

# International Land Deals and Rural Poverty Reduction in Kisarawe District, Coast Region, Tanzania<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

Using a combination of qualitative and quantitative techniques, this chapter examines processes and impacts of International Land Deals in Kisarawe District. Three focus group discussions encompassing 30 participants and 17 key informants were involved. A survey of 180 small-scale farmers who were heads of households or spouses also participated in the study. Qualitative data were analyzed using content analysis techniques whereby quantitative data were summarized using Statistical Package for Social Science. Results showed that the process of land leasing to the British Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited were top down. Secondly, the employment opportunity created by the investor though improved household income was not sustainable and so small-scale farmers bounced back into poverty. Thirdly, despite a Memorandum of Understanding signed between the investor and Kisarawe District, there were no mechanisms to ensure effective implementation of the deal as a result the win-win situation was not attained and that the deal exacerbated rural poverty among small-scale farmers.

**Keywords:** Land acquisition, rural development, poverty

## 1. Introduction

This chapter examines processes and impacts of International Land Deals (ILDs) in selected villages of Kisarawe District, in Coast Region where the government of Tanzania has earmarked large tracts of land for large-scale agricultural investment. In the past 5 to 10 years, Tanzania like other Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries has seen an increasing inflow of International Land Deals (ILDs). As such, the phenomenon has gained momentum such that foreign investors acquire large tracts of land for agricultural investment in the sub-continent. The major drivers of ILDs are mentioned to include food and biofuels demand in the global north (Cotula *et al.*, 2009; Areziki, 2011). Some writers including Kachika (2010) have reported that about 15 to 20 million hectares of land have been already transacted in ILDs in developing countries, and more than

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50% of the hectares are found in SSA. The village land in rural areas is the one targeted for the ILDs. Yet, these areas are not only poor, but also food aid dependent. This means that SSA is affected by food insecurity and hunger due to multiple factors including drought, poor agricultural technologies used, market failure and lack of institutional capacity to support agricultural inputs to the small-scale farmers.

While ILDs are involved in transferring village land from small-scale farmers to private and mainly foreign investors, poverty is relatively higher and widespread in rural areas where 75% of the Tanzania's population lives (Kabote *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, rural areas of Tanzania are likely to be more affected by ILDs compared to urban areas. The major concerns include food security, disruption of rural livelihoods through displacement of rural communities and environmental degradation, which all together exacerbate poverty in rural areas. ILDs are still at an infant stage in most of the SSA countries including Tanzania. As such, information about their potentiality and impacts on poverty reduction is still debatable. This chapter contributes to understanding ILDs and its impacts. It is structured into four major sections. Section 1 is an introduction part and covers background information, problem statement and methodology. Section 2 presents theoretical debate on impacts of ILDs and also elaborates the conceptual framework adopted by the study, while section 3 presents and discusses the results. The chapter winds up in section 4 by presenting conclusions and recommendations.

## **1.1 Problem Statement**

Tanzania has been involved and has concluded an international Land Deal (ILD) with the British Sub-Biofuel Tanzania Limited – also refereed in this study as an investor and/or foreign investor - in Kisarawe District. The investor acquired land in the district in order to cultivate *Jatropha* for biofuels production through a plantation model, which was expected to employ 1500 small-scale farmers. Thus, the deal touched livelihoods of the small-scale farmers in eleven villages with the population of over 11,200 people (Matondi and Rukuni, 2010; Simbeye, 2010) in the district. These villages include: Muhaga, Kibuta, Mtamba, Marumbo, Paraka, Kidugalo, Kurui, Mtakayo, Vilabwa, Mitengwe, and Mzenga (Simbeye, 2010). Following the debate, which is prevailing in the country and elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa with regard to the impacts of International Land Deals (ILDs), many questions need to be answered, but a pertinent query is whether the processes of acquiring land during ILDs in Kisarawe District can create a win-win situation for rural development and rural poverty reduction. It is also unclear whether implementation of the ILD was calamitous to rural poverty reduction in the villages surrounding the farmland, which was secured by the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited. This chapter provides some answers, and it is a step towards understanding processes and impacts of International Land Deals (ILDs) in poverty reduction in Tanzania. The study concentrated on the following specific objectives (i) assessed processes and roles of different actors involved in the International Land Deal negotiations; (ii) assessed employment created by Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited in relation to poverty reduction; and (iii) examined potential or existing strategies necessary for creating a win-win situation to reduce poverty among small-scale farmers. It was important to focus on employment creation because it was only the promise which was fulfilled by Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited. Community development promises in agriculture, water, health, education and rural roads development were not fulfilled by the investor.

## 1.2 Methodology

Data in this chapter were collected from six villages in Kisarawe District as presented in Table 1. The villages were purposively selected after the researchers got an advice from the district land officers. The criterion for village selection was proximity to the land acquired by the British Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited. The life expectancy in Kisarawe District is 45 years. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is Tanzania Shillings 150,000 (United Republic of Tanzania, 2012). Most of the people in the district are small-scale farmers and a few are livestock keepers. The district was appropriate for the study because, an International Land Deal has been concluded by the British Sub-Biofuel Tanzania Limited and Kisarawe District Council. Thus, over 11,200 villagers have already been affected whereby about 9,000 hectares of the village land have been transferred to the foreign investor (Matondi and Rukuni, 2010; Simbeye, 2010). The assumption was that with an operational International Land Deal in the district, small-scale farmers and livestock keepers may be benefiting through, for example, access to employment. On the other hand, they may be negatively affected by the land deal because the land which is at the heart of their livelihoods has been deprived from their ownership. Therefore, the district provided a good case study in order to understand processes of acquiring land through International Land Deals (ILDs) and its link to poverty reduction.

