study was guided by the complementary model which insists on higher interaction between elected and appointed officials. The results show that interaction level between elected and appointed officials was moderate and characterised by misunderstandings and distrust between the two parties. This implies that implementation of development projects suffered from low cooperation between elected and appointed officials, as a result there was low transparency, low accountability and generally not good performance of development projects. This means that more efforts are needed to improve the interaction and cooperation between elected and appointed officials in order to have meaningful outcomes.

Furthermore, the findings presented in the first manuscript reported negative attitude between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects. Elected officials viewed appointed officials as being corrupt, misusing project funds, not being accountable to the projects and that they lacked patriotism. On the other hand appointed officials viewed elected officials as merely being influenced by political interests and ignorant due to their low level of formal education. On the basis of the findings, it is concluded that:

- i. Inadequate monitoring of interaction and relationships between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects by local governments leads to medium interactions which are not satisfactory for effective performance to the projects.
- ii. Political interests and partisan politics influence the relations between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects that lead to ineffective interaction between the two and poor performance of projects.
- iii. Negative attitude between elected and appointed officials is influenced by distrust and interpersonal conflicts between the two parties. Therefore, their negative attitudes negatively affect their interaction in implementation of development projects in the study area.
- iv. The moderate level of interaction between elected and appointed officials that was found is opposed to the complementary model which affirms high cooperation and interdependency between elected and appointed officials to achieve better performance.

### **5.1.2 Governance of political-administrative relations in implementation of construction projects**

Adherence to four governance principles (transparency, accountability, participation and rule of law) between elected and appointed officials in construction of health and education infrastructures is presented in Chapter Three. This covered the third objective of this study. The study revealed that adherence to governance principles between elected and appointed officials was a great challenge in improving their relations in implementation of projects. Contrary to the complementary model which insists on cooperation and interdependent relations between elected and appointed officials, their relations were characterized by low transparency, low accountability and ignorance or rule of law. This was due to the fact that distrust and conflict of interests between elected and appointed officials influenced antagonistic and unfavourable relationship which made adherence to governance principles to become difficult. In addition, this calls for good strategies of increasing adherence to governance principles by elected and appointed officials and monitoring the governance practices in implementation of projects. On the basis of the findings, it is concluded that:

- i) Inadequate numbers of meetings against the number required by local governments at village and ward levels such as Village Councils, WDCs, project committees and Village Assembly lead to poor adherence to good governance in implementation of development projects.
- ii) Lack of serious monitoring of adherence of legal and administrative framework as a challenge in managing relations between elected and appointed officials in improving governance practices in the construction of health and education infrastructures projects.



- iii) Lack of trust, selfish, embezzlement of projects funds by elected and appointed officials influence low level of transparency and accountability in implementation of the projects.
- iv) The complementary model is an effective tool that does assist elected and appointed officials to adhere to governance principles as it advocates information sharing, involvement, compliance with rule of law by parties to maintain their interactions.
- v) Lack of transparency, accountability and adherence to rule of law among elected and appointed officials jeopardizes compliance with governance principles in implementation of projects in the study area.

### **5.1.3 Contribution and challenges of political-administrative relations in implementation of projects in Morogoro District Council**

The contribution of political-administrative relations in implementation of development projects and its challenges are discussed in chapter four which addresses the fourth objective of the study. This objective was guided by the complementary model which affirms that it is not feasible and undesirable to separate politics and administration; it rather insists on extensive interaction between elected and appointed officials. It was revealed that political-administrative relations play a significant role in promoting community participation; mobilizing financial resources for the projects; building trust and mitigating conflicts; accountability and improving transparency and responsiveness to development projects. This calls for good strategies to increase interaction and cooperation between elected and appointed officials in implementation of the projects with the target of minimizing misunderstandings and conflicts and enhancing participation of both parties,

The study findings further revealed challenges of political-administrative relations in implementation of development projects. It was indicated that lack of trust, low level of education, roles ambiguities, conflict of interests and low transparency were the major sources of poor cooperation between elected and appointed officials. This implies that local governments through councils establish strategies that take into consideration the challenges that negatively affect the relations between elected and appointed officials. The conclusions drawn from the results meeting this objective are:

- i)** When other factors for project success have been considered, the question of taking care of relationships between elected and appointed officials is very crucial for timely and appropriate level of project completion as suggested in the complimentary model of relationships.
- ii)** Lack of regular monitoring of relations between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects by council is considered as a challenge against effective cooperation between the parties.
- iii)** Elected officials especially at village and hamlet levels are not motivated to be fully committed to the project implementation because they don't have any monetary allowance as their counterparts.
- iv)** Apart from political-administrative relations, other factors such as institutional and geographical factors also contribute to effective implementation of development projects. Therefore, other factors that facilitate good relations between elected and appointed officials need to be considered.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

This section presents recommendations based on the objectives of the study as derived from the conclusion section. This section specifies appropriate strategies and measures which should be undertaken by local governments and other stakeholders in improving political-administrative relations for the purpose of improving construction of health and education infrastructures in Morogoro District Council.

### **5.2.1 Interaction level and attitudes on political administrative relations**

Based on the empirical findings and conclusion drawn about the interactions between elected and appointed officials in implementation of construction projects, it is recommended that:

- i) In order to increase interaction between elected and appointed officials, the Local Government Authorities (LGAs) in Morogoro District should facilitate regular training and awareness campaigns on the importance of their relations to facilitate effective implementation of the projects.
- ii) The local governments should regularly monitor compliance to rules, regulations, policy and code of conduct that guide relationships between appointed and elected officials in implementation of development projects.
- iii) Appointed officials should adhere to the principle of neutrality in their performance of development projects. Political neutrality will minimize politicizing of public services and reduce conflicts between elected and appointed officials especially those from opposition political parties.
- iv) In relation to negative attitude toward each other, it is recommended that elected and appointed officials should create positive attitude, increase their level of trust

and transparency especially in financial matters. It is difficult for the two parties to cooperate if there is negative attitude towards each other.

### **5.2.2 Governance of political-administrative relations in implementation of projects**

Based on the empirical findings and conclusion drawn about adherence to governance principles among elected and appointed officials in implementation of construction projects, it is recommended that:

- i) Adherence to governance practices has strong and positive contribution in improving relationship between elected and appointed officials in terms of transparency, accountability and rule of law. Therefore, the study recommends that Morogoro District Council should monitor adherence to governance by both parties in implementation of the projects.
- ii) In order to improve governance in implementation of the projects, elected and appointed officials should work based on mutual trust and respect as well as cooperation. This will improve sharing information about projects implementation and increase level of transparency and accountability.
- iii) Morogoro District Council should ensure that local and projects meetings are conducted as required by laws. The officials who are responsible to organize meetings must be accountable. This will improve governance practices in implementation of the projects.
- iv) The local governments should facilitate training to both elected and appointed officials on policies, rules and regulations that guide the relationships between elected and appointed officials in their conducts.

### **5.2.3 Contribution and challenges of political-administrative relations in implementation of projects in Morogoro District Council**

Based on the empirical findings and conclusions drawn about the contribution and challenges of elected and appointed officials in implementation of construction projects, it is recommended that:

- i) Local governments should encourage collaboration and partnerships between elected and appointed officials as advocated by the complementary model. More effort is needed to ensure that parties work as a team with interdependency and reciprocal relations. Collaboration between elected and appointed officials will minimize distrust and conflict of interest in implementation of development projects in the study area.
- ii) Local governments, through PO-RALG, must ensure political neutrality by appointed officials in their work performance. Public servants should be prohibited from engaging in partisan politics and favour decisions based on political interests. This will improve positive relations between elected and appointed officials in projects implementation.
- iii) The government should establish certain monthly allowances to village/hamlet chairpersons and other elected officials in the projects. This will improve morale and accountability of the elected officials and will minimize conflicts between elected and appointed officials. Allowance will also increase their time to be involved in projects rather than engaging themselves in other economic activities for their survival.

### **5.3 Contribution of the Study to the Body of Knowledge**

The research generated empirical information on contributions of political-administrative relations in implementation of construction of health and education infrastructures in a local government. This information is important for improving public development projects implementation. This study contributes to the existing literature on various strategies to regulate and improve the relationships between elected and appointed officials in implementation of public development projects in local governments.

