

**EFFECTIVENESS OF EXIT STRATEGIES ON SUSTAINABILITY OF  
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS IN TANZANIA: A CASE STUDY OF  
SELECTED WORLD VISION TANZANIA PROJECTS**

**BY**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This study assessed the effectiveness of exit strategies in development projects in Tanzania through two selected projects in Bahi District. These are the Agriculture and Food Security and Leadership Development projects intervened by World Vision Tanzania through Chipanga Area Development Programme. The study, therefore, analysed the design and implementation of exit strategies adopted; evaluated their success and finally, examined challenges experienced in the course of implementation. Both simple random and purposive sampling techniques were used. Qualitative data were collected using document analysis technique, interview, Focus Group Discussion and observation while quantitative data were collected using questionnaire. Analysis of qualitative data was done by using content analysis technique while quantitative data were analysed by using SPSS computer software. Study results have shown that the exit strategies were designed three years before projects phase out. The strategies were neither refined nor assessed before implementation. Further, it has been found that establishment of partnership with both private and public sectors, capacity building for community members and SHIMACHI leaders and transferring of projects portfolios to SHIMACHI were too weak to ensure successful exit strategies. The study also found that most exit activities in the final year of the projects were not implemented, food security did not improve and SHIMACHI leaders lacked managerial, financial and mastery of necessary skills to function. To tackle these obstacles, among others, the study recommends designing of exit strategies during projects inception, mobilisation of enough funds, and review of SHIMACHI constitution.

**DECLARATION**

I, JEREMIAH VEDASTUS MKOMAGI, do hereby declare to the Senate of the Sokoine University of Agriculture that this dissertation is my own original work done within period of registration and that it has neither been submitted nor being concurrently submitted in any other institution for a higher degree award.

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The above declaration is confirmed

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Date

(Supervisor)

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**DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to my beloved wife, Leticia Mkomagi and to my children, A. Lukiko, and G. Nibogola.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

|          |  |
|----------|--|
| ADP      | Area Development Programme                                       |
| CBO      | Community Based Organisation                                     |
| DM&E     | Design, Monitoring and Evaluation                                |
| FAO      | Food and Agriculture Organisation                                |
| FGD      | Focus group discussion   |
| HFIAS    | Household Food Insecurity Access Scale                           |
| IGA      | Income Generating Activities                                     |
| NBS      | National Bureau of Statistics                                    |
| NGO      | Nongovernmental Organisation                                     |
| NGONEDO  | Non Governmental Organisations Network in Dodoma                 |
| NSGRP    | National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty            |
| ILR      | Institutional Learning and Research                              |
| PC       | Project Coordinator  |
| RLDC     | Rural Livelihood Development Company                             |
| SHIMACHI | “Shirika la Maendeleo ya Jamii Chipanga”                         |
| SPSS     | Statistical Package for Social Science                           |
| UNDP     | United Nations Development Programme                             |
| UNESCO   | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation |
| URT      | United Republic of Tanzania                                      |
| UWADO    | “Umoja wa Wajasiliamali Dodoma”                                  |
| VAF      | Village Agricultural Facilitator                                 |
| WVI      | World Vision International                                       |
| WVT      | World Vision Tanzania  |

## CHAPTER ONE

### **1.0 INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background information**

An exit strategy for a project is a specific plan describing how a sponsor intends to withdraw from a region while ensuring that the projects' achieved development goals are not jeopardised and that further progress towards these goals will be made (Rogers and Macias, 2004a). The term is relatively new in development discourse (Davis and Sankar, 2006). As a concept, according to the Institutional Learning and Research (ILR) division, exit strategies were firstly conceived in business community, moved to political military and recently, into humanitarian, relief and development discourse (ILR, 2005). External evaluations and reviews of development programmes have been identifying exit strategies as crucial component for sustainability of development programmes and projects hence, their recent prominence in development discourse (IFAD, 2009; Davis and Sankar, 2006).

Proponents of exit strategies (IFAD, 2009; Gardener *et al.* 2005; Rogers and Macias, 2004b) note that the goal of an exit strategy is not only to maintain benefits achieved, but also to enable further progress toward the projects' development goals. Ideally, an exit strategy puts in place a system whereby the benefits expand beyond the original beneficiaries and their communities (Rogers and Macias, 2004b). Having an exit strategy, it is strongly argued, provides clarity, focuses programming work, enables better planning of available human and financial resources and gets people to

think about the end at the beginning of the programme (Davis and Sankar, 2006 Rogers and Macias, 2004b).

Amidst these ‘theoretical’ benefits which are based on ‘lessons learned’ from reviews of development projects, technical notes and discussion papers, there is inadequate information to justify the effectiveness of exit strategies in promoting sustainability of development projects. This is true of projects under World Vision Tanzania (WVT) including the Agriculture and Food Security and Leadership Development projects that were intervened by Chipanga Area Development Programme.

Chipanga Area Development Programme was an Australian sponsored programme under WVT Central Zone. It started in October, 1993 and graduated in September, 2009 (WVT, 2009a). Among other projects, the programme intervened in the Agriculture and Food Security, and Leadership Development projects. The primary goal of the Agriculture and Food Security project was to improve agriculture productivity hence, food security in the area (WVT, 2009a). WVT facilitated households and income generating activities (IGA) groups with equipment and materials, monitoring and guidance and technical support so as to enhance project success and sustainability. The Leadership Development project was established primarily to facilitate community leaders practice effective and efficient project management for their transformational development (WVT, 2009a). it was anticipated that upon ending of donor support community members, through their established Community Based Organisation (CBO) named “Shirika la Maendeleo ya Jamii Chipanga” (SHIMACHI), would be in position to take over successfully all

interventions that were hither to facilitated by the ADP. Nonetheless, information on the effectiveness of exit strategies adopted to achieve these goals is inadequate.

## **1.2 Problem statement**

World Vision (WV) intervenes in development projects through Area Development Programmes (ADPs) in partnership with local communities with the prime objective to make them sustainably managed by community members after ending its support (WVI, 2005, 2007). However, studies by Sakala (2004) as well as Masanyiwa and Kinyashi (2008) reveal that development projects under World Vision are not sustainable due to unsuitable implementation strategies.

While it is widely held that active community participation foster sustainability (IFAD, 2009; Olukotun, 2008), some literature shed light onto exit strategies, particularly, in the case of donor funded development projects (Davis and Sankar, 2006; Rogers and Macías, 2004a, b). Nonetheless, information about the effectiveness of exit strategies in sustaining benefits after projects graduation, including those under World Vision Tanzania, is scant.

## **1.3 Study objectives**

### **1.3.1 General objective**

To assess the effectiveness of exit strategies in sustaining donor funded development projects.

### **1.3.2 Specific objectives**

- (i) To analyse the design and implementation of the exit strategies adapted;
- (ii) To evaluate the success of the exit strategies;
- (iii) To examine challenges experienced in implementation of exit strategies.

### **1.4 Research questions**

- (i) What were the elements of the exit strategies adapted by the Agriculture and Food Security and Leadership Development projects?
- (ii) Were the elements of the exit strategies effectively implemented?
- (iii) Was projects impact improved, sustained or expanded?
- (iv) Were project activities continued in the same or modified format?
- (v) Was the local CBO (SHIMACHI) capacitated enough to take over project interventions successfully?
- (f) Which challenges were encountered in the course of implementing the exit strategies?

### **1.5 Justification and significance of the study**

The sorry state of performance of most development projects in most developing countries has triggered a lot of research on sustainability of development projects (Nikkhar and Redzuan, 2009; Olukotun, 2008, Alther, 2008). However, these studies ignored one important aspect of donor funded development projects namely; exit strategies and their effectiveness. Since donor funded development interventions are increasingly implemented through projects cycle model, which does not take into


account exit strategies, it is likely that newly initiated projects will fall in the same graveyard for being unsustainable. Unless this pitfall is addressed, efforts toward poverty reduction as envisaged in the National 2025 Development Vision and National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP) are not likely to succeed. This study intends to bridge this gap by linking exit strategies to project cycle and assess their effectiveness on sustainability of development projects.

This study has the potential to be valuable to development organizations that aim at imparting lasting project benefits in communities where their projects are implemented. Its findings will enable projects managers and community members to explore lessons in order to adjust their intervention strategies for existing projects and/or improve the design of subsequent projects to make them more responsive, self reliant and sustainable. For development practitioners, the study is expected to fill a knowledge gap on the practicality of exit strategies in development interventions. For researchers, it will contribute as an input for further research on exit strategies.

## **1.6 Conceptual framework**

The conceptual framework in Appendix 1 assumes that community needs determine projects objectives and goals which in turn, influence the formulation and implementation of an exit strategy by both community members and the agency involved in the intervention. Resources (inputs) for implementation should be mobilised from both local and external resources and ensuring that all important partners are adequately involved. The process should be gradual to allow the taking

over organisation to gain experience and adjust to its new responsibilities. Meanwhile, revisiting plans and assessing progress should be done throughout the life of the projects with the prime objective to maintain benefit streams in the future. Lessons learned through on going and post project evaluation should inform project management to adjust their intervention strategies for existing projects and/or improve the design of subsequent projects.



Modified from Gysen *et al.* (2002)

**Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the study**

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Defining exit strategy**

In its broadest sense an exit strategy is a strategy for designing, implementing, and ending external support in a manner consistent with the objective of producing sustainable development outcomes (Davis and Sankar, 2006). Specifically, an exit strategy is described by Rogers and Macias (2004a) as a plan describing how a programme intends to withdraw its resources while ensuring that achievement of the programme goals is not jeopardised and that progress towards these goals will continue. According to Rogers and Marcia (2004a, b), the benefits of the exit strategy should spread to include non project beneficiaries. In order to qualify as a strategy, the exit strategy must contain: Criteria for exiting; measurable benchmarks of progress in meeting the criteria; a time line for the exit process; action steps and responsible parties; and mechanisms to assess progress (Davis and Sankar, 2006, Rogers and Marcia, 2004b).

#### **2.2 Approaches in exit strategies**

Literature on exit strategies identify three approaches to exit: Phase down, phase over and phase out (Levinger and McLeod, 2002; Davis and Sankar, 2006; Gardner *et al.* 2004; House, 2007). The decision to use the phasing over or the phasing out approach depends largely on the nature of the programme activities and different conditions in the programming environment. Other factors include the time frame for

exit, available funding and available human, institutional, financial and physical resources in the area where the programme is departing (Davis and Sankar, 2006).

### **2.2.1 Phase down**

Phase down refers to gradual reduction of programme activities, utilizing a local organisation to sustain programme benefits while the original sponsor deploys fewer resources (; Gardner *et al.* 2004). Local stakeholders are equipped to sustain benefits generated while, at the same time, enabling the sponsor to become increasingly more strategic about its deployment of scarce resources (Batchelor *et al.* 2000). Phasing down is often a preliminary stage to phasing over and/or phasing out.

### **2.2.2 Phase out**

Under this approach a sponsor withdraws from involving in a programme without turning it over to another institution for continued implementation. Ideally, a programme is phased out after permanent or self sustaining changes are realised; eliminating the need for additional external support (Gardner *et al.* 2005). This is because the programme/project outcomes are already firmly established and there is no going back to the circumstances that led to the inception of the project (Batchelor *et al.* 2000).

### **2.2.3 Phase over**

Under this approach, a sponsor transfers programme activities requiring continued inputs to community-based organisations (CBOs), informal groups or networks or key individuals (Rogers and Macías, 2004a, b; Gardner *et al.* 2005). During

programme design and implementation, emphasis is placed on institutional capacity building so that the services provided can continue through local organisations (Gardner *et al.* 2005). The process of transfer may be very gradual and need to be coordinated with a capacity-building strategy that is designed to help the taking over organisations acquire the skills and resources required to implement the programme successfully. Over time, the role of project management should be reduced to advisory and, finally, to no role at all. The activity level may be reduced or maintained. Ideally, however, the benefit stream should remain relatively constant (Batchelor, *et al.* 2000).

### **2.3 Designing and implementation of exit strategies**

The way a project is designed and implemented can have considerable influence on its long-term sustainability by fostering participatory approaches, remaining flexible in the face of inevitable setbacks, and strengthening the capacity of stakeholders to plan and manage future actions (Ibeawuchi and Nwachukwu, 2010; IFAD, 2009). In order to critically analyse the influence of the designing and implementation of exit strategies, this study adapted Levinger and McLeod (2002) and Davis and Sankar (2006) frameworks.