Table 1: Key Information for Villages Involved in the Study

Village name	Division	Ward	Total number of households in the village	Population		Total population
				Male	Female	
Chakenge	Mzenga	Mzenga	305	-	-	1886
Mtakayo	Mzenga	Kurui	230	531	508	1039
Kidugalo	Mzenga	Kurui	220	450	378	828
Marumbo	Maneromango	Marumbo	308	602	736	1338
Mhaga	Sungwi	Kibuta	337	539	521	1060
Mtamba	Sungwi	Kibuta	300	643	616	1259

Source: Village Records, 2012

In order to expand the scope and improve the analytical power of the study with regard to processes of ILDs and their impacts on poverty reduction, the chapter adopted exploratory sequential data collection and analysis approach whereby two phases of data collection and analysis were involved. The first phase involved focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews. The second phase on the other hand, which was principally informed by the first phase, was a household survey. The aim of the second phase was to quantify some variables of interest discussed during focus groups and during key informant interviews. These variables include types of actors and their roles involved during negotiation of the International Land Deal and perceptions of possibility of moving out of poverty in the next five years, in the presence of the ILD. The chapter also adopted simple random sampling in selecting 180 survey respondents was used. Simple random sampling technique involved retrieving random numbers

from a calculator and comparing it with the serial number in the village register. Any household number in the village register which corresponded with the random number retrieved from the calculator was chosen for the study. Purposive sampling was also used in selecting respondents for qualitative interviews. The sampling unit, which was also the unit of analysis, was heads of households.

Three focus group discussions involving small-scale farmers were conducted in the villages of Chakenge, Marumbo and Mhaga. Each FGD had 10 small-scale farmers, male and female in order to capture perspectives of both men and women. In total, 30 FGD participants were involved in the study: 17 male heads of households and 13 spouses, who represented heads of households. Checklist of items was used to guide discussions and the focus was to collect qualitative information concerning processes and actors involved in ILDs and its impacts. To ensure that issues raised during FGDs were captured comprehensively, one member of the research team facilitated the process while the other two were documenting and making observations to ensure that few individuals in the FGDs did not dominate the proceedings. The chapter triangulates FGDs with key informant interviews in collecting qualitative information. Like during FGDs, checklist of items was used to guide the key informant interviews. The key informant interviews were conducted in order to get insights from various stakeholders at different levels: at the national level mainly at Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development (MLHSD), at the district level, at the investor's level and at the village level. In total 17 key informants were involved in the study.

## **2. Theoretical Discourse on International Land Deals**

Literature reveals a non-conclusive debate regarding the impacts of International Land Deals (ILDs) by portraying two contrasting theoretical strands. The underpinning arguments on one hand hold the view that through technology transfer, ILDs can boost agricultural productivity, which has been for many decades under performing in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). Proponents aptly put that technologies that can be applied by foreign investors in ILDs can raise agricultural productivity four to five times that of many small-scale farmers (Blumenthal, 2009). Proponents further mention job and employment creation to the small-scale farmers, improving access to market, improving revenues and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), improving infrastructure development and provision of public goods in form of rural roads, classrooms construction, development of water infrastructure, improvement of healthcare facilities and irrigation infrastructures as other benefits of ILDs (Cotula *et al.*, 2009; Arezki, 2011; Oxfam, 2011). Foreign investors normally use these theoretical and prospective benefits as promises to acquire large tracts of land in rural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and elsewhere. They argue that those benefits can help the rural poor small-scale farmers to move out of untold poverty. However, the arguments do not clearly depict a type of framework that can be applied to make the promises a reality and so the ILDs becoming a development strategy for poverty reduction.

The second theoretical strand regarding International Land Deals (ILDs) is a perceived threat to small-scale farmers and national economies. The central argument surrounding this line of thinking is that majority of the people in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) live in rural areas and agriculture is not only the livelihoods' mainstay, but also central to national economies. For instance, out of 80% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), which lives in rural areas, 70% depends on agriculture for food security and for the livelihoods more generally (McIntyre *et*

*al.*, 2009). This implies that SSA is an agricultural dependent sub-continent whereby land is one of the most important factors of production especially for the small-scale farmers. One can therefore conclude that transferring land from small-scale farmers to foreign investors through ILDs can have devastating impacts to the small-scale farmers' livelihoods and to the local and national economies in more generally.

Furthermore, implementation of the International Land Deals (ILDs) is accompanied by clearing vegetations for large-scale agriculture; involves intensive application of agro-chemicals and improved bio-technologies including genetically modified seeds. Such interventions can pose serious environmental problems in host countries particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where, in most cases, environmental management policies and institutions are weak (World Bank, 2011). This can in turn manifest into environmental degradation through various types of pollution, deforestation and loss of biodiversity because foreign investors can only be guided by economic rationalities that may not necessarily be environmentally friendly (Makunike, 2009; Montemayor, 2009; Spieloch and Murphy, 2009; Trivedi, 2009; ActionAid Tanzania, 2010; Shete, 2011). Based on these arguments, grappling farmland from small-scale farmers can undeniably pose serious socio-economic consequences and exacerbate rural poverty unless a win-win situation is guaranteed during the process of acquiring farmland by foreign investors and also during implementation of the International Land Deals (ILDs).