Therefore, policy makers and other stakeholders will use the strategies which have empirically proved to be effective on improving political administrative relations in the projects. The study attempted also to contribute towards the knowledge gap on adherence to governance practices such as transparency, participation, accountability and rule of law by elected and appointed officials in implementation of public development projects in local governments and provide strategies for improving governance practices.

### **5.4 Contribution to the Practice of the Complementary Model**

The study applied the complementary model to describe the relationship between elected and appointed officials in construction of health and education infrastructures. The use of the model in this study was based on the assumption that it considers political-administrative relations that interdependency and reciprocal relationships between elected and appointed officials are important for success of work performance. It encourages parties to work together as team and share information about development projects. The complementary model was found to be applicable in the study area; hence it can be adopted and efficiently implemented to improve implementation of construction of health and education infrastructures in Morogoro District Council by addressing the challenges that affect the relations between elected and appointed officials in the projects.

The study realized that joint efforts and collaboration between elected and appointed officials in addressing challenges in projects' implementation is needed as advocated by the complementary model.

### **5.5 Suggested Areas for Further Research**

The study recommends the following for further studies:

- i) Assessment of communities' perception on the relationship between elected and appointed officials in the projects was initially intended to be analysed in this study, but during data collection it was realised that, it is better to focus on actual data from elected and appointed officials. Therefore, it is suggested that further studies should be conducted to assess communities' perceptions on the contribution of political- administrative relations on effective implementation of public development projects in other local governments.
- ii) The study used the complimentary model in examining relations between elected and appointed officials in implementation of development projects. It is suggested that further studies should be conducted in other areas that implement construction of health and education infrastructures projects using other political-administrative models.

## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Survey Questionnaire

#### A: Self Introduction of the Researcher

Dear Respondent,

I am Kelvin Mutatina Njunwa a PhD student from Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro, Tanzania. This questionnaire is a part of my study that is titled **“Political-Administrative Relations in Public Development Projects Implementation in Morogoro District Council: A Case of Construction Health and Education Infrastructures”**. I would like to ask you some few questions related to political-administrative relations and its importance in construction of health and education infrastructure projects implementation in your locality. The interview will take about 30 minutes, and the information you will provide to me will be treated confidentially and only used for the purpose of this PhD research. Therefore, please be free to give us your opinions.

**E-mail address:** [njunwajr@gmail.com](mailto:njunwajr@gmail.com)

**Mobile** : 0713439252

#### Section A: Preliminary information

S/No.	Item	Details / Responses
1	Questionnaire Number	
2	Date of Interview	
3	Ward Name	
4	Village Name	
5	Hamlet (Kitongoji)	
6	Position	

#### Section B: Respondent's Background Information

**6. Sex:** 1= Male, 2= Female ( )

**7. Marital status:** 1= Single, 2= Married, 3=Divorced 4=Widowed ( )

**8. Age** ( ) years

**9. Level of Education:** 1 = Primary, 2 = Secondary, 3 = Diploma, 4 = Degree,  
5= No Formal Education ( )



**10. Primary Occupation:** 1 = Employed, 2 = Farmer, 3 Business ( )

**11.** For how long have you been working in this Ward/village? ( )

**C. Relationship between elected and appointed officials in project implementation**

12. Are you involved in oversight of construction of any of the health or education projects in your locality?

1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )

13. If yes, in which public development projects (educational/health) have you been involved?

S/ N	Type of development project	Tick
1	Primary school project	
2	Secondary school project	
3	Village dispensary	
4	Ward health Centre	

14. In your capacity what roles did you perform in development project implementation?

S/N	Roles performed	Yes	No
1	Supervision of the project implementation		
2	Collecting building materials and cash		
3	Influence community participation		
4	Member of project committee		
5	Direct participation in building and construction		
6	Over sighting function		

15. In your opinion, did the construction development project successful implemented as planned?

i) Yes ( )

ii) No ( )

16. If No why? \_\_\_\_\_

17. How do you interact with appointed officials/elected officials in projects implementation?

Statement	1	2	3	4	5
	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
1 They cooperate in organizing and conducting meeting as required i.e. 12 Village Councils, 4 WDCs					
2 They are cooperative in implementation of development projects.					
3 They always share information about projects implementation					
4 They work together in mobilizing resources for the projects i.e. funds					
5 They are comply with rules, regulations and laws in implementation of the projects					
6 They have friendly relationships in implementation of the projects.					
7 If conflicts related to implementation of projects arise between elected and appointed officials they are solved amicably					
8 They are comfortable to work each other in the project					

18. Which of the following are major challenges in your relations to the appointed/elected the officials in the projects? (**Tick the most experience challenges**)

- Distrust
- Financial mismanagement
- Personal interest/conflicts
- Partisan politics
- Roles ambiguities
- Low level of education
- Poor Accountability
- Others (*Specify*) \_\_\_\_\_

19. How do you perceive elected/appointed officials in implementation of construction health and education projects in your area?