#### **2.3.1 Levinger and McLeod's framework**

In their paper, titled: “Hello, I Must Be Going: Ensuring Quality Services and Sustainable Benefits through Well-Designed Exit Strategies”, Levinger and McLeod (2002) present key elements (also called tactics) that well designed projects should

follow for a successful phase-over. In this study, these elements served as a framework for analysing the design and implementation of the exit strategy adopted by Chipanga ADP. They include: Planning for exit from the beginning; develop partnership and local linkages; build local organizational and human capacities; mobilise local and external resources; stagger the phasing of activities and resources; and finally, allow roles and relationship to evolve (Levinger and Mcleod, 2002). In the views of Levinger and McLeod (2002), these elements should be integrated as part of the overall project approach by planning them from the beginning of the programme design stage. At the same time, revisiting plans and assessing progress should be done throughout the life of the programme with the prime objective to maintain benefit streams in the future. These elements, according to them, are interdependent and therefore, should be followed sequentially and that the absence of one element undermines the effectiveness of the exit strategy even when the other elements are in place.

### **2.3.1.1 Plan for exit from the beginning**

According to Levinger and Mcleod (2002), exit strategies should be formulated from the beginning of the project or programme. This, they note, allows external and local actors to focus on their time frame as an opportunity to achieve programmatic and capacity-building outcomes. Based on this assertion, the researcher was interested to find out whether the exit strategies were formulated from the beginning of the project design or not, and its impact during project implementation.

### **2.3.1.2 Develop partnership and local linkages**

Under this tactic, Levinger and Mcleod (2002) note that actual and potential leaders within the private and public sectors should be identified so as to lay grounds for a successful exit. According to them, the promising actors in the private and public sectors should be facilitated to understand and support the goal of the programme and committed to the programme or project even when the sponsor takes a less direct role. In line with Levinger and Mcleod (2002), Rogers and Marcias (2004b) allude that networking with local and international organisations is essential to ensure that local organisations continue to access resources they need after programme ends. In their views, direct link to international donors offer avenues for financial sustainability while local networks can provide resilience; mitigate risks to project success; provide information and access; and offer a support structure as the sponsor withdraws. This study, therefore, sought to find out whether partnership and local linkages were developed and their impact to the sustainability of the local organisation set in place.

### **2.3.1.3 Build local organisational and human capacity**

Building local organisational and human capacity is the third element propounded by Levinger and Mcleod. According to Hailey and James (2003), there is no one universally accepted definition of capacity building owing to the latitude of its interpretation. Yet despite this disagreement, the need for capacity building is universally accepted and it has been increasingly prioritised at the core of many development intervention strategies (Hailey and James, 2003). In this study, the definition offered by Levinger and Mcleod (2002) was preferred and therefore

capacity building was used to mean: “a general-purpose term to describe the broad category of activities intended to help local organizations (including NGOs, government, and community groups) accomplish their missions more efficiently and effectively” (Levinger and Mcleod, 2002, 10 pp).

Drawing from practitioners interviewed for their study, Levinger and Mcleod (2002) argue strongly that beneficiaries should be empowered so as to direct the development processes that affect them. This meant developing a variety of capabilities within an organisation in order to maintain benefit flows and planned activities so as to accomplish their missions more efficiently and effectively. They further note that where the object is a phase over, the organisation should strive to develop capabilities to design and deliver high-quality services and to manage commodities, including logistics and monitoring. In the views of Rogers and Marcias (2004b) high quality services help to create and sustain demand for programmes that improve people’s lives, and motivate the poorest of the poor to invest their scarce resources of time and effort into the programme. In this study, therefore, efforts was made to ascertain whether capacity building was done to community members, SHIMACHI, the local organisation set up, and its impact on the success of the exit strategies.

#### **2.3.1.4 Mobilize local and external resources**

Levinger and Mcleod’s fourth element is to mobilise local and external resources. The resources referred to are funds that could be used during and after the transition. While contending that exit of the sponsor in most cases meant the end of the funding

that they provided, Levinger and Mcleod (2002) suggest that actors should plan from the start to mobilize adequate resources to maintain the necessary scope and high quality of services until such a time when activities are no longer needed to sustain benefit flows. Alternatives, according to Levinger and Mcleod (2002), might include: Current donor funds local organisation(s) directly; other external (international) donors fund local organisation(s); community resources help fund activities; public sector actors (local, regional or national government) contribute resources; other local donors, including private sector contribute resources, and finally, local organizations introduce fees for services (Levinger and Mcleod, 2002)

Levinger and McLeod further note that introduction of user fees (also referred to as market or business approach in some literature) is often advocated as a way to make local organisations more financially self sustaining and stress that future funds planning should be integrated into a programme design (Levinger and Macleod, 2002). This study, therefore, sought to find out whether resources to fund the transition were mobilized and the viability of alternatives for funds generation set in place to make the local organisation established financially sustainable.

### **2.3.1.5 Stagger the phasing of activities and resources**

Levinger and Mcleod (2002) note that in order to make the exit strategy most effective the sponsor should identify, prioritize and schedule the staggering of key elements of a programme. Also, plans on how and when local actors will take on new roles and responsibilities need to be made. According to them, staggering the phasing of activities and resources provide an opportunity for the taking over organisation to

adjust to its new responsibilities by mobilising resources, gaining skill and experience gradually. In this study, the researcher sought to assess the process of staggering projects portfolio and how local project beneficiaries were prepared to continue with project benefits and activities.

### **2.3.1.6 Allow roles and relationship to evolve**

According to their sixth element, Levinger and Mcleod (2002) note that upon ending project or programme intervention, the relationship between the sponsor and the taking over organisation should not end as well. The sponsor, they note, should opt a useful advisory role to ensure that the programme or project continue smoothly under its new leadership. Based on these assertions, this study sought to find out how WVT and SHIMACHI, the local organisation set up, related.

Basically, Levinger and McLeod (2002) did not link these elements with project cycle development. This study, however, attempted to link and analyse the design and implementation of exit strategies to project cycle development. This was so done in order to gain further insight on how effective the exit strategies were designed and implemented. To that effect, the framework developed by Davis and Sankar (2006) was adapted.

### **2.3.2 The framework by Davis and Sankar**

This framework was primarily meant to provide a lesson on how United Nations Educational, Scientific and Culture Organisation (UNESCO) could effectively adopt and learn from international best practices for developing and implementing exit

strategies in its programming. This study, however, adapted it in the context of WVT for both organisations follow the project cycle approach.

According to Davis and Sankar (2006), there are four stages in an exit strategy that correspond to stages in the project cycle, namely: Exit strategy is developed during the project development stage; exit strategy is refined during project implementation stage; exit strategy is assessed during monitoring and evaluation stage; and finally, the exit strategy is implemented during project transition; culminating into phasing over or phase out (Davis and Sankar, 2006). According to them, during the project development stage, the foundations are being set, the project is defined, expectations are spelled out and the processes required to implement and review the projects are developed. During the very period, an exit strategy also is formulated so that project staff gets to know how the future will look like. This in turn, they argue, helps to refine project activities. Likewise, formulating exit strategies at the inception of projects provides a way to test the logic and assumptions made about project interventions.

During project implementation, according to Davis and Sankar, (2006), project ideas are put into realities. As the process goes on changes occur and lessons are learned leading to adjustment of original aims and goals. As the project develops, the exit strategy needs to be refined in the light of these changes and lessons. During project review, David and Sankar (2006) propound that information about how well the project is progressing is generated. The information generated is used for decision making, including whether or not to progress or end the intervention. Such a decision

affects the kind of exit strategy to be adopted and how to exit (David and Sankar, 2006). Based on the above assertions by Davis and Sankar (2006), this study sought to determine whether the exit strategies adapted was linked to project cycle development and its impact to the long term sustainability of project benefits after project graduation.

## **2.4 Success of exit strategies**

Gardner *et al.* (2005) as well as Rogers and Marcia (2004b), drawing from Levinger and Mcleod (2002) suggest three measures to gauge the success of an exit strategies: If the programme impact has been sustained, expanded or improved after programme end; if the relevant activities are continued in the same or modified format, and if the systems developed and organizations and individuals trained or empowered by the programme continue to function effectively. In this study, these measures were used as benchmarks for assessing the success of the exit strategies adapted by the ADP.

### **2.4.1 Programme/project impact**

Studies about programme impact address the concept in a variety of ways and as a result, it has come to represent a number of ideas. The common denominator however, has been focusing on the longer term changes brought about by a certain development intervention (Madsen, 1999). Impact goes beyond the achievement of outputs and immediate objectives and tries to capture the social, economic, environmental, and other developmental changes that have taken place as a consequence of the project or programme (UNDP, 2001). Impact can be related either to the specific objectives of an intervention or to unanticipated changes caused

by an intervention. Such unanticipated changes, positive or negative, may also occur in the lives of the people not belonging to the beneficiary group (Madsen 1999; UNDP, 2001; Rogers and Marcia, 2004b).

Studies also point to factors considered in impact assessment, ranging from contextual, time-scale, level and target, and external influences (Madsen 1999). In the views of Davis and Sankar (2006) as well as Rogers and Marcia (2004a, b) the only way to rigorously evaluate the success of an exit strategy is to return to the programme area some fixed time after exit. While the former is silent about the ideal time for undertaking a rigorous evaluation about programme/project impact, the latter note that one or two years after programme or project graduation would provide some information but longer term evaluation should also be done for some proportion of the programme. Rogers and Marcia (2004a, b) strongly argue that post programme or project evaluation also helps to generate information about programmatic and contextual factors leading to sustainability, and about the role of the exit strategy in that process. For that reasons, this study was done two years after graduation of the Agriculture and Food Security and Leadership Development projects.

#### **2.4.1.1 Measuring project impact**

Studies about impact place it as the last and ultimate in the chain of monitoring and evaluation process (Madsen, 1999; Ebrahim, and Rangan, 2009). It is also argued by some writers that in order to effectively measure impact, it is necessary to complete the previous stages of the process first (Madsen, 1999). This assertion is based on

a normative view that organizations working on social problems, especially if they seek public support, should be able to demonstrate impact in solving societal problems (Ebrahim, and Rangan, 2009). Likewise, the incompleteness in implementation stage or in the monitoring process will negatively impact on the process of impact assessment (Madsen, 1999).

Critics of the impact chain approach (Roche, 1999, cited in Madsen, 1999, 40pp) argue that while the impact chain is a useful way to distinguish various levels of change and recording and reviewing the process of change, it may be counterproductive to use it too rigidly for realities and perceptions of stakeholders do not neatly categorise into the different stages. Rogers and Marcias (2004a, b) hold similar views and note that while comparing different forms of exit may be informative, programmes and their contexts vary considerably. As such, it would be difficult to separate the success of the exit strategy itself from other factors related to sustainability.

In order to address the debate above, this study adopted the Oxfam/Novib ‘context-in’ approach (Madsen, 1999). Unlike the classical assessment approach which follows the impact chain, this approach shows that it is not absolutely necessary to complete the previous stages in the impact chain prior to the ultimate assessment of project impact. This approach starts by looking at what changes are considered most significant in people’s lives, irrespective of any programme/project. Then, it explores

what processes brought such changes about, amongst which sponsor initiated programmes/projects may be one (Roche, 1999, cited in Madsen 1999, 41pp).

The context-in approach has some inherent weaknesses, including the fact that it is not directly focused on the project or on an assessment of particular anticipated impacts of a certain intervention (Madsen, 1999). Despite this weakness, the approach has a number of advantages, which were considered crucial for the purpose of this study. These are: It avoids the typical indicator dilemma. Also, it avoids the over exposure and exaggeration of the projects' importance vis a vis other causes of change and it is therefore, more genuine when deciding what caused the change. In addition, it "jumps over" the many obstructions faced in the classical impact chain assessment. For example, lack of data, baseline, monitoring of previous stages, to mention few. Finally, it exerts no prejudice regarding order of relevance and importance. It is, therefore, more objective especially when it come to the question of attribution (Madsen, 1999).