## **2.1 Conceptual Framework**

One of the contemporary development issues in rural areas and Tanzania more generally, is the increasing trend of International Land Deals (ILDs) for large-scale agriculture. This chapter examines potentials of International Land Deals in transforming the rural sector to reduce poverty in selected villages of Kisarawe District, Coast Region Tanzania. The most important concepts used in the chapter and, which need operationalization include International Land Deals (ILDs), rural development and poverty. Although an International Land Deal is a broader concept, it is clearly defined in this chapter as a process whereby foreign governments, institutions and private companies lease or purchase large tracts of arable land outside their home countries, more so in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) including Tanzania to address food problems in their home countries and or addressing energy demands through raising crops for biofuel production (Trivedi, 2009).


Rural development on the other hand, is conceived in this chapter as development which benefits the rural populations, mainly the small-scale farmers and agro-pastoralists. This kind of development is unquestionably a stepping stones for sustainable improvement in standard of living and it is a pre-condition for rural poverty reduction. The word rural in this chapter includes areas excluding district capitals, towns, municipalities and cities. The rural sector therefore is one which involves populations, whose living depends on small-scale farming especially crop and livestock production in rural areas (Anrique and Stamoulis, 2007). The primary concern in this chapter was whether processes of acquiring land in International Land Deals (ILDs) in rural Tanzania can transform the rural sector to a higher level of development than it was before the deals, through poverty reduction. Poverty, on the other hand, is a multidimensional concept. The multiple dimensions of poverty include socio-economic, political, material wellbeing and cultural issues (Narayan *et al.*, 2000). In this chapter, poverty was measured through local peoples' perceptions and the chapter conceives poverty as an inability to attain minimum standards of living. The indicators of poverty used in this chapter were established by focus

group participants during wealth ranking. Therefore, using local people's perceptions of poverty helps to establish relevant indicators for measuring poverty in a specific context including rural areas. This thinking enabled also the authors to establish whether the local people were likely to attain development and move out of poverty under the context of International Land Deals (ILDs).

Theoretical discourses as discussed in this chapter have shown that although International Land Deals (ILDs) can exacerbate poverty particularly in developing countries, it can, on other hand help to reduce poverty if a win-win situation is observed during negotiations and also during implementation of the deals. On the view of this observation, the authors of this chapter succinctly argue that a win-win situation can be achieved through three fundamental strategies: first, by controlling the threats of the ILDs through adhering to good code of conduct both for the private investors and host governments that can bind the foreign investors to ensure implementation of an economically viable proposed project. Secondly, a win-win situation can be achieved through responsibly managing the process for land acquisition by the investors during negotiations and also during implementation of the ILDs. Thirdly, a win-win situation can be achieved by taking on board voices of all important stakeholders including the local people during the negotiation process of the ILDs (Meinzen-Dick and Braun, 2009).

Essentially, International Land Deals' promises do not trickle down automatically to the small-scale farmers in Tanzania and elsewhere, but require a win-win situation both for the investors and the small scale farmers for the benefits to be realized (FAO, 2009). In the context where regulatory and policy frameworks are strong and responsible for the small-scale famers, a win-win situation can be achieved and ILDs can realize their potential opportunities to the rural poor, ensuring rural development and thus becoming instrument for poverty reduction. On the other hand, the authors of the chapter argue that ILDs can threaten small-scale farmers' livelihoods in a situation where, the regulatory and policy frameworks in a host country are weak and irresponsible to the rural small-scale farmers. In this situation, ILDs can aggravate poverty in a host country. Failure to achieve a win-win situation implies increasing possibility for small-scale farmers to fall into poverty. When this happens, one can argue that ILDs are exacerbating poverty in the host country such as Tanzania.

Figure 1: Relationship between Land Deals and Poverty Reduction



Source: Authors' Construct

### 3. Results and Discussion

#### 3.1 Wealth Status

Table 2 presents wealth indicators that were established during FGDs, which define different socio-economic groups based on wealth. Through wealth ranking, the study established 10 indicators which can differentiate three socio-economic groups, and one of the important wealth indicators was size of farmland owned by the household. It can be seen from Table 2 that the lower and middle group categories have many common features. Indeed, households belonging to these groups lived in poor housing condition. They lived in wood and muddy walled houses with grass thatched roofs. Livelihoods for households in the lower and middle groups sometimes depended on remittances and could hardly afford health cost for all household members. In addition, they had no access to solar power; they were food insecure and some did not own any piece of land. The Venn diagram that was applied during FGDs in order to establish incidence of poverty in the study villages showed that 75% were poor in each village under study.

Based on the indicators used for wealth ranking conducted during Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), the chapter revealed that slightly more than half of the respondents belonged to the middle group and about 40% belonged to the lower level wealth status (Table 3). This implies that majority of the respondents involved in the household survey belonged to the middle and lower wealth status groups. As reported earlier in this chapter, survey results were in line with results collected during FGDs, which showed that over 75% of people in the study villages were

poor. It is therefore clear from these results that the views presented in this chapter are the views of the poor who lived in the villages whereby land was critical for their livelihoods.