Statement	Connotation	1	2	3	4	5
-----------	-------------	---	---	---	---	---

		n	Strongl y Disagre e	Disagre e	Neutra l	Agre e	Strongl y Agree
1	They are well acquainted with administrative procedures, rules and regulations	+					
2	They are transparent and always share information about the projects	+					
3	They are working in trust with appointed/ elected officials	+					
4	They are accountable to the projects	+					
5	They work for their self-interests rather than for public interests	-					
6	They are not accountable to the project success	-					
7	They are corrupt and mismanage project funds	-					
8	They are influenced by partisan politics	-					

20. What should be done to improve compliance with governance practices between appointed and elected officials in project implementation? (**Tick the most experience challenges**)

- Decrease level of distrust between elected and appointed officials
- Conduct regular meetings as required by laws and other meetings
- Minimize personal interest/conflicts
- Avoid partisan politics
- Maintain role demarcation between the two

- Improve accountability to the projects implementation
- Ensure regular monitoring of adherence of governance aspects
- Others (*Specify*) \_\_\_\_\_

21 To what extent, from your experience, do good relations between elected and appointed officials contribute to successful project implementation?

Statement		0	2	3	4
		None	Little	Much	Very much
1	Improve local people's participation				
2	Ensure proper use of financial resources				
3	Reduce partisan politics				
4	Enhance mobilization of resources				
5	Increase transparency and accountability				
6	Increase poor financial resource management				
7	Minimize interpersonal conflicts				
8	Increase poor governance practices				

22. To what extent, from your experience, do bad relations between elected and appointed officials affect your development projects implementation?

Statement		0	2	3	4
		None	Little	Much	Very much
1	Increase successful implementation of the projects				
2	Delay in implementation of the project				
3	Cause poor community support on the project				
4	Poor mobilization of resources for the project				
5	Decrease transparency and accountability				

6	Lead to misuse of financial resources				
7	Increase interpersonal conflicts				

23. Do you know any policies, laws or regulations that guide your relationship with elected/appointed officials?

i) Yes (    )      ii) No (    )

If yes mention them:

.....

.....

.....

.....

24. Apart from political-administrative relations, what other factors affect development project implementation?

.....

.....

.....

.....

**THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION**

## **Appendix 2: A copy of Focus Group Discussion Guide**

Political-Administrative Relations in Public Development Projects Implementation in Morogoro District Council: A Case of Construction of Health and Education Infrastructures”.

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1. Do people in this Ward/ Village participate in construction of health and education infrastructure projects?
2. Who initiated the implementation of those health and education projects?
3. How are the representatives of people (elected official) involved in implementation of the projects?
4. What are the roles played by both elected and appointed officials to ensure successful implementation of the projects?
5. List the main constraints that constrain effective implementation of health and education projects in your area.
6. How do you perceive the relationships between elected and appointed officials in implementation of the projects?
7. How do you view the issue of governance in implementation of the projects?
8. Do you consider the relation between elected and appointed officials to be positive or negative in implementation of the projects?
9. What are the benefits of political- administrative relations in the implementation of the said projects?
10. What are the major challenges that negatively affect their relations in implementation of the projects?
11. What other factors do you think that affect implementation of the construction projects in your area?