Studies show that in donor initiated projects/studies impact has been studied in relation to a number of issues: Achievement according to objectives, impact on livelihoods and poverty status in particular, sustainability and cost-effectiveness, innovation and flexibility, replicability and scaling-up, gender impact, environmental impact, and impact vis-à-vis democratisation and pluralism (Ridell *et al.* 1997). In this study, however, impact assessment was limited to achievement according to objectives with specific focus on improvement of knowledge, attitude and behaviour (KAB) in agricultural production; increase in income, household food security, participation and sustainability (Madsen, 1999).

#### **2.4.1.2 The problem of attribution**

Assessment of programme/project involving multi faceted interventions at different points and locations over years pose difficulties in identifying direct causal links (Hailey and James, 2003). The difficult question that arises is to which degree can the identified changes be attributed to a development intervention? While the conventional approach emphasizes proving the “cause-effect” relationship, the Oxfam/Novib approach seeks confirmation of attribution by different stakeholders (Madsen, 1999). This study adopted the Oxfarm/Novib approach.

#### **2.4.1.3 Measuring household food security**

According to Perez-Escamilla and Segall-Correa (2008), there are five commonly used methods to measure food security, namely: (i) the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) method for estimating calories available per capita at the national level; (ii) household income and expenditure surveys; (iii) individual's dietary intake; (iv) anthropometry; and (v) experience based food insecurity measurement scales. The same authors note that experience based food insecurity measurement scale is the only method that represents a direct measure of food insecurity. The other four methods are indirect measures of food insecurity. According to them, all methods complement each other and the method of choice depends on the question being answered and the economic and logistical resources available to collect valid data (Perez-Escamilla and Segall-Correa, 2008).

In this study, household food security was measured by adapting the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS). This is a nine-item scale designed to measure the prevalence and severity of household food insecurity that was developed by USAID's Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance (FANTA) project in 2006 (Coates *et al.* 2007). The tool was preferred because, according to Perez-Escamilla and Segall-Correa (2008), has the following advantages: (i) it is the only fundamental method that measures directly the phenomenon of interest based on the food insecurity experience as perceived by the affected individuals; (ii) it captures not only the physical but also the psychosocial dimensions of food insecurity; (iii) the method can be used for mapping and understanding causes and consequences of food insecurity and hunger using the household as the unit of analysis; (iv) data collection, processing and analysis is straightforward and relatively inexpensive, allowing for the decentralisation of data collection efforts; (v) the same scale, with language adapted to the local context, based on cognitive qualitative research, may be applied in very diverse socio cultural settings yielding valid and predictable results (Perez-Escamilla and Segall-Correa, 2008), .

HFIAS assesses whether households had experienced food insecurity (access) in the preceding 30 days (Coates *et al.* 2007, FAO, 2008). The tool has nine questions that ask about modifications households made in their diet or food consumption patterns due to limited resources to acquire food. The respondent is ideally the person in charge of food preparation or the head of household who answers on behalf of all household members. The tool covers three themes: Experiencing anxiety and

uncertainty about the household food supply; altering quality of the diet; and reducing quantity of food consumed (Coates, *et al.* 2007).

The frequency of occurrence was considered rarely if experienced once or twice in the past four week; sometimes, three to ten times in the past four weeks, and often, more than ten times in the past four weeks (Coates, 2007 *et al.* FAO, 2008). Quantification of modifications made by households was made by assigning households a score that ranged from 0 to 27. In the final analysis, a higher HFIAS score was indicative of poorer access to food and greater household food insecurity (Coates, 2007 *et al.*). While FAO (2008) groups households into three categories, Coates (2007 *et al.*) has four. In this study, the four categories approach was adopted; food secure (score 0-6), mild food insecure (scores 7-13), moderate food insecure (scores 14-20), and severely food insecure (scores 21-27).

#### **2.4.2 Effective functioning of organisation set in place**

Rogers and Macías (2004b) allude that where the plan for sustainability is to create a local CBO, the success of that approach will depend on three criteria: Management capacity, mastery of the necessary technical skills and the ability to obtain the financial and other resources needed to maintain its activities by the taking over organisation. In their observation, these criteria must be met for the CBO to be fully functional and capable of sustaining development activities. The same authors further note that sustainability of the CBO or groups may be enhanced by establishing what they called ‘vertical and horizontal linkages’ to other groups, local or international.

According to Rogers and Macías (2004b), horizontal linkage include networks of similar groups in neighbouring communities while vertical linkages involve linking the local CBO with government or other organisations so as to receive assistance from them. While horizontal linkages may be a source of mutual assistance and support among the groups and economies of scale in some activities, vertical linkage is critical for support, supervision, provision of resources, and training. This study, therefore, used the above mentioned capacity areas and forms of linkage as benchmarks to assess the effectiveness of SHIMACHI.

## **2.5 Challenges of implementing exit strategies**

In their review of UNESCO's exit and transition strategies, Davis and Sankar (2006) identify poor project definition and project management as factors which can lead to uncoordinated and haphazard implementation of exit activities near the programme/projects' end. Under such circumstances, the opportunity to monitor and track a community's progress (toward graduation) over time will be missed, as will the opportunity to develop strong linkages and partnerships with local organizations over time (Gardner, *et al.* 2005). Gardner *et al.* (2005), drawing experience from the C-SAFE projects in Zimbabwe and Zambia, articulate that persistent drought, funding restrictions, belated planning of exit strategy, limited follow up capacity, and community ownership of the exit strategy can negatively affect the success of the exit strategy. Nonetheless, it was unclear whether the same factors articulated by Gardner, *et al.* (2005) and Davis and Sankar (2006) affected effective

implementation of the Agriculture and Food Security and Leadership Development projects that were implemented by WVT through Chipanga ADP.

## **2.6 World Vision Tanzania interventions in development projects**

World Vision Tanzania (WVT) is a Christian Development, Relief and Advocacy Non governmental Organisation (NGO) established in 1981. It is a member of World Vision International (WVI) which is a partnership of Christians working in nearly 100 countries worldwide, 25 of which are in Africa. WVT partners with the government at the national, regional and local (district, ward and village) levels, Faith Based Organizations (FBO), other likeminded NGOs, multilateral and unilateral organizations in its bid to find lasting ways to improve the lives of children and their families by focusing on community needs (WVI, 2012; WVT, 2011).

WVT intervenes in development programmes/projects through ADPs. Programmatic engagement lasts for 15-20 years whereby WVT assist community members to identify their own potential resources and build partnerships with government, faith based organisations and other development agencies to make lasting transformational changes possible (Ferndriger, 2010). The engagement period is more than a decade because it takes time before the project can take off with full participation of local people. It is for this reason and in order to yield the intended results projects life span is usually divided into three phases. These are assessment and design, implementation and transition phases.

The assessment and design phase covers the first two years. During this period participatory research is carried out to establish the root causes of poverty in the community and what the needs of the community are. The implementation phase is carried out between the third and eleventh years. At this stage the plans that were designed in the previous phase are executed. The transition phase ushers in between the twelfth and fiftieth years. At this level, WV prepares to leave the community by executing exit strategies. Finally, the community is left to enhance the project achievements based on structures put in place and expertise acquired (Ferndriger, 2010). There is however, inadequate information regarding the effectiveness of exit strategies adopted by WVT. Therefore, it was important for this study to assess the effectiveness of the exit strategies adopted so as to ascertain their practicality in sustaining development projects.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **3.0 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Description of the study area**

The description of the study area is based on geographical location, climatic condition, and socio economic activities undertaken by the people in Chipanga area.

##### **3.1.1 Geographical location and administrative information**

This study was done in the former Chipanga ADP. The ADP was found in Chipanga Division, Bahi District (formerly Dodoma Rural District) in Dodoma Region. The division has five administrative wards, namely: Chipanga, Chikola, Chali, Mpalanga and Nondwa. This study was done in Chipanga and Chikola wards, specifically, in Chipanga A, Chipanga B, Chikola and Ng’hulugano villages. These villages were selected for the study because they cover some of the areas where the ADP projects were implemented.

##### **3.1.2 Climate**

Chipanga Division experiences hot and dry temperatures of about 21 degree centigrade. The area is mostly characterized by semi arid climate with flat plains, shrub land and thorn bush vegetation. Annual rainfall ranges between 300mm and 600mm. The area usually, receives rains between December and April (URT, 2010).

### **3.1.3 Economic activities**

The major economic activity in Chipanga area is farming. Millet, sorghum, paddy and groundnuts are major food crops while sesame, peanuts and sunflower are important cash crops. On the other hand, pastoralists keep traditional cattle, goats and chicken (URT, 2010).

### **3.2 Study design**

In this study, a descriptive case study design was preferred because it allowed in depth examination of the selected cases (Burns, 2000; Varkevisser *et al.* 2003). Also, it enabled using a wide array of different data sources and collection methods which allowed triangulation of data and substantiating evidence to improve reliability and validity of data and findings ((Neale *et al.* 2006; Burns, 2000; Varkevisser *et al.* 2003). There are however, few limitations pertaining to case studies. Case studies have been viewed in the evaluation and research fields as less rigorous than surveys or other methods (Neale *et al.* 2006; Burns, 2000; Adam and Kamuzora, 2008). Case studies can be lengthy and therefore, are criticized for failing to sustain the reader's interest (Neale *et al.* 2006). Another criticism is that they rely on one or few units of data collection hence, are not generalizable (Neale *et al.* 2006; Adam and Kamuzora, 2008). These limitations and pitfalls were overcome by writing a report that provides rich information in digestible manner, and being systematic in data collection and analysis so as to ensure validity and reliability of the study findings. In this study, the Agriculture and Food Security, and Leadership Development projects that were intervened by Chipanga ADP served as case studies. The two projects were purposively selected because they planned and implemented exit strategies which

involved, among others, putting in place a local organisation called SHIMACHI to further carry out development interventions. To the point of this study the two projects had been phased over to SHIMACHI in the past two years.

### **3.3 Study population and sample size**

The population for this study consisted of households supported by former Chipanga ADP through the Agriculture and Food Security, and Leadership Development projects. The sampling frame consisted of 180 household members formerly supported by ADP out of whom 120 respondents were selected using random sampling technique. Their names were obtained from ADP documents. The sample size of 120 respondents was considered optimum and representative of the study population. Also, it exceeds the minimum number of 100 cases that are recommended by many researchers (Bailey, 1994).

### **3.4 Sampling procedures**

This study used both simple random sampling and purposive sampling techniques (Bryman, 2008). Simple random sampling was done for household respondents. Purposive sampling was done for key informants, namely; the Project Coordinator (PC), the ADP/SHIMACHI Chairperson, and the Designing, Monitoring and Evaluation (DM&E) officer. The selection of key informants was based on their ability to provide relevant answers to study questions.

### **3.5 Data sources**

The sources of data for this study comprised of both secondary and primary data sources. Secondary data sources included ADP documents and reports that were obtained from WVT, Western Zone Office, and SHIMACHI office. Data that were actually collected from secondary sources included: WVT programmatic interventions through ADPs, project goals for the Agriculture and Food Security, and Leadership Development projects, elements of the exit strategies in the final year of projects intervention; their achievements and constraints, and World Vision policy about exit strategies. Other data were about geographical and administrative location, economic activities and climatic conditions of Chipanga area. Primary data were directly obtained from the field. In this study secondary data supplemented primary data and therefore, enriched the study.

### **3.6 Data collection methods**

Both quantitative and qualitative methods were used to collect data. Quantitative data were collected using an interview schedule which was administered to respondents at household level. Qualitative data were collected using key informant interviews, focus group discussion (FGD), document analysis and observation. Key informant interviews were held with the Project Coordinator (PC), ADP/SHIMACHI Chairperson, and the Design Monitoring and Evaluation (DM&E) officer while the FGD involved three (3) members who were formerly supported by the ADP and three (3) members of SHIMACHI.

Prior to field work, permission to conduct the study was granted by the Vice Chancellor at Sokoine University Agriculture and the District Executive Director of Bahi district. The rationale for the study was prepared and presented to respondents prior to interviews (Appendix 1). Respondents were only interviewed after they had accepted participating in the study. Arrangement for time and places for meeting with key informants was made in advance. Data collection started in mid October and ended in mid November. It was done by the principal researcher and two research assistants. The research assistants were trained for two days to familiarize them with the interview schedule and how to use it to collect data. They were also involved in pre testing the tool. Every evening, data collected by the research assistants were cross checked by the principal researcher for validation.