Table 2: Wealth Indicators Defining Socio-economic Groups

Variable	Lower group	Middle group	Upper group
Quality of housing	Housing thatched with grasses with walls made of wood and muddy	Housing thatched with grasses with walls made of wood and muddy	Housing with corrugated iron sheets with walls made of cement bricks
Size of farmland owned	Own 0 to 1acre of farmland	Own 2 to 5 acres of farmland	Own 6 to 10 acres or more of farmland
Electric power	None	None	Has solar power and or generator for lighting and other uses
Assets owned	One Bicycle	one Bicycle, one Radio, one mobile phone	TV and Radio, vehicle, Bicycle, Motorcycle, mobile phone and a shop for income generation
Number of meals a day	Not more than 2	Not more than 2	Three or more
Ability to afford school fees	Difficult to afford school fees even for secondary school	Can afford school fees for children in public secondary schools	Can afford school fees for children in public secondary schools
Livestock ownership	None	None	Some own livestock (size not specified)
Number of chicken owned	Own 1 to 5 chickens	Own 6 to 10 chickens	Up 100 chickens
Farmland with perennial plants (Mango, Cashew etc)	None	None	Some own a farmland planted with perennial crops such as Mango and Orange
Ability to afford health costs	Difficult to afford health costs	Difficult to afford health costs	Can afford health costs
Remittances	Depend on remittances	Sometimes depend on remittances	Do not depend on remittances



Table 3: Respondents' Wealth Status in Percentages

Quintile	Village name						Total (N=180)
	Marumbo (n=30)	Mtamba (n=30)	Mhaga (n=30)	Mtakayo (n=30)	Kidugalo (n=30)	Chakenge (n=30)	
Upper	0	0	27	7	0	3	6
Middle	63	37	50	60	90	30	55
Lower	37	63	23	33	10	67	39

### 3.2 Processes of Land Acquisition and Actors Involved in ILDs

Table 4 summarizes qualitative data about processes and roles of different actors involved during land acquisition by the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited in Kisarawe District. An actor is conceived in this chapter as an individual who has political influence; or an institution, or an organization, which took part in the process of the ILD in Kisarawe District. Results in Table 4 showed a numbers of actors at different levels and stages through which the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited had to follow in order to acquire land for agricultural investment. First, the investor had to secure a certificate of incentives from Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) after having identified an area of interest for agricultural investment. It was not clearly elaborated by the key informant at TIC, how foreign investors including Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited identified an area of interest in a country which is not their domicile. Unquestionably, the task to identify an area for investment was not supposed to be an investor's role, rather, the government's role through either the TIC or the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development (MLHSD). The investor's next procedure was to apply for the farmland to the Commissioner for Lands, who is normally based at the MLHSD headquarters and is responsible for approving the application. The commissioner for lands then notified the investor about acceptance of land acquisition. Following acceptance, the investor had to write a letter to the Central Management Team (CMT) of the Kisarawe District Council, specifying how many hectares the investor wanted and for what purposes. The Central Management Team comprised of heads of departments had to discuss the request of the particular area, but not to reject the approval and later on forwarded the approval to the Land Allocation Committee (LAC) of the district council. The Land Allocation Committee under the chairmanship of the District Executive Director (DED) had to inform the Social Service Committee (SSC) of the District Full Council about the decision of the Land Allocation Committee (LAC). The full council comprises of all ward councillors in the district. The LAC is mandated by law to decide whether the approval should continue to the next step or not. The next step was for the investor to present the proposal to the District Full Council (DFC) for endorsement. After endorsement, the information was sent to the Village Governments/Village Councils through the Village Executive Officer (VEO).

Table 1: Actors Involved and their Roles during Land Deal Negotiations

Actor's level	Actor involved	Actor's role
Investor	Foreign investor	(i) Application for an identified farmland by specifying size of land needed and the purpose of acquiring the land  (ii) To give compensation to the people who lose land
Central government	(i) Ministry of Lands and Human Settlement Development  (ii) The President and commissioner of lands  (iii) Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC)	(i) The ministry ensures that the land act and investment policy are adhered to during the process of land deals  (ii) The Ministry also has a role for land survey, identification of boundaries of village lands, demarcation of lands owned by individuals in the village and land valuation  The President enables transfer of village land to general land. Once a village land has been transferred to general land it can be leased to any investor. Commission of land does this task on behalf of the President  The TIC is the government agency for coordinating, encouraging, promoting and facilitating investment in Tanzania
Local government	(i) District Council  (ii) Village Council	(i) Endorsement of land deal applications  (ii) Ensure that land deals are done in accordance to the Land Acts and investment policy  (iii) Ensure that the local people do not lose anything during the process
Local people	Village assembly	(i) Discussion with the investor about proposal of the land deal and the promises put forth by the investor  (ii) The village assembly has the mandate to accept or reject any land deal request
Political leaders	Member of Parliament, District Commissioner and Ward Councillor	Advocated for the leasing of farmland to the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited

Village Councils had to discuss the feasibility of the proposed large-scale agricultural investment in a particular location. The information, mainly the decision of the Village Councils (VC) was then forwarded to the Village Assembly (VA) where the foreign investor had to discuss with the local people mainly small-scale farmers about the idea and opportunities and promises that

would accrue from the envisaged International Land Deal regarding rural development and reduction of poverty. Based on the structure of the local government in Tanzania, the Village Assembly comprises all village members aged 18 years and above. During Village Assembly, the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited was also supposed to clarify queries posed by the local people especially on how small-scale farmers could benefit from the International Land Deal (ILD) and the way how they could be negatively affected by the ILD. According to the Land Act no. 5 of 1999, the Village Assembly (VA) is mentioned to be the manager of the village land and so it has the mandate to accept or reject the farmland request for foreign or domestic investment. This is also the case in the study area. However, during ILDs negotiations the Village Assemblies only received information through the Village Governments and or Village Councils without full participation in the decision to accept or reject the ILDs, which in principle had already being endorsed by the Commissioner for Lands at the national level and by the District Full Council at the district level.