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION**

### **Appendix 3: A copy of key Informant Interview Guide**

Political-Administrative Relations in Public Development Projects Implementation in Morogoro District Council: A Case of Construction of Health and Education Infrastructures

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1. In your opinion, how is your relationship with appointed/elected officials in implementation of the projects?
2. Do you consider the implementation of the construction projects are successfully implemented as planned or not?
3. How do you view interaction between elected and appointed officials in the project?
4. How does the relationship between elected and appointed officials contribute to effective implementation of the projects?
5. How do you rate the compliance of elected and appointed officials with governance principles in their interaction in implementation of construction projects?
6. Without good relationship between elected and appointed officials, what will be the situation of implementation of the projects?
7. In your opinion, what do you consider as major challenges of relationship between elected and appointed officials in the projects?
8. In relation to the rule of law, do you consider that elected and appointed officials adhere to administrative policies, code of ethics and law in governing their relations?
9. What is your general perception on the accountability of elected/appointed officials in implementation of the projects?

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION**

**Appendix 4: A copy of Checklist for Observation**

Political-Administrative Relations in Public Development Projects Implementation in Morogoro District Council: A Case of Construction of Health and Education Infrastructures

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1. On-going construction of health and education infrastructure projects implemented.
2. Completed health and education infrastructures in the study areas.
3. Quality of the constructed buildings.
4. Attending statutory meetings such as Full Council, Ward Development Committees, and Village Councils.
5. Interaction between elected and appointed officials in construction projects.

**THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION**



## Appendix 5: Data collection permits from Morogoro Districts Council

**JAMHURI YA MUUNGANO WA TANZANIA**  
**OFISI YA RAIS**  
**TAWALA ZA MIKOA NA SERIKALI ZA MITAA**  
**HALMASHAURI YA WILAYA YA MOROGORO**  
*(Barua zote zitumwe kwa Mkurugenzi Mtendaji Wilaya)*

Simu: +255 23 2613185

Fax. No. 023 261 3185

Barua pepe: ded\_morogoro@yahoo.com



Ofisi ya Mkurugenzi Mtendaji (W)

S.L.P 1880

MOROGORO.

KumbNa. MDC/D.30/6.VOL III/59

02/01/2019

Mtendaji wa Kata,  
 Kata za; Mkambarani, Kiroka, Mikese na Kinole.  
**Halmashauri ya Wilaya ya Morogoro.**

### YAH: UTAMBULISHO

Husikanasomotajwahapojuu.

Namtambulisha kwako ndugu **KELVIN M. NJUNWA** kutoka Chuo Kikuu cha Kilimo Sokoine (SUA), mhusika atafanya utafiti katika Halmashauri ya Wilaya ya Morogoro

Utafiti huo Utahusu **"Political Administrative relations in Development project implementation in Tanzania: A case of Education and Health Projects."** Muda wa kibali cha Utafiti ni mwezi mmoja kuanzia tarehe **15/02/2019** hadi tarehe **14/03/2019**.

Tafadhari apewe ushirikiano ili aweze kukamilisha zoezi la utafiti huo.


Nakutakia kazi njema.

Kelvin N.B. Luvunga  
**KNY: MKURUGENZI MTENDAJI**  
**HALMASHAURI YA WILAYA YA MOROGORO**

Nakala: Afisa Tarafa  
 Tarafa ya Mkuyuni na Mikese  
**Halmashauri ya Wilaya ya Morogoro.**

**MKURUGENZI MTENDAJI WA WILAYA**  
**HALMASHAURI YA WILAYA**  
**MOROGORO**

## Appendix 6: Approval for PhD proposal

		<b>SOKOINE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE</b> <b>DIRECTORATE OF RESEARCH AND POSTGRADUATE STUDIES</b>	
Our Ref:	PDS/D/2015/0014	Our Date	28.09.2016
Your Ref:		Your Date	

Mr. Kelvin M. Njunwa  
 Department of Development Studies  
 Sokoine University of Agriculture  
**Morogoro.**

u.f.s

Head  
 Department of Development Studies  
**SUA- Morogoro.**

Dear Mr. Njunwa,

**RE: APPROVAL OF YOUR PhD RESEARCH PROPOSAL**

Please refer to the above mentioned subject.

I am writing to inform you that the Chairman of SPGSC has noted the approval made by the Board of College of Social Sciences and Humanities for your PhD Research Proposal. This means you are now officially registered for your PhD studies at SUA.

You are allowed to embark on your research work for your PhD study.

Wishing you all the best for studies.

Sincerely,

  
 Ms. A. Mwageni  
 for **DIRECTOR**

c.c. Chairman College Postgraduate Studies Committee

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