### **3.6.1 Quantitative method**

Quantitative data were collected from household respondents by using an interview schedule (Appendix 6). The tool consisted of both open and close-ended questions and was divided into four sections. Section one covered demographic and socio economic variables while section two covered projects' supported activities, kinds of support offered and the status of activities done by household members and SHIMACHI. Section three covered projects impact and effective functioning of SHIMACHI and IGA groups. Section four covered challenges encountered in the course of implementing the exit strategies.

The tool was administered to household respondents who were supported by the ADP through the Agriculture and Food Security and Leadership Development projects, some of whom had joined with SHIMACHI. The interview schedule was preferred because it allowed the same types of data to be collected from a number of people in the same way; facilitating quantitative and systematic analysis (Stewart, 2009). Also, it generated reliable and valid data from study respondents within a reasonable time period at a minimum cost (Bell, 2000; Kothari, 2010).

Pre testing of the interview schedule was done on 15 respondents. It helped the researcher to cross check validity of the tool with respect to study objectives and questions, to identify adequacy of instructions to interviewees, and how well the questions flowed (Bryman, 2008). In addition, it helped to adjust the coding system, ascertaining time needed to administer the tool, and the need for probing some open ended questions (Varkevisser *et al.* 2003). Finally, the tool was modified so as to accommodate changes that were found necessary.

### **3.6.2 Qualitative methods**

In order to collect qualitative data, interview, FGD, document analysis and observation were used.

#### **3.6.2.1 Interview**

A semi structured interview guide was used to collect primary data from key informants (Appendices 2, 3, 5). This tool helped to gain opinion from informants.

As suggested by Burns (2000), the use of a semi-structured interview enabled informants to use their own perspective and the language natural to them rather than that of the researcher. Also, it enabled the researcher to elicit information about the way SHIMACHI, and IGA groups functioned. The tool was designed with open ended questions which allowed follow up questions depending on the response.

### **3.6.2.2 Focus group discussion**

FGD is one of the qualitative methods of data collection. It is used to obtain in-depth information on concepts, perceptions and ideas of a group (Varkevisser *et al.* 2003). In this study, only one focus group discussion was conducted. The discussion was “...more than a question-answer interaction” (Varkevisser *et al.* 2003, 182 pp). This enabled participants to express their views and perceptions about the subject matter without undue interference. Besides, it enabled the researcher to gain more insights about issues that were not clearer (Varkevisser *et al.* 2003; Bryman, 2008). The discussion involved 2 former ADP committee members, 2 SHIMACHI members and 3 former ADP supported household members. A focus group discussion guide (Appendix 4) was prepared to facilitate the discussion.

The discussion was facilitated by the researcher with the assistance of a recorder. The facilitator explained the purpose of the FGD, the kind of information needed, how it will be used and sought permission for participating in the discussion and digital recording. The recorder jotted down the general description of the group dynamics (level of participation, presence of dominant group and level of interest), opinions of

participants and emotional aspects such as reluctance and strong feelings attached to certain opinion. Finally, the facilitator summarised the discussion to check for agreement and additional comments, and thanked the participants.

### **3.6.2.3 Observation**

Observation is a technique that involves systematically selecting, watching and recording behaviour and characteristics of living beings, objects or phenomena (Varkevisser *et al.* 2003). In this study, non participant observation was used to observe activities and benefits that had been sustained since ending of ADP support. An observation guide was prepared and used to facilitate data collection (Appendix 7). The use of observation helped the researcher to triangulate data collected through the questionnaire and interview guide (Kothari, 2010; Bryman, 2008; Varkevisser *et al.* 2003).

### **3.6.2.4 Document analysis**

Burns (2000) suggested that documents can be used to corroborate evidence from other sources and specify events and issues in greater detail than available through other data gathering methods. However, Robson *et al.* (2001) cautioned that documents may only partially reflect reality, and may only tell the researcher what should be done, not whether it is actually done. Bell (1999) advised that documents should be critically examined for a number of aspects of evidence including: The intended purpose of the document, any unintended or unwitting evidence within the document, the authorship, the assumption and biases within the document. The

researcher may then be able to decide whether the document is reliable for a particular purpose. In this study, document analysis was used to collect secondary data using researcher's diary. The analysis involved documents and reports regarding sustainability of development projects based on exit strategies. These included: Chipanga ADP assessment report, End of Programme Report, Programme Evaluation Report, Annual Programme Report (2009 Financial Year), and Learning through Evaluation, Accountability and Planning Lexicon.

### **3.7 Data processing and analysis**

Quantitative data collected from household members were edited, coded, classified and tabulated by using Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS). Data editing was done so as to identify errors and omissions and to make necessary corrections. Data coding was done by assigning numbers to responses so that they could be put into a limited number of categories or classes (Kothari, 2010). Thereafter, data were classified in accordance with study objectives. Finally, data were tabulated. Processing of qualitative data from key informants involved transforming audio data into meaningful interview notes. Data from secondary sources were scrutinised, summarised and finally, construed into meaningful information intended for this study.

Quantitative data were analysed using descriptive statistics based on frequencies to find distribution of individual variables among respondents. Qualitative data from FGD participants and data from secondary sources were analysed through content

analysis technique whereas the content of the transcripts were analysed and categorised as suggested by Burns (2000) into the objectives of the study. The technique was preferred since it allowed making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of contents of document (Dekeba, 2001).

### **3.8 Measurement of key variables**

Key variables that are presented under this section are household food security, project impact and effective functioning of SHIMACHI.

#### **3.8.1 Household food security**

Household food security was measured by adapting the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS). The tool has nine questions which are scored 1 (rarely), 2 (sometimes) or 3 (often) depending on the frequency of occurrence. Rarely implied the situation was experienced once or twice in the past four week, sometimes implied three to ten times in the past four weeks and often implied more than ten times in the past four weeks. Based on these scores an index of 27 scores was developed so as to determine the status of food security. Households which scores 0-6 were food secure; scores ranging from 7-13 were mild food insecure, scores ranging from 14-20 were moderately food insecure and scores ranging from 21-27 were severely food insecure.

According to HFIAS, a household is mildly food insecure if the household head or any member of the household worried about not having enough food sometimes or often, and/or were unable to eat preferred foods, and/or ate a more monotonous diet than desired and/or some foods considered undesirable, but only rarely. Moderately food insecure households sacrificed quality more frequently by eating a monotonous diet or undesirable foods sometimes or often, and/or had started to cut back on quantity by reducing the size of meals or number of meals, rarely or sometimes. Severely food insecure households graduated to cutting back on number of meals often, or experienced any of the three most severe conditions (running out of food, going to bed hungry, or going a whole day and night without eating), even as infrequently as rarely (Coates, *et al.* 2007).

### **3.8.2 Project impact**

Project impact was measured by using a five point Likert scale with codes: (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) I don't know, (4) agree, (5) strongly agree (Burns, 2000). Study respondents were presented with statements upon which they indicated their level of agreement/disagreement. In the final analysis, strongly disagree/disagree and strongly agree/agree were aggregated into disagree and agree, respectively.

### **3.8.3 Effective functioning of SHIMACHI**

Effective functioning of SHIMACHI was measured by using a five point Likert scale with codes: (1) strongly dissatisfied, (2) dissatisfied, (3) I don't know, (4) satisfied,

and (5) strongly satisfied. Study respondents were presented with statements upon which they indicated their level of satisfaction/dissatisfaction. In the final analysis, strongly dissatisfied/dissatisfied and strongly satisfied/satisfied were aggregated into dissatisfied and satisfied, respectively.

### **3.9 Use of Likert Scale**

The use of Likert-scales within the interview schedule was advantageous in that it generated data from the participants' response which produced relatively homogenous scales about the impact of projects intervened and the performance of SHIMACHI with reasonably high validity and reliability. This, according to Burns (2000), increases the probability that a unitary attitude was being measured. Major weaknesses of this tool are that while it measures the favorableness to the topic, it does not measure exactly how much more favorable a participant's attitude is between the measurement intervals/designations (Engels, 2010; Kothari, 2010). Also, it depends on how the respondents perceive the meanings of the options from strongly disagree to strongly agree (Engels, 2010). Besides, there are chances that respondents may reply according to what they think they should rather than how they feel (Kothari, 2010). In order to overcome these weaknesses, the Likert scale included open ended questions.

### **3.10 Limitations of the study**

The accomplishment of this study was not without limitations some of which are:

Firstly is unavailability of some important project documents about the design and implementation of the projects. This was so because they had already been archived in another ADP. However, the researcher managed to access Programme Assessment Report, Financial Year 2009 Annual Progress Report and End of Programme Report (2009) which served the purpose.

Secondly is unavailability of some study respondents. Some project staff had been shifted to other projects while others had left the organisation altogether. While the former were traced, projects staff who had quitted the organisation could not. This reduced the number of projects staff interviewed to only two. Also, some of the supported community members sampled out had shifted to other places therefore, could not be contacted. This reduced the sample size to 110 respondents.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **4.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION**

#### **4.1 Demographic and socio economic characteristics**

In assessing the effectiveness of exit strategies in development projects in Tanzania, it was important to consider the demographic and socio economic characteristics of household heads involved in the study since they influence participation in projects intervention and household food security.

##### **4.1.1 Household size**

In this study consideration of household size was important because larger household size can increase household's vulnerability to food insecurity in case of poor household' own farm production. Study results in Table 1 reveal that the average household size was 5.5. This figure was higher by 13.4% and 11% when compared to the 2002 population census results and 2008 district survey results, respectively (URT, 2010). The study further established three categories of household sizes. Small household size had 0-3 people; medium household size had 4-6 people and large household size had more than 6 people in a household. Study findings in Table 1 reveal that about 55% and 31% of households had medium and large household sizes, respectively.

#### **4.1.2 Age**

The ages of study respondents were conventionally categorised into ten year age groups. Years below 15 were considered too young to participate in project interventions, hence, were not included in the age categories. Results in Table 1 indicate that most respondents, 91%, aged between 15 and 65. This age category is considered as active age group and thus, could actively participate in project interventions. Only about 9% of respondents aged 65+. These results show that most people who joined with the ADP, 91%, were in the active age group.

#### **4.1.3 Marital status**

Study results in Table 1 show that married respondents were 79.1%; widowed respondents were 10.9%; divorced respondents were 9.1% and single respondents were 0.9%. In general, the results reveal that most study respondents were married.

#### **4.1.4 Sex**

Regarding sex distribution, study results in Table 1 show that 60% respondents were male and 40% were females. These results imply, generally, that more men than women joined the ADP. The reasons for the disparity between men and women could be explained by the following facts: One, attending seminars involved going to the ADP headquarters which meant leaving other household chores, including food preparation unattended. In rural setting where food preparation and other domestic chores are mainly done by women, it was unlikely for them to attend such development activities. Thus, men had more opportunities to attend the seminars than

women. Two, men as bread winners were motivated by the desire to increase their incomes through material support provided by the ADP.

**Table 1: Demographic and socio economic characteristics (n=110)**

| Variable                               | Frequency | Percentage |
|--|-----------|------------|
| <b>Number of people in a household</b> |           |            |
| 0-3                                    | 16        | 14.5       |
| 0-6                                    | 60        | 54.5       |
| > 7                                    | 30        | 31.0       |
| <b>Household size=5.5</b>              |           |            |
| <b>Age category (in years)</b>         |           |            |
| 15-24                                  | 1         | 0.9        |
| 25-34                                  | 14        | 12.7       |
| 35-44                                  | 29        | 26.4       |
| 45-54                                  | 37        | 33.6       |
| 55-64                                  | 19        | 17.3       |
| 65+                                    | 10        | 9.1        |
| <b>Marital status</b>                  |           |            |
| Married                                | 87        | 79.1       |
| Widow/widower                          | 12        | 10.9       |
| Single                                 | 1         | 0.9        |
| Divorced/divorcee                      | 10        | 9.1        |
| <b>Sex of respondent</b>               |           |            |
| Male                                   | 66        | 60         |
| Female                                 | 44        | 40         |
| <b>Occupation</b>                      |           |            |
| Peasant                                | 102       | 92.7       |
| Formal employment                      | 4         | 3.6        |
| Petty trader                           | 2         | 1.8        |
| Herder                                 | 2         | 1.8        |
| <b>Level of education</b>              |           |            |
| Primary                                | 93        | 84.5       |
| Secondary                              | 9         | 8.2        |
| Illiterate                             | 8         | 7.3        |

#### **4.1.5 Occupation**

Regarding occupation, results in Table 1 reveal that the main occupation in the study area was farming (92.7%). The least undertaken activities were formal employment

(3.6%), petty trading (1.8%) and livestock keeping (1.8%). As long the ADP offered farming related support, it was easier for community members to join with the ADP so as to improve their farm productivity, incomes and food security.