Basically, the minutes of the Village Governments/Village Councils, Village Assemblies, Land Allocation Committee and that of the District Full Council were submitted to the relevant ministry, in this case the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlement Development (MLHSD). According to section 7(76) of the Land Act No. 5, 1999, if the land requested by the investor exceed 50 hectares, an assent from the Commissioner for Lands has to be sought by the district council within which the land of interest is located. This was also carried out in the study area. In this case the village land had to be transferred into general land before it was leased to the foreign investor. The Minister had to announce the decision to lease the farmland through government gazette and provided 21 days for the Village Assemblies to give final endorsement. The International Land Deal which involves less or equal to 20 hectares is by law under control and decision of the Village Assembly whereas the district council handles land deals involving hectares between 21 and 50.

Another important thing to mention is that after the Tanzania Investment Centre has granted certificate of occupancy to the investor, it had to write an introductory letter to the Regional Commissioner (RC) where the land of interest was earmarked. The Regional Commissioner had to write to introduce the foreign investor to the district authority preferably to the District Executive Director (DED) who then introduced the investor to the villages. This operation seems to operate in hierarchical norm, while supported by the old land policy that upheld the colonial notion that land is owned by the President on behalf of the citizens. In this manner, it assumes that land been sought is not owned by anyone. While interviews at the district and national level uncovered land deal process for land acquisition by foreign investors as stipulated by the Land Act No.5, 1999, focus group discussions and key informant interviews in the villages revealed practical issues with regard to the processes of International Land Deals (ILDs). As reported by the key informants at the national and district level, key informants at the village level also reported a number of actors that assumed different roles as presented in Table 4. Unlike national level key informants, village level key informants noted that the process of land acquisition began through Village Councils which received letters from Kisarawe District Council informing about the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited, to have leased 8210.68 hectares of the village lands.

Key informant interviews in the villages also revealed that the district council influenced and convinced the Village Governments and villagers – small-scale farmers - more specifically, who lived in close proximity to the land targeted for lease by the foreign investor, to accept the

International Land Deal that had been proposed. Village Governments discussed the proposal and through Village Assemblies, the local people were convinced by their Member of Parliament, District Commissioner, ward councillors and the investor to accept the proposed farmland investment. Interviews revealed that not more than two Village Assemblies were conducted to endorse acceptance of the land leasing to the foreign investor. These results were in line with results collected from key informant interviews with district officials who also acknowledged that village assemblies were conducted regarding the International Land Deal. Even though, minutes for the meetings were not found in the Village Governments' Offices due to possibly poor record keeping.

Principally, the Member of Parliament, the District Commissioner and ward councillors are not part of the Village Assembly in Tanzania. Nonetheless, it was important for them to take part during Village Assemblies to discuss the proposed International Land Deal because villagers have basically, little knowledge about the International Land Deals (ILDs). Thus, higher level authorities were expected to be observers, advisors and to provide guidance to the process and not leaders of the negotiations because village land belongs to the villagers and that local voices were critically important in the process. Interviews at the village level also clearly showed that Village Councils and the local people in the study villages accepted the proposed land deal mainly for two reasons: first, they had little knowledge about ILDs, and importantly the promises put forth by the foreign investor were attractive and seemed like an incentive to the villagers. Such promises included; the promotion of Community Development Projects (CDPs) such as agricultural support programme, health, education, water and rural roads infrastructure development. Secondly, the local people were requested and were expected by the higher government authorities to endorse the deal and not otherwise.

### **3.3 Land survey, valuation and compensation**

After the decision to lease the land to the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited was reached, the next task was to survey the land, make valuation for relevant compensation to the small-scale farmers. The government authorities at the district and national level were responsible to ensure that the land that was to be leased to the foreign investor was surveyed. This was followed by land valuation before compensation could take place. Government experts from the Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements Development (MLHSD) and from District Land Office participated during land survey and valuation. Small-scale farmers participated by showing boundaries of their land. The participation of the village government in the whole exercise was only when the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited consulted them before the village assemblies met to grant assent for the land lease. Interviews with district officials revealed that land survey, valuation and compensation were done as per the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that was signed between the investor and Kisarawe District Council. In this MoU, local people's participation during land deal negotiation is clearly mentioned as showing land boundaries. Since the small-scale farmers had little opportunity to negotiate how much they needed for compensation, it was revealed during Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) that the amount of compensation received was not enough and also was not timely paid.

What comes out very clearly about negotiations during International Land Deals (ILDs), land survey, valuation and compensation is that the local people were not effectively involved in reaching a decision to lease land to the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited. For instance, there was no agreement between the investor and the local people on how much land should be

compensated and for how much money. The compensation was done by the investor in a manner that was not transparent. What is clearly known is that the amount of compensation to be paid was based on existence of perennial crops in the leased land such as cashew trees, mango trees and palm trees. Nonetheless, it was unclear how much money a cashew, a mango and a palm tree was worth and thus the amount of money compensated. Since it was the central government's land surveyors who participated during land survey and valuation, this chapter argues that the amount of money one had to be compensated was agreed upon and known only between the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited, land surveyors and the district council, but not by the local people. The local people were only given cheques oblivious of how much they deserved to be compensated. In Mtakayo village for example, key informants reported that only two households were compensated out of 128 whose land was leased to the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited.

### **3.4 Criteria for Accepting or Rejecting an International Land Deal**

Interviews with the district land officers established some criteria for accepting and or rejecting a request to lease land to the foreign investor. The first criterion was that the size of land requested should be available. Second, there should be compatibility of a proposed investment with the environment and livelihoods of the population where the investment ought to be. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is one of the conditions for accepting or rejecting a proposed investment in farmland. Ideally, if negative impacts outweigh positive ones the investment should be rejected. The challenge in Tanzania is that it is the investor who contracts experts to carry out the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). With this arrangement, there is high likelihood of getting biased EIA report that can favour the investor's ambitions though the EIA report passes through a public hearing before it can be positively endorsed by the National Environmental Management Council (NEMC). But in a situation where legal and policy frameworks for environmental management are not well developed like it is in Tanzania, there is a possibility that the investor can influence a positive nod from the NEMC by influencing some vocal people during public hearings. Therefore, the appropriate way of doing EIA is that it could be commissioned by the government through department of the Vice President's Office's that deals with environmental issues. In this arrangement, the investor should pay the price for doing EIA.

Based on environmental impact assessment, Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited was not supposed to disturb water sheds and graveyards. The investor was also supposed to plant more trees to protect water sources whenever necessary. Since *Jatropha* cultivation for biofuels production is a kind of monoculture crop that causes ecosystem perturbations, the investor was required to leave some areas within the leased land intact/undisturbed. Despite all these, there was no any monitoring system to ensure that investor's operations did not disturb water sources and graveyards and ensuring that some areas remained undisturbed. The third criterion is that the foreign company should be registered with Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC). Based on these criteria, some foreign investors showed interest to invest on farmland in the Kisarawe District, but were not successful. For example, an Indian company wanted to establish sugarcane agriculture in the district. This investment was expected to use irrigation techniques drawing water from River Ruvu. But the said river is a major source of drinking water for more than 4 million people living in Dar es Salaam city. According to the district land officers, this foreign investment was not compatible with the livelihoods of the people and therefore was rejected.

In other parts in the world, land deals are reported to fail due to public unrest. FAO (2009) for example reported that a land deal, which involved leasing of 1.3 million hectares of land to South Korea investor's in Madagascar, failed. Other unsuccessful land deals reported in the report are: 500,000 hectares of land, which had to be leased to Saud Arabia investor's and 1.2 million hectares of land, which had to be leased to the Chinese government in Philippines (FAO, 2009). Public unrest with regard to land deals in Tanzania has not yet been successful mainly due to lack of information about land deals in the country. Most of the people especially villagers whose land is targeted for land deals do not understand clearly about trends of this phenomenon. This is because information about trends of land deals in Tanzania is not transparent.

### 3.5 Survey Data on Actors Involved in the International Land Deal

Table 5 presents survey data on respondents' responses about involvement during negotiation of International Land Deal in the study area. Results revealed that 54% were not involved in the process (Table 5). Involvement in this chapter means active participation during negotiations, land survey and valuation. Results also showed that involvement of respondents differed by wealth status as majority of respondents who were involved came from middle and poor wealth status compared to the upper quintiles (Table 5). Nonetheless, what respondents reported as involvement in the process of land deal was just attending to the Village Assemblies, which were meant to endorse leasing of the land to the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited in accordance with the directives from higher levels of administration as reported during FGDs and also during key informant interviews. In other words, there were no critical discussions during Village Assemblies, which could result into a participatory local decision of either accepting or rejecting the ILD for a win-win situation. Lack of critical discussions to effectively negotiate the ILD between the local people and the investor can largely be explained by little capacity in terms of understanding about the dynamics of ILD's negotiations by the local people and or pressure to assent the land deal lease from the higher levels of authorities. It can also be explained by local peoples' little knowledge of the opportunities and challenges of large-scale farmland investment in local economies.

Table 5: Percentage Involvement in Land Deal Negotiations by Wealth Status

Variable	Household wealth status			Total N=180
	Upper	Middle	Lower	
	n=11	n=99	n=70	
Involved	45	52	39	46
Not involved	55	48	61	54

Data on various actors who were involved in the process of leasing land to the foreign investor are presented in Table 6. What is observed from these data conform to the results obtained from Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and also from key informants. Nevertheless, it is revealed that slightly more than half of the respondents were not aware about the actors who were involved in the process. This was expected because the process was clouded by lack of transparency and that

small-scale farmers were excluded in making critical decisions regarding the land deals in the study area.