#### **4.1.6 Level of education**

On education, respondents with primary education were 84.5%; secondary education was 8.2% and illiterates were 7.3%. The results, generally, imply that acquisition of formal education could help them to adapt to new farm practices and technologies. This in turn, could increase work efficiency and farm productivity (Yonghong and Katrina, 2007).

### **4.2 Design and implementation of exit strategies**

The study analysed the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the exit strategies. The analysis was based on the frameworks propounded by Levinger and Mcleod (2002) and Davis and Sankar (2006). The elements of the exit strategies in the final year of project intervention were also analysed.

#### **4.2.1 Levinger and Mcleod (2002) framework**

Levinger and Mcleod (2002) propound that an effectively designed and implemented exit strategy bear six elements. The elements should be integrated as part of the overall project approach by planning it from the beginning of the programme design stage and revisiting the design during implementation to assess progress so as to

maintain benefit streams in the future. Study results regarding the design and implementation of these elements are presented below:

#### **4.2.1.1 Plan for exit from the beginning**

According to the PC, the strategies were not formulated from the inception of the projects. According to the PC and DM&E, the exit strategies were formulated in the twelfth years of the projects. This was so because by 1994 when the projects were designed, WVT and sponsor policies did not demand formulation of exit strategies. The fact that exit strategies were not formulated from the inception of projects is not in line with Levinger and Mcleod (2002) who envisioned that the exit strategies should be formulated simultaneously with project design.

#### **4.2.1.2 Develop partnership and local linkages**

In the views of Levinger and Mcleod (2002) agencies involved in donor supported interventions should consider diverse types of organisations, including private and public sectors as potential partners, to ensure improved service delivery and eventual sustainability of projects. Study findings show that the ADP established partnership with Bahi district council, NGO Network in Dodoma (NGONEDO), FARAJA, Umoja wa Wajasiriamali Dodoma (UWADO), Rural Livelihood Development Company (RLDC) and the Foundation for Civil Society. According to the PC, the objects of establishing partnership with other institutions/organisations were to enable the local CBO get technical advice and support and to look for funds from donors and other local organisations. An inquiry from SHIMACHI chairperson

showed that UWADO had trained SHIMACHI leaders to prepare proposals for grants while RLDC had supported IGA groups with micro enterprise activities such as keeping local chickens using improved techniques and provision of loans in Chikola ward. Also, the Foundation for Civil Society had granted SHIMACHI funds for conducting leadership training in Chikola ward in 2009. All these took place during the projects' transition period. Although Levinger and Mcleod (2002) envisioned that direct link with international donors facilitate financial sustainability, both the PC and SHIMACHI chairperson admitted that SHIMACHI was not linked to any international institution.

#### **4.2.1.3 Build local organisational and human capacity**

Capacity building is one of the key tenets for ensuring project ownership and eventual sustainability. In the views of Levinger and Mcleod (2002) beneficiaries should be “empowered” so as to direct the development processes that affect them. Study findings show that capacity building was done for the ADP, SHIMACHI and community members before formulation of the exit strategies and continued during the transition period. It was further found from the PC that the ADP built organisational capacity by establishing physical infrastructures such as office block, motorcycles, tables, chairs, and other office equipment so as to facilitate effective job performance. Upon exit, most of these infrastructures were handled over to SHIMACHI.

Further inquiry from the PC and FGD participants showed that human capacity was built through trainings of both staff and community members and provision of subsidized material support to community members. An inquiry from the PC about the areas of capabilities revealed that CBO leaders were trained in leadership, networking and collaboration, and local fund raising. Community members, on the other hand, were facilitated with improved agriculture practices both in crop farming and animal husbandry, entrepreneurship, human rights, village budgeting, disaster preparedness, child protection, to mention a few. In their paper about “Programme Graduation and Exit Strategies”, Rogers and Marcia (2004b) emphasised that in a phase over scenario, during programme/project design and implementation, emphasis should be placed on institutional capacity building so that the services provided can continue through local organisations.

#### **4.2.1.4 Mobilize local and external resources**

Mobilisation of local and external resources has to do with mobilisation of funds for the transition period . According to the PC and SHIMACHI chairperson funds for the transition period was mobilised from the project donor; the Australian support office, in accordance to WVT organisational policy. Further interrogation with the PC on alternatives for strengthening future financial resource base for SHIMACHI showed that arrangements for mobilization of contributions in form of membership fee from individuals, groups, and well wishers was set in place. The approach, however, had proved unsuccessful since members were reluctant to pay their annual contributions.

The reason behind, according to SHIMACHI chairperson and participant of FGD, was failure of SHIMACHI to deliver services to the expectations of its members. As cautioned by Levinger and Mcleod (2002); Rogers and Marcia (2004b), members of a local organisation only pays if they feel they are getting something of value for their contribution. Rogers and Marcia (2004b) further note that community contributions are only feasible if the community supports and value the activities and possess the resource to donate. While Levinger and Mcleod (2002) strongly argue that sponsors should plan from the start of programmes to mobilise adequate resources that would enable maintaining the necessary scope and high quality of services this study found that mobilisation of contributions was done during the transition period. Therefore, up to the point of graduation of projects not much funds had been raised.

#### **4.2.1.5 Stagger the phasing of activities and resources**

According to Rogers and Marcia (2004b) transfer of responsibilities to community organisations should take place gradually, with the sponsor reducing its material and technical support over time to an advisory role, and finally to no role at all. According to the Phase out Plan for Chipanga ADP, however, staggering of activities and resources took a form of ‘handover’ that occurred in the event period of two months; August-September, 2009. Therefore, the process did not give adequate time for transferring project portfolios, which according to the PC, “requires ample time to enable leader of a local organisation to learn and own the process”. Under such circumstance, SHIMACHI leaders could not get chance to adjust to its new

responsibilities. According to the chairperson of SHIMACHI and participants of FGD, during the transition period, SHIMACHI leaders were involved in minor supervisory roles for WVT staff continued to hold all management responsibilities.

#### **4.2.1.6 Allow roles and relationship to evolve**

Allowing roles and relationship to evolve is all about continued relationship between SHIMACHI and WVT. While in a phase over context, sustainability of relationship is welcome, this study established that WVT and SHIMACHI had weak relationship and that SHIMACHI was on the verge of collapsing hence, raising doubts about the sustainability of WV projects. Indeed, in a study done in Zambia by Sakala (2008), it was found that WV managed projects were not sustainable. Lack of sustainability of NGO managed projects is also documented by Alther (2008) who reports that with few exceptions, NGOs in Swaziland stop visiting their former projects shortly after handing over. As a result, many of the established groups had no possibility to improve their skills or develop their project.

#### **4.2.2 Davis and Sankar (2006) framework**

At this stage, the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the exit strategies was analysed in relation to project cycle development based on the framework propounded by Davis and Sankar (2006). Study findings are shown below:

#### **4.2.2.1 Exit strategy is developed during the project development stage**

Based on this criterion, it was found from the DM&E and PC that the exit strategies were not developed during the project development stage. They were solely developed by the ADP in the projects' twelfths year. This is when the projects were entering into their transition period. These findings are not in line with Davis and Sankar (2006); Rogers and Marcia (2004b); Levinger *et al.* (2002) who propounded that exit strategies should be formulated from the inception of projects.

#### **4.2.2.2 Exit strategy is refined during project implementation stage**

According to the PC the exit strategies were not refined during project implementation stage. This was so because they were developed at a time when they were required for implementation. Therefore, no any kind of modifications was made to the strategies in response to the feedback from projects implementation. Failure to assess the exit strategy during projects implementation is not in line with Davis and Sankar (2006) who proposed that during project implementation, changes occurs and lessons are learned and therefore, the exit strategy should be modified to reflect such changes and lessons learned.

#### **4.2.2.3 Exit strategy is assessed during monitoring and evaluation stage**

While WVI (2007) point that exit strategies should consider local partners' issues and responsibilities and adjust designs to increase likelihood of sustainability, this study however, found that the exit strategies were not assessed. As a result, no any modification was made in respect to feedback from monitoring and midterm reports,

projects' evaluation report as well as end of programme evaluation report. The latter was done during the transition period; seven months prior to projects graduation. The findings, therefore, suggests mismatch of what is documented in plans and what actually takes place on the ground.

#### **4.2.2.4 Exit strategy is implemented**

According to the PC and DM&E, the exit strategies were implemented for three years. By that time, according to the PC, the focus was directed to capacity building for both SHIMACHI staff and IGA groups to facilitate them perform their roles effectively. Finally, in September 2009 the projects were phased over to SHIMACHI, a local CBO formed in 2004 to further carry out ADP interventions in the area.

#### **4.2.3 Implementation of the elements of the exit strategies in the final year**

The final measure in analysing the effectiveness of the design and implementation of the exit strategies was to ascertain how effectively the elements of the exit strategies were implemented. Study results in Table 2 reveal that the exit strategies were effective in some elements and not with others. The results disclose that three out of six elements (50%) were not implemented at all. The reasons behind, according to Financial Year 2009 Annual Programme Management Report, were funds shortage, unavailability of facilitators and unfavourable weather conditions. Of the three elements implemented, only one (33.3%) was implemented for over one hundred percent while the remaining two were implemented for 58.8% and 19% of set targets. The main reason for failure to fully implement these elements, according to the

Financial Year 2009 Annual Programme Management Report, was shortage of funds. Also, the number of participants for the training of CBO leaders on mushroom production was increased since the training was conducted within their localities; hence, more participants were invited.

**Table 2: Exit activities in the Agriculture and Food Security Project**

| <b>Activity for financial year 2009</b>  | <b>Target</b> | <b>Achievement</b> | <b>%</b> |
|--|---------------|--------------------|----------|
| Train farmers on sesame, groundnuts and sunflower production                                 | 100           | 19                 | 19       |
| To facilitate farmers attend field visit for sharing and learning from progressive farmers   | 17            | 10                 | 58.8     |
| To train CBO members on vegetable and mushroom production                                    | 20            | 27                 | 135      |
| To facilitate 'Nane Nane' farmers Exhibition   | 10            | 0                  | 0        |
| To train community members and project staff on early response to disaster management (ERDM) | 34            | 0                  | 0        |
| To facilitate 1000 families plant trees  | 1000          | 0                  | 0        |

**(Source: 2009 Annual Programme Management Report- Chipanga ADP)**

With respect to the Leadership Development project, study findings in Table 3 indicate that more than three quarters, 83%, of the planned activities were implemented for more than 60%. Only one activity, 17%, was implemented for 18.2%. The reasons for failing to reach set targets, according to the Annual Programme Management Report, was that facilitators from district Community Development office had limited time to train IGA groups and Saving and Credit Cooperative Society (SACCOS) members in planned places and time. Another reason was funds cut which necessitated giving priority to top CBO leaders with the

expectation that in the future, they will, in turn, train leaders in the lower cadre. This study, however, found that CBO leader had not managed to train leaders in the lower cadre, including IGA groups. Results in Table 2 and 3 generally imply that exit strategies were effective in achieving some targets but not others.

**Table 3: Exit activities in the Leadership Development Project**

| Activity for financial year 2009  | Target | Achievement | Percent |
|---|--------|-------------|---------|
| To train CBO leaders on good governance, leadership and local resource mobilisation | 20     | 12          | 60.0    |
| To train IGA groups on entrepreneurship   | 55     | 10          | 18.2    |
| To conduct CBO meetings   | 3      | 9           | 300.0   |
| Train SACCOS members on book keeping  | 54     | 35          | 64.8    |
| To conduct networking meetings  | 2      | 3           | 150     |
| To conduct programme evaluation   | 1      | 1           | 100     |

(Source: 2009 Annual Programme Management Report- Chipanga ADP)

#### **4.3 Success of the exit strategies**

The success of the exit strategies reflects the achievement of projects goals and further progress towards these goals by community members. The success of the exit strategies was evaluated based on the measures propounded by Gardner *et al.* (2005) as well as Rogers and Marcia (2004b). These are: If the programme impact has been sustained, expanded or improved after programme end; if the relevant activities are continued in the same or modified format; and if the systems developed and organizations and individuals trained or empowered by the programme continue to function effectively.