Table 6: Respondents' Responses on Actors Involved during Land Deal Process in Percentages

Variable	Village name						Total
	Marumbo	Mtamba	Mhaga	Mtakayo	Kidugalo	Chakenge	N=180
	n=30	n=30	n=30	n=30	n=30	n=30	
Village assembly	40	10	10	30	30	17	23
Village government	3	10	7	7	30	7	11
District council	0	7	20	10	3	3	7
Ward councillor, MP, central government and the investor	3	10	3	7	3	7	6
Do not know	53	63	60	47	33	67	54

Note: MP=Member of Parliament

### 3.6 Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited and Job Creation

Table 7 presents number of people who accessed employment from Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited in relation to the total population in each study village. Village records showed that Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited created 750 jobs in eleven villages surrounding 8210.68 hectares of land, which were appropriated by the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania limited. The local people were employed as farm workers, surveyors, security guides, supervisors, and some were employed as drivers. Table 7 also reveals that 2% to 6% people of the total population accessed employment from the investor. However, the percentage of access differed by villages.

Table 7: Employment Created by the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited

Village name	Total population	Job access	% of total population
Chakenge	1886	45	2
Mtakayo	1039	-	-
Kidugalo	828	45	5
Marumbo	1338	80	6
Mhaga	1060	60	6
Mtamba	1259	30	2

Table 8 presents respondents' responses on access to employment created by Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited. Results showed that 67% of the respondents did not access employment. Majority of respondents who accessed employment from the private investor came from middle

and lower wealth quintiles (Table 8). Based on these results, land deals seemed like an opportunity to the middle and lower quintiles because it was expected to move people out of poverty by generating remuneration through employment. Survey results were in line with qualitative results, but key informants noted that the middle and lower wealth households strived more to access employment compared to the upper wealth households because they had limited choices for their livelihoods. Therefore, they requested employment from Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited in order to generate household income to improve livelihoods. Key informants also reported poor working environment manifested through transporting workers by Lorries and also health risks associated by using agricultural chemicals without using proper protective gears. Nonetheless, survey results revealed that despite importance of employment for rural poverty reduction the remuneration as presented in Table 9 was too meager.

Table 82: Respondents' Responses on Access to Employment in Percentages

Variable	Household wealth status			Total
	Upper	Middle	Lower	
	n=11	n=99	n=70	N=180
Did not access	18	70	70	67
Accessed	82	30	30	33

This implies that the employment opportunity, which was created by the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited though improved household income hardly, helped small-scale farmers, move out of poverty considerably. This result can be explained by three key reasons: first, some of the employment beneficiaries stayed in employment for 8 months and some stayed for 10 months before Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited closed the activities as reported during FGDs and also as reported by key informants. Thus, the authors of this chapter argue that 8 to 10 month period was too short to impact positive changes on household wealth status of the employees and so did not help small-scale farmers move out of poverty. In view of this shortcoming, the employment and income generated from it were not sustainable. Secondly, the amount of remuneration obtained from the employment was inadequate and thirdly, those who accessed employment had no enough time to deal with other livelihood activities because they had to work for more than 12 hours in a day as reported during focus group discussions suggesting that diversifying to other livelihood options though is potential for rural poverty reduction was not possible for the employees of the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited.



Table 9: Remuneration per Type of Work

Position of employment	Basic pay in Tanzania Shillings (TAS)	Net pay in Tanzania Shillings (TAS)
Farm worker	112,000	100,800
Supervisor	200,000	180,000
Driver	300,000	270,000
Security guard	200,000	180,000

Table 10 presents respondents' perceptions on dynamics of wealth status under the presence of Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited. Results showed that 54% of respondents who reported that would move into upper group were from middle wealth group. In addition, 66% of the respondents who were in the middle group would stay in the same category and 53% of respondents who would fall into lower group were from middle group (Table 10). These results suggest that the middle group would benefit more from Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited through moving out of poverty, but only if the remuneration and work environment were improved.

Table 10: Respondents' Perceptions on Dynamics of Wealth Status

Variable	Perceived wealth status in the context of Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited			Total N=180
	Will be in upper quintile (n=35)	Will be in a middle quintile (n=29)	Will be in lower quintile (n=116)	
Upper wealth status	11	7	4	6
Middle wealth status	54	66	53	55
Lower wealth status	34	27	43	39

### 3.7 Strategies for a Win-Win Situation

Table 11 presents qualitative results on strategies for a win-win situation. This is a situation whereby small-scale farmers and the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited can benefit from the International Land Deal (ILD). As elaborated in the conceptual framework in this chapter, a win-win situation in International Land Deals (ILDs) can be achieved through three fundamental strategies: first, it can be achieved by controlling the threats of the ILDs through a well charted code of conduct between Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited and the government of Tanzania. Secondly, it can be achieved through facilitation of prospective opportunities of the ILDs through appropriate legal and policy framework, and third, it can be achieved by taking on board informed voices of the local people during negotiations of the ILDs.

Results from FGDs and key informants revealed that there were no mechanisms in place to ensure that the small-scale farmers benefited from compensation of the lost land, which they

used for grazing, collecting firewood and medicinal plants, building materials and where they used as a grave yard. In addition, there was no mechanism that was set to ensure that food security is not jeopardized by the International Land Deal (Table 11), because *jatropha* production for biofuel can unfavorably affect crop production in host countries like Tanzania. Results also showed that although Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited (the foreign investor) promised to promote and finance Community Development Projects (CDPs) in the form of Agricultural Support Programmes (ASPs), health, education, water supply and rural roads infrastructure development, there were no strategies to ensure that the foreign investor complied and made true of the promises. Therefore, CDPs as promised by the investor during negotiations of the land deal were not implemented. Furthermore, there was poor mechanism to ensure active participation of the small-scale farmers during negotiations to lease land and also in the process of land valuation and compensation. Active participation of the local people during land deal negotiations can facilitate a win-win situation in terms of agreements reached by both parties: the investor and the small-scale farmers.