#### **4.3.1 Project impact sustained, improved or expanded**

In this study, project impact was defined as significant changes resulting from the Agriculture and Food Security project. The interest was therefore, to evaluate whether project impact had been sustained, improved or expanded. Eight items were measured by a five point Likert scale, namely: Use of draught animals, improved seeds, farm yard manure and improved livestock husbandry. Others were increase in household income and finally, food security. Study results in Table 4 show that respondents agreed that the use of farm yard manure had increased (92.7%), that the use of improved seeds had increased (91.8%), that farming was mainly done by using ox ploughs (86.4%). In fact, generally, as remarked by a member in FGD:

*“People did not know how to farm using ox ploughs, but they now do; people did not know how to put manure on their farms, but they now do; people did not use improved seeds, but now they use them; people did not know that paddy is a cash crop and were growing just for family consumption but now they grow bigger plots”.*

It was further found that the use of ox plough, improved seed and farm yard manure had been emulated by households which were not supported by the ADP. This is to say, the benefits of the project had expanded to previously non beneficiaries, hence success of the exit strategies. However, majority of them disagreed that village agricultural facilitators continued to visit farmers regularly (80%), IGA group continued to function effectively (73.6%); and that food security had improved (70%). These results imply that exit strategies were effective in achieving some targets but not others.

**Table 4: Project impact (n=110)**

| Statement   | Don't know |      |       |      |     |      |
|---|------------|------|-------|------|-----|------|
|   | Disagree   |      | Agree |      |     |      |
|   | n          | %    | n     | %    | n   | %    |
| Farming is mainly done by using ox ploughs                            | 7          | 6.4  | 8     | 7.3  | 95  | 86.4 |
| The use of improved seeds has increased                               | 1          | 0.9  | 8     | 7.3  | 101 | 91.8 |
| The use of farm yard manure has increased                             | 3          | 2.7  | 5     | 4.5  | 102 | 92.7 |
| Entrepreneurial groups continue to function effectively               | 81         | 73.6 | 25    | 22.7 | 4   | 3.6  |
| Village Agriculture Facilitators visit farmers regularly              | 88         | 80   | 4     | 3.6  | 18  | 16.4 |
| Improved dairy cattle and poultry husbandry is being widely practised | 53         | 48.2 | 26    | 23.6 | 30  | 27.5 |
| Household income has increased  | 47         | 42.7 | 31    | 28.2 | 32  | 29.1 |
| Household food security has improved                                  | 77         | 70   | 7     | 6.4  | 26  | 23.6 |

Results from participants of FGD showed that household income had not increased due to persistent drought which affected cash generating crops. They said that Chipanga area had one crop growing season and the rains were very erratic. This was because the area experiences a semi arid climate. The reasons for improved livestock keeping not being widely practiced, according to participants of FGD, were several. One, improved dairy cattle were affected by the dry climatic condition; shortage of good feed, and shortage of fund to buy medicines amongst community members. Two, poultry project suffered from recurrent diseases eruption, poor care and food provision. As a result, most chicken died. The remaining few had to be sold for failure to upkeep them or in fear of recurrent diseases. Three, keeping local chicken using improved techniques suffered from inability to purchase food and medicines.

Fourthly, keeping local cattle using improved techniques suffered from periodic eruption of diseases, and reluctance to reduce the size of herds.

Household food security was the ultimate measure of project impact, reflecting long lasting changes resulting from Agriculture and Food Security project. It was subjected to further analysis by using Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS). By using the HFIAS, this study sought to understand the prevalence and severity of household food insecurity (access) in the surveyed households.

Regarding prevalence of food insecurity, study results in Table 5 show that only about 37% of respondents were food secure. The remaining, 63%, was food insecure ranging from mild to severely food insecure. In respect to the nine questions asked (Table 6), food secure households experienced none of the food insecurity (access) conditions, or just experienced worry, but rarely. Mildly food insecure households worried about not having enough food, sometimes or often, and/or were unable to eat preferred foods, and/or ate a more monotonous diet than desired and/or some foods considered undesirable, but only rarely. Moderately food insecure household reduced the quality of food more frequently, by eating monotonous diets or undesirable foods sometimes or often, and/or had started to reduce the size of meals or number of meals, rarely or sometimes. Severely food insecure household had reduced meal size or number of meals often, and/or ran out of food, went to bed hungry, or went a whole day and night without eating, even as infrequently as rarely. Compared with findings from a study conducted in Kisiriri ADP (Masanyiwa and Zilihona, 2008), which showed that 72% of project supported household members were food secure,

this study not only show that the impact of food security project had not been sustained but that it had actually deteriorated.

**Table 5: Status of food security among former ADP supported households (n=110)**

| <b>Food security status</b> | <b>Non members of SHIMACHI</b> |          | <b>Members of SHIMACHI</b> |          | <b>Total</b> |
|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|----------------------------|----------|--------------|
|                             | <b>n</b>                       | <b>%</b> | <b>n</b>                   | <b>%</b> |              |
| Food secure                 | 18                             | 35.3     | 23                         | 39       | 37.4         |
| Mildly food insecure        | 19                             | 37.3     | 19                         | 32.2     | 34.5         |
| Moderately food insecure    | 12                             | 23.5     | 14                         | 23.7     | 23.6         |
| Severely food insecure      | 2                              | 3.9      | 3                          | 5.1      | 4.5          |
| Total                       | 51                             | 100      | 59                         | 100      | 100          |

Considering severity of food insecurity (access), study results in Table 6 show that that household food insecurity (access) was decreasing with increasing severity. That is, upon experiencing uncertainty about how to keep food on the table in the near future, households were forced to sacrifice quality (by eating food not preferred (58.2%) and/or reducing food varieties (58.2%) in favour of quantity. As food became more inaccessed, households, had to adopt “extension” strategies so that available food could last longer, including cutting meal size (70%) and/or reducing the number of meals (54.5%). Persistent inaccessibility to food culminated into hunger, either by going to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food (22.7%) and/or going a whole day and night without eating because there was not enough food (5.5%).

**Table 6: Severity of food insecurity (access) among study respondents (n=110)**

| <b>Condition experience by household member(s)</b>  | <b>Frequency</b> |                   |              | <b>Total</b> |
|---|------------------|-------------------|--------------|--------------|
|   | <b>Rarely</b>    | <b>Some-times</b> | <b>Often</b> |              |
| 1. Worried about not having enough food   | 16 (14.5)        | 22(20)            | 46(41.8)     | 84(76.4)     |
| 2. Not able to eat the kinds of foods preferred because of a lack of resources                                      | 32(29.1)         | 26(23.6)          | 21(19.1)     | 79(71.8)     |
| 3. Ate a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources  | 20(18.2)         | 28(25.5)          | 16(14.5)     | 64(58.2)     |
| 4. Ate some foods that really they did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food | 22(20)           | 27(24.5)          | 15(13.6)     | 64(58.2)     |
| 5. Ate a smaller meal than they felt they needed because there was not enough food                                  | 16(14.5)         | 36(32.5)          | 25(22.7)     | 77(70)       |
| 6. Ate fewer meals in a day because there was not enough food   | 18(16.4)         | 35(31.8)          | 7(6.4)       | 60(54.5)     |
| 7. Lacked any food to eat of any kind because of lack of resources to get food                                      | 15(13.6)         | 8(7.5)            | 5(4.5)       | 28(25.5)     |
| 8. Went to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food  | 17(15.5)         | 7(6.4)            | 1(0.9)       | 25(22.7)     |
| 9. Went a whole day and night without eating food because there was not enough food                                 | 4(3.6)           | 1(0.9)            | 1(0.9)       | 6(5.5)       |

Figures in brackets are percentages

The results in Tables 5 and 6 above, generally, show that the exit strategies had not succeeded to improve food security in the study area. The main reason for persistent food insecurity, according to participants of FGD, was persistent dry season, erratic rainfall and limited diversification of sources of income. The findings support Gardner *et al.* (2005) who conducted a study in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho and found that recurrent cycle of drought presents a challenge to not only planning but also implementation of exit strategies.

#### **4.3.2 Project activities continued in the same or modified format**

In ascertaining whether project activities had been continued in the same or modified format, it was found that 84.5% of respondents still continued to engage in their previously ADP supported activities, which are petty business, and improved crop farming and livestock keeping. Nevertheless, it was found that about 57%, 72% and 37% of respondents experienced a decline in productivity of their activities in improved livestock husbandry, improved crop farming and petty business, respectively.

At organisational level, SHIMACHI was required to continue to support its members, either individually or in groups, with material and technical supports as it was under the ADP. These included provision of subsidised ox ploughs, improved cereal seeds, drought resistant cassava cuttings and ox carts. Others were trainings community members about improved agricultural practices, market linkage and networking, leadership, management and financial control, entrepreneurship, and farm and exposure visits. The current study sought to determine whether SHIMACHI was supporting its members. The study found that with exception of only one seminar about leadership and management of resources, SHIMACHI had not supported its members. The reason behind was found to be a weak financial base and lacked experts on part of SHIMACHI. These findings clearly show that project activities were continued in neither the same nor modified format. Instead, the implementation of project activities had actually, deteriorated. In this regard, the findings of the study imply that the exit strategies were not effective.

#### **4.4.3 Effective functioning of organisations developed and individuals trained**

The notable impact of Leadership Development project was establishment of structures upon which further development interventions could be built. These included setting up of SHIMACHI, IGA groups and Village Agricultural Facilitators (VAFs). In order to determine the effectiveness of these structures, this study sought the satisfaction/dissatisfaction of study respondents regarding the functioning of these structures.

##### **4.3.3.1 Effective functioning of SHIMACHI**

SHIMACHI was a local organisation set up by the ADP to further carry out project interventions. In evaluating effective functioning of SHIMACHI, this study used a Likert scale. Respondents were presented with statements that addressed management capabilities; mastery of necessary skills and ability to generate fund and other resources.

Statements about management capacities/abilities addressed: Ability to network with other organisations; ability to plan project activities; ability to implement activities, and ability to monitor activities, and ability to manage resources. Others were ability to hold meeting regularly; ability to provide trainings; ability to adhere to standards and values established; ability to improve service delivery in line with community needs and finally, ability to portray positive image of the organisation. Statements about mastery of necessary skills addressed ability to make innovations and respond to challenges and conflict resolution. Considering ability to generate funds and other

resources, only ability to generate funds was considered. Credit disbursement, loan repayment schemes and management of revolving funds were ruled out when the tool was pre tested for SHIMACHI did not have any organ dealing with financial matters.

In ability to generate funds and other resources, study results in Table 7 show that, none of the respondents were satisfied. Also, about only two percent of the respondents was satisfied with SHIMACHI's management capabilities (1.8%) and mastery of necessary skills (1.8%). In contrast, the results further show that about 45%, 66% and 48% were dissatisfied with the way SHIMACHI functioned with regard to ability to generate funds and other resources, management capabilities and mastery of necessary skills, respectively. Moreover, with the exception of management capabilities (31.8%), 50% and about 55% (54.5%) of the respondents were non committal regarding ability of SHIMACHI to generate funds and mastery of necessary skills respectively. This could be explained by failure of SHIMACHI to hold meetings with its members to enable them to know its role and performance. Generally, these results indicate that the exit strategies adopted were not effective.

**Table 7: Respondents' satisfaction about the functioning of SHIMACHI (n=110)**

| <b>Area of performance</b>                                | <b>Unsatisfied</b> |          | <b>Don't know</b> |          | <b>Satisfied</b> |          |
|---|--------------------|----------|-------------------|----------|------------------|----------|
|   | <b>n</b>           | <b>%</b> | <b>n</b>          | <b>%</b> | <b>n</b>         | <b>%</b> |
| Ability of SHIMACHI to generate funds and other resources | 50                 | 45.4     | 60                | 54.5     | 0                | 0        |
| Management capabilities of SHIMACHI                       | 73                 | 66.4     | 35                | 31.8     | 2                | 1.8      |
| SHIMACHI's mastery of necessary skills                    | 53                 | 48.2     | 55                | 50       | 2                | 1.8      |

#### **4.3.3.2 Trained individuals**

The ADP trained Village Agricultural Facilitators (VAFs), two from each village. Their roles included: Sensitising community members through on farm training about farm preparation, use of manure, and plant spacing. Others were sensitising livestock keepers to utilise dipping services and to change the attitude of keeping big herds of worthless livestock. This study was interested to find out whether VAFs continued to undertake these roles.

While Rogers and Marcia (2004b) argue that identifying key individuals to serve as point persons within communities' increases the long term functioning of that organisation, study results indicate that only about 15% of respondents affirmed that VAFs visited farmers regularly. Most respondents, 85%, held that VAF did not visit farmers regularly. According to members of FGD the reasons for VAFs not visiting farmers showed that there was no any organ to which they were directly accountable, and hence, could be held responsible. Besides, material incentives they rewarded were too inadequate to motivate them perform their duties effectively. The above results imply that VAFs were not undertaking their roles as envisioned; suggesting that the exit strategies were not successful in that respect.

#### **4.3.3.3 Effectiveness of IGA groups**

In the transition phase of the projects, community members were mobilised by the ADP through SHIMACHI to form IGA groups. The current study, therefore, sought to determine whether IGA groups continued to function. Study results indicate that

74% of respondents disagreed that IGA groups continued to function effectively. The reasons behind, according to the chairperson of SHIMACHI and participants of FGD were infirm management of the groups themselves and failure of SHIMACHI to meet their expectations, particularly, provision of soft loans. This study established that most IGA groups were either inactive or had collapsed altogether. For example, the livestock keeping group was entrusted to take care of a cattle dip that was repaired by the ADP. The group started in 2008 and by 2009 its members had rose to 20. Up to October 2011, however, group members had dropped to 4. According to the group chairperson, it had offered cattle dipping service only once and had no feasible prospect to continue providing cattle dipping service to livestock keepers due to infirm management and shortage of water for livestock dipping (caused by persistent drought). Put generally, IGA groups had either collapsed or poorly performing. As such, the exit strategy was not successful in ensuring that IGA groups continue to function effectively.

#### **4.4 Project attribution**

Under this sub section the interest was to find out what had brought about changes which community members considered significant in their area. FGD members were asked to describe how the situation would have been in the absence of the ADP. Thereafter, they were asked to find out what had brought those changes. After a short while discussion, FGD members attributed a number of changes to the ADP. These included: Use of farm yard manure, ox ploughs, improved seeds, planting cereals in lines and growing paddy for both food and cash. Further inquisition on the role of public extension officers revealed that although they were present in the area, their

presence was hardly felt because they did not reach as many people as the ADP did. It was also found that in recent years, the use of farm yard manure and planting in lines had been made compulsory by the district authorities.

#### **4.5 Challenges experienced during designing and implementation exit strategies**

The current study was found that a number of challenges were encountered in the course of designing and implementation of exit strategies, including: Persistent drought, belated planning of the exit strategies, inadequate opportunities for SHIMACHI leaders to assume responsibility, limited community support towards SHIMACHI and inadequate of funds.

##### **4.5.1 Persistent drought**

Chipanga ADP is located in a semi arid area that experiences repeated cycles of drought. According to the PC and 2009 Annual Progress Report, between 2006 and 2009 Chipanga area experienced consecutive long dry spells that severely affected agriculture production leading to food shortage and insecurity. About 88% of all households in the division (study area inclusive) suffered from critical food shortage due to prolonged drought. The drought incidences coincided with the period when the Agriculture and Food Security and Leadership Development projects were implementing the exit strategies. The findings support Gardner *et al.* (2005) who noted that that recurrent cycle of drought presents a challenge to not only planning but also implementation of exit strategies.

#### **4.5.2 Belated planning of the exit strategies**

According to the PC and DM&E, the exit strategies were not formulated from the inception of the programme and projects. This made it impossible to refine and assess it so as to make necessary changes to reflect the changing circumstances and lessons learned prior to implementation of the strategies. Late formulation of the strategies inevitably, affected negatively effective implementation of the strategies.

#### **4.5.3 Inadequate opportunities for SHIMACHI leaders to assume responsibility**

Although the exit strategies were implemented for three years SHIMACHI leaders lacked the opportunity to assume their new roles during the transition period. According to SHIMACHI chairperson and FGD participants, ADP staff continued to hold their position up to the point of their departure; denying SHIMACHI leaders an opportunity to gain experience. Under such circumstance, up to the point of project phase out, the ability and commitment of SHIMACHI leaders and other stakeholders to meet their new roles could not be gauged out. These results highlight incongruence between project design on paper and plans (of action), on one hand, and what actually occurs in the implementation of development projects, on the other.

#### **4.5.4 Limited community supports towards SHIMACHI**

During the transition period, community members were mobilised to join with SHIMACHI by forming IGA groups. Among other benefits, they would be eligible SHIMACHI members. Accordingly to SHIMACHI chairperson, by 2008, IGA

groups had amounted 96. Nonetheless, the figure had dropped to 33 in the subsequent year. The reason for such withdrawal, according to the chairperson of SHIMACHI, was failure of SHIMACHI to meet expectation of community members including supplying them with improved goats, chicken and financial loans. That failure, in turn, angered community members; some withdrew from SHIMACHI while others declined to pay their annual membership fees.

#### **4.5.5 Limited follow ups**

In its bid to realise transformational development, the ADP conducted trainings and in some cases provided material support to community members. Despite these well intended efforts, FGD participants and the chairperson of the ADP resented that there was limited follow up to track and ascertain whether trained individuals really made use of the knowledge and skills acquired. The issue of limited follow up also featured out after project graduation whereas, in principle, World Vision has no lucid policy of making follow up on the progress of the local organisation put in place (WVT, 2007). According to WVI (2007) post programme evaluation can only be conducted if there is a special need for so doing. As such, it is impossible for the organisation to judge the effectiveness of their exit strategies.

#### **4.5.6 Inadequate funds**

Study findings have shown that a number of activities were not implemented in the final year of the project due to inadequate funds. This affected accomplishment of projects target set. Inadequate funds further had affected the capability of SHIMACHI to undertake its responsibilities as envisaged in its constitution.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### 5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Conclusion

The current study assessed the effectiveness of exit strategies in development projects in Tanzania through two selected projects in Bahi district. Based on study findings, the study has drawn same conclusions with respect to study objectives.

Study findings have shown that the exit strategies were formulated three years before projects phase out. For that reason, the exit strategies adopted were neither refined nor assessed before their implementation. Besides, some elements of the exit strategies were inadequately implemented. Study findings have further shown that food security had not improved due to persistent drought and over reliance on erratic rain fed agriculture. The study has also shown that SHIMACHI suffered from weak managerial and financial capabilities, and mastery of necessary skills. Based on these findings, the current study concludes that not only were the exit strategies adopted for the implementation of the Agriculture and Food Security and the Leadership Development projects designed towards the end of the project and inadequately implemented but also were not effective as they failed to sustain both activities and benefits attained by the two projects intervened. It is further concluded that various challenges both internal and external to the projects adversely affected effective implementation of the exit strategies.

## **5.2 Recommendations**

Based on the conclusion drawn, this study recommends the following:

### **5.2.1 Development practitioners/World Vision Tanzania**

- (i) Exit strategies should be formulated from the inception of development projects/programmes. This would help identify risk factors that would affect sustainability and subsequent success as early as possible. In the course of project implementations, modifications should be made to the strategy so as to accommodate changes that occur in the course of project development.
- (ii) Mobilisation of adequate funds for transition period from the project donor and/or other donors, within and outside the country. This should also include funding for post programme evaluation which would enable drawing lessons and feedback from previous transitions. Internal alternatives for strengthening resources bases should include adoption of economic models rather than merely relying on membership and annual fees.
- (iii) In situations where phase over takes place prior to “adequate empowerment” of local CBOs set in place, sponsors involved in the interventions should rehearse with Regional Administrative Secretaries so as to arrange for local CBO set in place to be affiliated to local government authorities in their respective districts. This will enable them to get the much missed, but highly needed, technical support and capacity via district Community Development Department office.

(iv) In areas experiencing unreliable rainfall, for which agriculture is dependent, sponsors of project interventions should establish diversified livelihood strategies that could contribute to resilience to climatic hazards. This can include establishment of min irrigation schemes that can help to overcome prolonged drought and erratic rainfall.

### **5.2.2 SHIMACHI management**

SHIMACHI should review its constitution to make it more responsive to community needs and strengthen its economic base and that of its members.

### **5.3 Suggestions for further studies**

The current study assessed the effectiveness of exit strategies based on two projects that were implemented by the same ADP. Further studies should undertake comparative study to compare projects in which no systematic exit strategy was employed with projects in which a systematic exit process was implemented. The latter project should have formulated the strategy from the beginning.

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## APPENDICES

### **Appendix 1: Interviewee consent form**

I am Jeremiah Vedastus Mkomagi, a researcher from Sokoine University of Agriculture, Morogoro. I am researching on the “Effectiveness of Exit Strategies on Sustainability of Development Projects in Tanzania: A Case Study of Selected World Vision Tanzania Projects”. The selected projects are Leadership Development, and Agriculture and Food Security projects under the former Chipanga Area Development Programme.

In order to accomplish my study, I would like to interview you on some issues based on your knowledge and experience about the above mentioned projects. I have obtained permission from my University, the District Executive Director (DED) and the World Vision Tanzania Central Zonal Manager. Study findings will specifically enable World Vision, projects managers and community members explore lessons that can enable them to adjust their intervention strategy for existing project and/or improve the design of subsequent projects to make them more sustainably managed by community members.

Data collected in this interview, including digital recordings and transcripts, will be treated with confidentiality. Should you choose to participate in my study, any information obtained through our interviews and my observations will be treated with confidentiality. I hope you allow me to continue with the interview.

**Thanks**

## **Appendix 2: Interview guide for the DM&E officer**

**Date of interview.....Place.....Duration (hours) .....**

1. Who was the sponsor of the Food Security and Leadership Development projects?
2. What project activities were supported?
3. What supports were provided by the sponsor/WVT?
4. Which criteria were used by sponsor /WVT to determine when and how to exit?
5. In view of project sustainability, what project benefits were to be continued, by whom and how?
6. Upon phase over, does WVT continue to have ongoing relationship with the CBO (SHIMACHI)? If yes, continue with question 7. If no, continue with question 7.
7. Why and in which ways? Continue with question 8.
8. Why not? Continue with question 9.
9. Referring to project definition, management and community support, which challenges were encountered in the course of implementing the exit strategy?
10. How were they remedied?

**Thank you for participating in this study**

### **Appendix 3: Interview guide for Project Coordinator**

**Date of interview.....Place.....Duration (hours).....**

1. Was the exit strategies formulated from the beginning of the ADP?

If yes, continue with 2. If no, go to question 6.

2. Who were involved?
3. What exit activities (as distinct from programme activities) were planned?
4. Why was it important to plan for the exit by this time?
5. Which strategies were planned to enforce the strategies?

Continue with question 9.

6. Why was the exit strategy not formulated from the beginning of the ADP?
7. When was it formulated?
8. Did later formulation of the exit strategy affect its implementation? If yes, how and which alternatives were available? Continue with question 9.
9. Did the ADP establish partnerships with local or foreign organisations, either in private or public sector to support the transition period and/or the new organisation upon exit? If yes, continue with question 10. If no, go to question 13.
10. Which organisation(s) did the programme establish partnership with?
11. What kinds of partnership(s) were developed?
12. What roles and responsibilities were to be played by these partners during and after transition? Continue with question 15.
13. Why were the partnership not developed? Continue with question 14.