During implementation of the deal in the study area, Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited used monoculture agricultural system with heavy utilization of agricultural chemicals in order to control herbicides and pesticides in *Jatropha* production. Notwithstanding the application of heavy agricultural chemicals that are potential for chemical pollution leading into environmental and soil degradation, there were no monitoring and mitigation mechanisms to ensure compliance to environmental protection. These results imply that small-scale farmers were marginalised and thus could hardly benefit from the land deal compared to the foreign investor. In other words, it is the foreign investor who was benefiting from the International Land Deal and not small-scale farmers.

Table 11: Strategies for a Win-Win Situation

Strategy	Nature of a strategy	Practical strategies
Strategy to ensure that the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited makes correct and in time compensation to the affected people	The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Sun-Biofuel and Kisarawe District mentions that lands to be leased should be properly vacated at the appropriate time. It also states that compensation for the affected people should be timely done within Tanzanian norms	There was poor mechanism to ensure that the affected local people were properly compensated and that compensation was done in time and transparently. Thus, compensation was a challenge contrary to what is stipulated in the National Land Policy, 1995
Strategy to avoid threatening food security	Not stipulated in the MoU	None
Strategy to ensure that the Sun Biofuels Tanzania Limited comply with the agreement terms in accomplishing the promises for implementing community development projects	The MoU explicitly stipulates that the Sun-Biofuel is supposed to promote and fund community development projects (CDP) in the form of local agricultural support programme, health, education, water and rural roads infrastructures	Though stipulated in the MoU, there was no mechanism to ensure that the foreign investor promoted and provided financial support for CDP as a result the promises to finance CDP were not fulfilled
Strategy to ensure that the local people participate actively in land deal negotiations	The MoU mentions that villagers should be involved in the process through defining boundaries of the land to be leased to the Sun-Biofuel	Villagers were involved in defining boundaries of the land to be leased, but were poorly involved in the negotiation to lease how many hectares of land to the investor
Strategy to ensure that there is transparency in land deal negotiations	The MoU stipulates that common agreement and negotiations between the Sun-Biofuel and villagers should take place with regard to the buffer zone around each village	Although the Kisarawe District Council is responsible to assist gaining agreement, there was no mechanism to ensure that land deal process takes place in transparency
Strategy to ensure monitoring of soil depletion and loss of biodiversity	The MoU mentions that the foreign investor is responsible to ensure that Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is carried out in accordance with Tanzanian laws	The EIA was commissioned by the foreign investor, yet there was no strategy to ensure monitoring of land and soil pollution and also there was no monitoring strategy for loss of biodiversity
Strategy to ensure respect to existing customary land rights	None	None

#### **4. Conclusions and Recommendations**

This chapter examined processes and impacts of International Land Deals (ILDs) on poverty reduction. The specific objectives were (i) to assess processes and roles of different actors involved in the International Land Deal negotiations; (ii) to assess employment created by the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited in relation to poverty reduction; and (iii) to examine potential or existing strategies necessary for creating a win-win situation to reduce poverty among small-scale farmers. Based on the results of this study, land acquisition process though included actors from village level to the national level, was a top down whereby small-scale farmers had very limited opportunity to thoroughly air out their views to reach consensus and make an informed decision to lease the village land to the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited. In other words, the power to lease the land was more concentrated at the national level as one of the actors during the process. It appeared that land acquisition is a political concern because politicians had strong influence in the process. Therefore, small-scale farmers had little power to negotiate with the foreign investor to lease the land and also to implement the promises of the investor. For this effect, there was no way they could reject the ILD under the prevailing circumstances. Even if small-scale farmers were properly consulted, key informants held the view that small-scale farmers had little knowledge about ILDs to make an informed decision for a win-win situation. The implication is that it is the investor who benefited from the ILD in Kisarawe District compared to small-scale farmers.

Secondly, access to employment created by the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited (the investor) though contributed to the household income, had little impact on poverty reduction because that income was not sustainable. In addition, the remuneration offered to the small-scale farmers was inadequate for poverty reduction. Employment also covered a small segment of the population in the study villages. Even the job creation target was not reached. This is a challenge for the International Land Deal in the study area because employment was only an opportunity among a list of theoretical promises put forth by the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited, which was implemented.

Signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited and Kisarawe District Council was a good strategy for effective implementation of the ILD. Yet, there was poor mechanism to ensure that a win-win situation was attained so that both the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited and small-scale farmers shared benefits of the deal. For instance, there were no mechanisms to facilitate the promises put forth by the investor to bring about positive impact to the small-scale farmers regarding poverty reduction. The language used in the MoU was also a stumbling block for the small-scale farmers to understand what was in it. Based on the conceptual framework of this chapter, it is concluded that the Sun-Biofuel Tanzania Limited did not only help the local people move out of poverty, but also exacerbated poverty. In order to improve the situation, land leasing process need to actively take on board voices of the small-scale famers. Secondly, a copy of the MoU had to be provided in a readable and understandable language to the small-scale farmers for scrutinizing the strategies there in to enhance a win-win situation. Another best strategy was to ensure that the derivative right of occupancy was not granted to the Sun-Biofuels Tanzania Limited until some promises have been accomplished or either promises running parallel with implementation of the deal without waiting for the investor to generate profits.

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