14. Which arrangements were made to ensure that local organizations continue to have access to the resources they need after the programme end? Continue with question 15.
15. Did the ADP facilitate the establishment of a new organisation/institution that would assume responsibility for adapting development activities and maintaining their benefits? If yes, continue with question 16, if no go to question 18.
16. What is the name of that organisation?
17. When was it established?
18. Were household beneficiaries involved in capacity building by the projects? If yes, continue with question 19. If no, go to question 23
19. When was it built in the course of project cycle? Before transition, during transition or both?
20. How were they capacitated?
21. Who capacitated them?
22. In which areas (capabilities)? Continue with question 25.
23. Why capacity building was not done?
24. Which alternatives were available? Continue with question 25.
25. Were financial resources mobilized for the transition?  
If yes continue with question 26. If no, go to question 28.
26. Who provided financial resources for the transition period?
27. Were plans made for strengthening financial resource base for that organisation? If yes, continue with question 28. If no, go to question 29.

28. Which alternative sources of fund were put in place? Continue with question 29.
29. Were the exit strategies refined by the time of midterm evaluation?  
If yes, continue with question 30. If no, continue with question 32.
30. Which modifications were made?
31. How useful were they during the transition period? Continue with question 32
32. Why was the exit strategies not refined? Continue with question 33.
33. Were the exit strategies assessed during end of programme evaluation?  
If yes, continue with question 34. If no, go to question 36.
34. Which modifications were made?
35. How effective were they during the transition period? Go to question 37.
36. Why was the exit strategies not assessed before implementation? Continue with question 37.
37. For how long were the exit strategies implemented?
38. Who were involved in implementing exit activities?
39. Were all planned activities implemented? If no, continue with question 40. If yes, go to question 42.
40. Which activities were not implemented?
41. Why? Continue with question 42.
42. Do you think the allotted time sufficed for a gradual transferring of project portfolio (activities and resources) to a local institution? If no, why? Continue with question 43.
43. Which projects activities were to be sustained by individuals /groups?
44. Which projects activities were to be sustained by the new organisation?

45. Which project resources were to be sustained by the new organisation?
46. Which project benefits were to be sustained by the new organisation?
47. Were leaders in the new organisation involved in management of programme activities and resources during transition period? If yes, continue with question
48. If no, go to question 50.
48. In which posts/capacity areas?
49. Which skills were needed by leaders in the new organisation to accomplish their mission effectively? Continue with question 51.
50. Why not?
51. Which alternative were opted for to capacitate them with required skill?
52. Upon exit, were physical infrastructures (Buildings, office equipments, transport facilities, work facilities, etc.) established by the projects submitted to the new organisation? If yes, in which terms. If no, why?
53. Upon phase over, does WVT continue to have ongoing relationship with the new organisation?
54. Referring to project definition, management and community support, which challenges were encountered in the course of implementing the exit strategy?

**Thank you for participating in this study**

#### **Appendix 4: Focus group discussion guide**

**Discussion date .....Place..... Number of participants.....**

Theme 1: Designing and implementation of exit strategies

Sub theme 1.1: Elements of exit strategies and their implementation

Question: How effective were the designing and implementation of exit strategies?

Theme 2: Success of exit strategies

Sub theme 2.1: Projects impact

Question2.1: Which long lasting changes were generated by Leadership Development and Agriculture and Food Security projects?

Sub theme 2.2: Project activities

Question: Which project activities were to be continued by individuals and the CBO?

Sub theme2.3: Effective functioning of organisations, groups or individuals trained

Question 2.1: Do the organisation for which project management responsibilities were vested perform its roles effectively?

Theme 3: Challenges of implementing exit strategies

Sub theme3.1: Project definition and management

Question: What challenges were encountered during implementation of exit strategies?

**Thank you for participating in this study**

### **Appendix 5: Interview guide for the local CBO Chairperson**

1. Since sponsor's exit, has the number of beneficiaries and project resources increased or decreased? By how much and Why?
2. Are there any partnership between the CBO (SHIMACHI) and other institutions, private or public? If yes, what are these? How is the organisation benefiting from that partnership? If no, how does SHIMACHI access various resources (human, fund, material) needed for its operations?
3. What activities and support were to be continued by SHIMACHI? Since sponsor's exit, are these activities continued? If yes, are they continued in the same or modified format? Do you think these activities address felt needs of beneficiaries? If no, which activities are no longer done?
4. Do you think SHIMACHI has managed to sustain benefits generated by the ADP through food security and leadership projects? If yes, which supports SHIMACHI provides to community members? If no, which benefits have not been sustained? Why?
5. Are measures taken to sustain progress made by projects under the WVT? If yes, what steps? If no, why?
6. Do you think the organisation still need ongoing relationship with the donor/ WVT? If yes, why? How has the organisation been relating with WVT since its exit? If no, why not?
7. What factors have contributed to continuity or lack of sustainability of the benefits arising from the projects?
8. Which challenges were encountered during programme transition period?

**Thank you for participating in this study**

## **Appendix 6: Interview schedule for household members**

### **Part A: Background information**

1. Name of ward.....Date of interview.....
2. Name of village..... Sub village.....
3. Name of respondent.....Household code
4. Household size.....
5. Age of respondent.....
6. Education level of respondent
  - 1) Primary
  - 2) Secondary
  - 3) Tertiary
  - 4) Illiterate
7. Main occupation of respondent
  1. Peasant
  - 2) Employee
  - 3) Petty trader
8. Sex of respondent
  - 1) Male
  - 2) Female
9. Marital status of respondent
  - 1) Married
  - 2) Widow/widower
  - 3) Single
  - 4) Divorced

### **Part B: Project activities**

10. When did you start involving with the Area Development Programme (ADP) interventions?
  - 1) From its very beginning

- 2) Sometime after it had started
- 3) Shortly before sponsor/WVT ended the programme
- 4) After sponsor/WVT had exited

11. Are you still involved in project activities under SHIMACHI?

- 0) No
- 1) Yes

12. In which project(s) was you involved in under the ADP?

- 1) Leadership development
- 2) Agriculture and Food Security
- 3) Both leadership development and agriculture and food security

13. If involved in the Agriculture and Food Security Project, what project activities were you involved and supported by the ADP?

| <b>Project Activity (circle)</b> | <b>Details (specify)</b> |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Improved livestock keeping       |                          |
| Improved crop farming            |                          |
| Petty business                   |                          |

14. Are you still involved in (all) those activities?

- 0) No
- 1) Yes

If no, continue with question 16; if yes go to question 18.

15. Which activities have you dropped? .....

16. Why?.....

What is the status of those activities? Write in the column labeled status by using the codes 1) expanded 2) modified 3) declined 4) sustained (continued in the same way). Finally, give explanations

| <b>Activity</b>              | <b>Status</b> | <b>Explanation(s)</b> |
|------------------------------|---------------|-----------------------|
| 1.Improved livestock keeping |               |                       |
| 2. Crop farming              |               |                       |
| 3. Petty business            |               |                       |

17. Which of the following organisation did you receive support from?

- 1) World Vision Tanzania through Chipanga ADP
- 2) SHIMACHI
- 3) Both World Vision Tanzania and SHIMACHI

18. The table below has various kinds of support that were offered by the ADP and SHIMACHI. As a beneficiary, specify the kind of support you got by ticking in the columns labeled 1 and 2 to represent WVT and SHIMACHI, respectively.

| <b>Material support</b>           | <b>1</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>Technical Support (trainings)</b>            | <b>1</b> | <b>2</b> |
|-----------------------------------|----------|----------|---|----------|----------|
| 1. Subsidized ox plough           |          |          | 1.Improved farming techniques                   |          |          |
| 2.Subsidized improved seeds       |          |          | 2. Market linkage                               |          |          |
| 3.Drought resistant cassava seeds |          |          | 3. Leadership, management and financial control |          |          |
| 4.subsidized Cart                 |          |          | 4. Entrepreneurial skills                       |          |          |
| 5. Cattle dipping                 |          |          | 5. Regular farm visits by VAFs                  |          |          |
| 6.Exposure visits                 |          |          |   |          |          |

19. What is the status of support provision under the SHIMACHI?

Use codes: 1) improved 2) sustained 3) declined

| <b>Support Kind</b> | <b>Status</b> | <b>Example(s)</b> | <b>Reason(s)</b> |
|---------------------|---------------|-------------------|------------------|
| 1. Material         |               |                   |                  |
|                     |               |                   |                  |
| 2. Trainings        |               |                   |                  |
|                     |               |                   |                  |

### **Part C: Project impact**

20. Below are a series of statements about project impact among supported household members since WVT exited. Please, select one of the five choices provided that most closely corresponds to your opinion. Use the codes: 1) Strongly disagree 2) Disagree 3) No difference 4) Agree 5) Strongly agree

| <b>Statement</b>  | <b>Opinion</b> |
|---|----------------|
| Household income has increased  |                |
| If strongly disagree/disagree, why?   |                |
| If strongly agree/agree which income sources have increased/diversified?            |                |
| Farming is mainly done by using ox ploughs  |                |
| If strongly disagree/disagree, specify the kind of tools you used last season? Why? |                |
| The use of improved seeds has increased   |                |
| If strongly disagree/disagree, which seed variety did you use? Why?                 |                |
| IGA groups continue to function effectively   |                |
| If strongly disagree/disagree, Why?   |                |
| Village Agriculture Facilitators visit farmers regularly                            |                |
| If strongly disagree/disagree, why?   |                |
| Improved livestock husbandry has been widely practiced                              |                |
| If strongly disagree/disagree, why?   |                |
| If strongly agree/agree, which husbandry?   |                |
| Household food security has improved  |                |
| If strongly disagree/disagree, continue with question 2.                            |                |
| If agree, go to question 23   |                |

21. Choose the correct response on Household Food Insecurity. If your answer is Yes, Use codes: 1) Rarely (once or twice in the past four week) 2) Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) 3) Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) to indicate frequency.

| <b>Household experience in past four weeks</b>   | <b>No<br/>(X)</b> | <b>Yes<br/>(✓)</b> | <b>Frequency</b>                   | <b>1</b> | <b>2</b> | <b>3</b> |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|------------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|
| Did you worry that your household would not have enough food?  |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |
| You or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because of a lack of resources?   |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |
| Did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources?   |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |
| Did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food? |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |
| Did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed because there was not enough food?                                   |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |
| Did you or other household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was not enough food?  |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |
| Was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get food?  |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |
| Did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food?   |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |
| Did you or any household member go a whole day and night without eating anything because there was not enough food?                                      |                   |                    | 1=Rarely<br>2=sometimes<br>3=often |          |          |          |

#### **Part D: Effective functioning of organisations and individuals trained**

22. What is your opinion regarding the performance of the CBO? Use the codes: 1) Very unsatisfactory 2) Unsatisfactory 3) Not sure 4) Satisfactory 5) Very satisfactory.

| <b>Statement</b>   | <b>Opinion</b> | <b>Comment/example<br/>(if any)</b> |
|--|----------------|-------------------------------------|
| Ability to generate fund for the organisation  |                |                                     |
| Ability to network community members or IGA groups with external organisations for sponsorship |                |                                     |
| Ability to plan activities   |                |                                     |
| Ability to implement activities  |                |                                     |
| Ability to monitor activities  |                |                                     |
| Ability to manage CBO resources  |                |                                     |
| Ability to manage conflicts  |                |                                     |
| Ability to hold meetings regularly   |                |                                     |
| Ability to provide trainings (to both staff and members)                                       |                |                                     |
| Ability for SHIMACHI staff and members to adhere to self established standards and values      |                |                                     |
| Ability to make innovations and respond to challenges  |                |                                     |
| Ability to create positive image of the organisation by delivering quality services.           |                |                                     |
| Ability to continually make improvement in service delivery                                    |                |                                     |

#### **Part E: Challenges experienced in implementing the exit strategy**

23. Community members were involved in preparing the exit strategy

0) No 1) Yes 2) I don't know

0) The leaders of SHIMACHI were actively involved in managing the implementation of the exit strategy 0) No 1) yes 2) I don't know

24. There was adequate information sharing between community members and the ADP management about the exiting process

0) No 1) Yes 2) I don't know

**Thank you for participating in this study**

**Appendix 7: Observation guide**

- 1) Presence of manure in farms which had been prepared for cultivation.
- 2) If farms were cultivated by using ox ploughs.
- 3) Presence of agro vets.
- 4) Presence of poultry sheds.
- 5) Assets handed over to SHIMACHI by the ADP.
  - (i) Office block
  - (ii) Furniture
  - (iii) Transport facilities
  - (iv) Office equipment